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ABSTRACT
The dissertation investigation proposes a modified supply chain management model that is
grounded on marketing theory and the concept of production sharing. Specifically, the model challenges
the traditional cooperation-conflict continuum of strategic marketing management with a new
managerial approach based on a cooperation-competition continuum. I investigate the significance of
the new model in explaining behaviors in the supply chain management and its performance. In
addition, I investigate whether the proposed managerial continuum (cooperation-competition) is
consistent with other behaviors including power, conflict, trust, and customer relationship marketing
such that coordination and supply chain performance is enhanced.
The data collection from manufacturers, tier 1 and tier 2 suppliers was completed in the Mexican
auto industry. Eight of the top auto manufacturers and multiple suppliers in Mexico, U.S., Europe and
Asia participated in the study. Results from the investigation show support for competition as a
relational managerial strategy as an alternative to cooperation. There is also support for the relationship
between the continuum and value added return. A Partial Least Squares analysis of the data shows
support for the relationships between the continuum and opportunism, trust, and conflict. Managerial
and research implications from the study are highlighted as well as the future research opportunities.
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INTRODUCTION, THEORETICAL EXPLANATION, AND SUPPLY
CHAIN CONCEPTS AND MANAGEMENT
“Marketing channels are perhaps the most numerous
and economically most important Interorganizational
networks in any society.” (Reve and Stern, 1979, p. 405)

In recent years, distribution research has focused more on the study of
collaboration/cooperation strategies as the primary means to achieve coordination between
buyers and suppliers (Jap, 1999; Vasquez et al, 2005) than on any other alternative management
strategy. In fact this emerging strategic orientation has been earmarked the key to managing
customer-seller relationships in order to improve value creation and customer’s competitive
advantage (Anderson and Narus 1991; Cardozo et al 1992; Day 2000; Dunn and Thomas 1994;
Dyer and Sing 1998; Ford 2001; Grönroos 1997; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Walter et al 2003).
Chen et al (2004) referred to these strategies as strategic collaboration, the building of dynamic
capabilities necessary for the supplier-buyer dyad to achieve sustainable competitive advantage.
Hunt and Davis (2012) have designated collaboration/cooperation strategies as “a grounding” for
specific research designed to advance knowledge in distribution and supply chain management.
Previously, power was the dominant research tradition for distribution research as
evidenced by various seminal studies (El Ansary and Stern, 1972; Hunt and Nevin, 1974; Lusch
1976; Etgar 1977; Frazier and Summers, 1986; and others) stimulated particularly by Emerson
(1962) and French and Raven’s (1959) characterizations of power. However, knowledge
advances. Although controversial, certain authors have challenged power’s dominant role by
claiming that distribution relationships are no longer power-based (Vazquez, 2005; Chen and
Paulraj, 2004).

In relationship marketing, power is considered alien to effective working

relationships (Hingley, 2005; Doney and Cannon, 1997; Brethner and Carswell, 2002; Pole And
1

Haskell, 2002). Power asymmetry is detrimental to building quality relationships and to
sustaining them (Gummesson, 1994; Naude and Buttle, 2000). Intensely controversial, the
power debate has not been settled.
As indicated, collaboration/cooperation strategies between firms have emerged as the
dominant research tradition within academic and industry literature. Will this new tradition last?
The dilemma is that the majority of these studies of power and collaboration/cooperation were
done during a period (1970 to 2001) of sustained economic growth. The traditional model of
channel member behavior that reflects this business environment is based on a hierarchical
system coordinated vertically and controlled by a manufacturing firm. Achrol and Etzel (2003)
maintain that a new business and distribution environment exists today, one that is much more
dynamic and unstable. This environment is characterized by redistribution of marketing
functions and the symmetry of power and coordination. Flexibility and adaptation are
requirements because strategies and goals are dynamic and subject to rapid change (Macneil
1980; Achrol and Kotler 1999; Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001; Weitz and Jap 1995).
Today, globalization and the global economic crisis demand a review of conventional
thinking. Globalization and the global economic crisis have made demand markets more
complex and uncertain thereby mandating superior performance and commitment between
parties (Sheu and Hu 2009). Events in the global economy recently have significantly impacted
the concept of supply chain and supply chain management. The global market is in turmoil.
Europe is struggling with negative economic growth. The United States is showing modest
growth. Even the major emerging markets such as Brazil, China and India are challenged.
An industry hit hard by the global economic crisis is the automotive sector, particularly in
the U.S., Europe and Japan. General Motors’ bankruptcy caused the firm to reconfigure its
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downstream supply chain. Numerous dealer franchise operations and factories were closed. Ford
Motor Company and others have demanded across-the-board cost reductions from upstream
suppliers. Ford has reduced its global supplier base from more than 5,000 to 850 (Torres, 2011).
Eleven of fourteen major auto suppliers filed for reorganization or declared bankruptcy
(McKinnon, 2008). A major auto supplier, Delphi, has dramatically reduced its supplier base
(Gutierrez, 2011). While 2012 has been a good year for U.S. automotive sales, supplier-buyer
relationships continue to reflect a state of chaos within which the traditional model of supply
chain management, particularly the strategic collaboration perspective, is challenged. Given
business uncertainty and an asymmetric distribution of benefits among supply chain partners,
opportunism and other self-serving behaviors represent a real threat to the role of strategic
collaboration (Scheer et al 2003; Nyaga, 2010). However, the dynamic global business
environment offers opportunity for new approaches to the supply chain and its management.

THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THIS RESEARCH PROJECT

The purpose of this research is to propose a new revised model of supply chain
management wherein

relational strategies

for managing relationships fall along a

cooperation/competition continuum (Blind et al 2012; Michie and Sibley 1985; Dagnino and
Padula 2002; Quintana-G. and Benevides-V, 2004, Chen 2008). The research project analyzes
the extent to which buyers and suppliers utilize cooperation, competition, or combination thereof
(co-opetition), strategies to manage their relationships and improve coordination necessary to
achieve sustained competitive advantage. In contrast, the traditional model of channel member
behavior based management strategies on a cooperation/conflict continuum (Robicheaux and El
Ansary, 1975). I argue, and propose, that the revised model fits better with today’s global
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business environment. While the objective of supply chain management remains coordination,
the revised model proposes that coordination can be better achieved by the relational managerial
strategies cooperation, competition or co-opetition.
My research specifically treats competition as a relational managerial strategy in contrast
to Neo-Classical Economics which treats competition as an external environmental condition
between two parties (Schmidt and Kochan, 1972; Michie and Sibley, 1979; Hunt and Davis,
2012). For example, LaCoste (2012) treated price competition (a non-relational, Neo-classical
construct) as an alternative strategy to relational cooperation between competitive suppliers.
Based on Game and Resource Advantage (RA) Theories, I consider relational competition to be
an alternative managerial strategy to relational cooperation. In addition, I explain the relational
cooperation-competition paradigm in terms of achieving positive, acceptable returns (superior
financial performance) from the dynamic supply chain business relationship. If the returns are
unacceptable, I hypothesize this leads to opportunism, that is, the resulting conflict between the
parties becomes dysfunctional and the relationship is likely to be terminated. If successful, the
study results may redirect research and business practice from the traditional cooperationconflict strategic management continuum towards the relational, strategic cooperationcompetition management paradigm.
As mentioned, this study modifies the traditional model of channel member behavior
specifically for the global supply chain business environment. First, traditional marketing
divided the supply chain into its upstream versus downstream segments by focusing primarily on
the latter, that is, consumer marketing distribution. The downstream “channel of distribution”
differs from the upstream “supplier” segment in that the former distributes the final product that
the latter has created. This distinction is significant in that the mindsets of downstream and
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upstream participants differ. Upstream suppliers tend to focus on “total cost of business” per
manufacturers’ directives; downstream distributors tend to focus on customer value as indicated
by price. Except for the manufacturer, downstream and upstream participants lack reciprocal
understanding of their respective roles within the supply chain system (Faulkner 2002). This
study is limited to those business relationships that exist within the upstream “manufacturersupplier” segment. Second, the new revised model tests a proposed cooperation/competition
continuum for its relevance in the management of dyadic relationships between manufacturer
and first order supplier, and the first and second order suppliers within this upstream segment.
The study also investigates the role of customer relationship marketing (CRM) within the
upstream business environment. CRM is a market segment strategy designed to incentivize high
volume users to remain brand loyal. To date, CRM has not been investigated in a global
production sharing, supply chain setting. Understanding CRM’s potential role in supply chain
management would be an important contribution to marketing and industry.
This dissertation is organized in the following manner. Chapter 1 contains a literature
review of the major theories that explain distribution and supply chain management as well as
descriptive discussions of the supply chain concept and supply chain management. Chapter 2
contains a literature review of the traditional model of channel member behavior and its key
behavioral constructs. It is presented such that the revised model can be positioned relative to the
model and its significant behavior research contributions. Chapter 3 sets forth the revised model
of supply chain management, its key behavioral constructs, the relational cooperationcompetition management continuum and the research hypotheses. The model also integrates the
customer-oriented, customer relationship marketing (CRM) to investigate its role in supply chain
management. In Chapter 4, I discuss the research methodology and design including the sample
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design, questionnaire design and development of the survey. Chapter 5 presents the tests of
significance used to evaluate the hypotheses and the research findings. Finally, Chapter 6
discusses the research and practical implications of the research findings. It concludes with a
section on the research limitations and recommendations for future research.
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CHAPTER 1: MARKETING DISTRIBUTION’S THEORETICAL
FOUNDATIONS – A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The literature review is divided into two sections: a) the review of the major theories that
explain marketing distribution and the supply chain; and b) discussions of the supply chain
concept and supply chain management.

1.1 THEORIES OF MARKETING, DISTRIBUTION AND THE SUPPLY CHAIN

Among the plethora of theoretical explanations of distribution behavior and business
practice, seven theories are germane to this project. The following discussion provides an
overview of these theories as they pertain to the supply chain and its management. These are:
Game Theory, Resource Base Theory, Resource Advantage Theory, the Theory of Market
Processes (Transvection Theory), Transaction Cost Theory, The Theory of Relationship
Marketing and the Theory of Production Sharing.
Game Theory consists of a set of analytical tools intended to help us observe, understand
and anticipate the interactions with others and to apply these tools to enhance decision making
and strategic outcomes (Osborne and Rubinsetin, 1994). Game Theory evolved from World War
II during which military strategists sought to anticipate the movements of opposition forces
rather than follow their expected (normative) behaviors, that is, they anticipated their opponent’s
actions as part of the strategic decision making process (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1997).
Numerous authors have investigated the relevance of game theory for business
(Chatterjee and Lilian 1986; Chatterjee and Samuelson, 2001; Eliashberg and Lilian 1993;
Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1997). Anupindi et al (2001) and Cachon and Netessine (2006)
stated that game theory has direction application in supply chain management. They tout it as an
essential tool for the analysis of the supply chain’s multiple agents who often have conflicting
7

objectives. Anticipating another’s actions has direct application because business is a game you
actively attempt to influence or shape. Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1997) and Faulkner (2002)
recognized that business is not simply winning or losing the game, nor is it about how well you
play it. They recognized that firms can succeed without their partners or competitors failure and
firms can fail despite having played the game business situation well. In order to succeed, you
must know how to play the right game which the authors attribute to game theory.
Game Theory is also consistent with Alderson’s Transvection, Resource Base, and
Hunt’s Resource Advantage Theories. The theory has evolved to recognize business and supply
chains are dynamic, disequilibrium-seeking, nonzero sum relationships that focus on value
creation. The relationships have a synergistic total value added. A specific member must identify
this total value and determine what value remains without his participation. The difference is the
member’s value added relative to the total and other members. The member’s relative power to
set the rules that govern the relationships within the system determine his ability to add-to and/or
to protect his value added position. His power is attributable to his ability to control critical
resources and/or customer markets (Cachon and Netessine, 2006).
The theory’s key contributions to business strategy include a) its recognition that by
understanding your business partner’s knowledge base and patterns of behavior given different
situations you can redefine the business opportunity (or game) and b) game management is
achieved by incorporating into the decision making process cooperation and competition as
viable relational managerial strategies (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1997).
Resource Base Theory of the Firm states that firms are combiners of resources that are
heterogeneous and imperfectly mobile. These firms operate in industries characterized by
imperfect information. Critical to the theory is the creation of market value in products and
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services desired by customers. Given the nature of the business environment, firms have access
to technologies, competencies, capabilities and various organizational structures that can be
superior to other firms (Hunt and Davis 2012). Blind et al (2012) positioned supply chain
management more directly within Resource Base Theory. They indicated that the theory was
directly associated with cooperative, relational marketing. They cited knowledge acquisition as
critical to competitive advantage. Knowledge acquired, assimilated or transformed from other
disciplines or industries facilitated competitive advantage (Kessler et al 2000; Kogut and Zander
1996). Information search accesses asset specific knowledge valuable to the firm (DeSarbo et al
2007; Wang et al 2009) and competitors could provide valuable information made available
using cooperative strategies (Grant and Baden-Fuller 1995).
In addition, market researchers have associated collaboration with value creation and
innovation. Collaboration supports differential advantage by providing access to markets,
technologies, reduced cost and risk, improved competitiveness, knowledge development,
exploitation and enhanced financial performance (Jorde and Teece 1989; Tsai 2002). Gnyawali
and Park (2011) and Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen (2009) found collaboration to increase
innovation.
Resource Base Theory is not a theory of competition, rather a supporter of collaboration,
and is credited with enabling firms who adopt collaborative management strategies to have
greater benefits and control over competitors than is possible by adopting competitive
relationships (Chen and Chen 2011; Quintana-Garcia and Benavides-Velasco 2004). Hence, in
resource base theory, competitive strategies are generally not a significant means by which
competitive advantage is achieved. An important point: Blind et al (2012) and LaCoste (2012)
consider cooperation and competition to exist on a single continuum; however, they treat
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cooperation as a relational management strategy and competition as a self-indulgent, aggressive
“action” more characteristic of Transaction Theory. Their concept of competition is
operationalized in its Neoclassical Economics role as traditional price competition. It is not
operationalized as a relational management strategy alternative to cooperation. As such, their
argument that cooperation and competition exist on a single continuum lacks internal
consistency, that is, both constructs are not relational in a behavioral sense.
In his development of Resource Advantage Theory (RA), Hunt adopted the Resource
Base Theory premises (except its foundation based on Neoclassical Economics) and the caveat
that intra-industry demand is heterogeneous to strengthen his positioning of RA theory vis-à-vis
Neoclassical Economics (Hunt and Davis, 2012). Hunt argues that RA Theory assumptions are
more realistic than the Neoclassical Theory of Competition. He presents RA Theory as “the first”
generalized theory of marketing. Given the theory’s breath and complexity and the author(s)
extensive writings to develop and justify the theory, only the essence of his conceptualization of
this critical contribution to marketing and distribution thought is discussed (Lusch, 2000).
As indicated, Hunt (2010) derived his theory based on several interdisciplinary
theoretical frameworks including Resource Base Theory, Alderson’s Theory of Marketing
Processes, Neo-Classical Economic Theory of Competition and several others (Hunt and Davis,
2008). RA Theory is an economic and “disequilibrium” theory of competition. His primary
thesis for competition is that it includes the theory of the organization. In contrast to Neoclassical economics reliance on the theory of perfect competition, he maintains perfect
competition is but a special case within the domain of competition.
competition exists in a state of disequilibrium.

10

In the real world,

The other basic tenants of RA Theory are: a) Demand is heterogeneous across and within
industries. Hence, demand is dynamic; b) Consumer and company information is imperfect and
expensive; c) A firm’s resources are neither static nor immobile, but imperfectly mobile to
include financial, physical, legal, human, organizational and informational; d) Human motivation
is explained as constrained self-interest seeking; e) The firm’s objective is not to maximize
profit, but to achieve superior financial performance; and f) The role of management is to
recognize, understand, create, select, implement and modify strategies.
Table 1.1 Foundational Premises of Perfect Competition and Resource-Advantage Theory 1
Premise
P1. Demand is
P2. Consumer information is
P3. Human motivation is
P4. The firm’s objective is
P5. The firm’s information is
P6. The firm’s resources are
P7. Resource characteristics
are
P8. The role of management is

P9. Competitive dynamics are

Perfect Competition Theory

Resource-Advantage Theory

heterogeneous across
industries, homogeneous
within industries and static

heterogeneous across
industries, heterogeneous
within industries, and dynamic

perfect and costless

imperfect and costly

self-interest maximization

constrained self-interest
seeking

profit maximization

superior financial performance

perfect and costless

imperfect and costly

capital, labor and land
homogeneous and perfectly
mobile
to determine the quantity and
implement production
function
equilibrium-seeking, with
innovation exogenous

1

financial, physical, legal,
human, organizational,
informational and relational
heterogeneous and imperfectly
mobile
to recognize, understand,
create, select, implement and
modify strategies
disequilibrium-provoking with
innovation endogenous

Source: Hunt, Shelby D. and Robert M. Morgan (1997), “Resource-Advantage Theory: A
Snake. Swallowing Its Tail or a General Theory of Competition,” Journal of Marketing, 61
(October), 74-82.
11

Hunt (2010) states that competition is evolutionary, disequilibrium provoking and a
process within which innovation and organizational learning are endogenous. Organizations and
consumers have imperfect information in which entrepreneurship, institutions and public policy
affect economic performance. Evolutionary theories of competition require units of selection to
be durable and heritable, that is, transferable to others with competition for comparative
advantages in resources constituting the selection process.
Because RA Theory combines heterogeneous demand theory with the resource based
theory of the firm, intra-industry demand is treated as heterogeneous with respect to consumer
tastes and preferences. As such, industries are considered collections of market segments. For an
industry to have different market segments, products must be “bundles of attributes” constituting
different market offerings. By definition, market segment tastes and preferences are considered
relatively homogeneous with regard to industry products and services.
Without getting into the theoretical detail, an organization achieves competitive
advantage by combining heterogeneous, imperfectly mobile resources (tangible and intangible)
to create market offerings. These resources include financial, physical, legal, human,
organizational, informational and relational. When combined with heterogeneous demand, the
resources provide significant diversity in size and scope of business performance within an
industry. Organizations combine these resources uniquely to create market offerings (products)
that are valued by some market segment(s). Firms have at least some resources, or combinations,
that are unique and these constitute comparative advantage in the marketplace. The
organization’s utilization of these resources to create unique market offerings provides
competitive advantage. These unique market offerings are the basis for superior financial
performance.

12

Hunt and Davis (2012) argue RA Theory is consistent with the concepts of supply chain
and supply chain management. While the theory explains value creation and superior financial
performance for the firm, it does so for the entire supply chain system, too. Competition for
comparative advantage involves firms looking outside themselves for critical resources. Many of
these resources are relational with customers, suppliers, competitors, government and unions, all
of which result from supply chain competition. Supply chains with abundant relational resources
may achieve higher levels of cooperation, coordination and value creation, that is, performance.
These statements are totally consistent with conclusions reached by researchers of supply chain
management.
Hunt (2010) considers Alderson’s (1965) Theory of Market Processes (Functionalist
Theory) to be the first credible effort to formulate a general theory of marketing. Alderson’s
theory is based on Chamberlin’s (1962) Theory of Heterogeneous Demand, Clark’s (1961)
Theory of Effective Competition, Merton (1968) Theory of Functionalist Systems and the
concept of a behavioral system. The system is a group of entities held together by an expectation
of some surplus value in excess of what they could attain by working alone. The group will
maintain the system so long as expectations are met. In fact, the system is designed to facilitate
cooperative interaction largely due to its shared goals (Alderson, 1965).
The system has boundaries within which there is cooperative interaction. Within each
system is a control group who determines the system’s plan of action and induces participation
of others on its own terms. System power is related to the power figure’s capacity including his
capacity to induce cooperation. The system may consist of a single or multiple organizations.
However, the plan of action will apply to all members. All resource allocations follow the
cooperative norm. If necessary to facilitate expected returns, the allocations may be distributed
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by competition internally. The allocations may be determined by the power figure applying
multiple criteria. Hence, Alderson’s theory is consistent with Resource Allocation Theory.
The essence of Alderson’s theory is the transvection. The transvection is defined as an
alternating sequence of sorts and transformations. The sort is an inventory, heterogeneous or
homogeneous, that assumes increasing intermediary or ultimate consumer value as the inventory
is transformed and progresses through the transvection process. Transformations are value added
changes to the inventory including physical (raw material to component to final product), spatial
(location) or symbolic (meaning such as brand).Within the transvection, institutions maintain
sorts in storage (merchant wholesalers and retailers) and perform physical (manufacturing),
spatial (transportation) and symbolic (promotion, branding) activities. The objective of the
transvection is to transform tangible and intangible resources from raw materials to an
assortment of goods that is valued by different intermediaries and ultimate consumers and return
profit to the transvection institutions (consistent with, or exceeding, expectations). Conceptually,
the channel of distribution is a subset of the transvection given that the former involves the
distribution and marketing of the final product and the latter the creation and development of the
final product (Michie 1975).
Alderson considered profit essential to the transvection’s survival. Companies and
employees collaborate because profitable performance is more likely generated by cooperative
activity than by working independently. Survival depends on transvections competing for the
patronage of intermediaries and ultimate consumers. If these institutions value your assortment
of goods more than those of competitors, your firm achieved differential advantage in the
marketplace. Alderson identified several bases of differential advantage: market segmentation,
the transvection, product innovation and modification, promotional appeals and process
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improvements. In short, Alderson’s theory is closely associated with heterogeneous demand and
supply and differential advantage. The marketing process is a matching process of demand with
supply at the institutional level(s). Exchange occurs when a match occurs. Hence, businesses
reliance on differential advantage and competition is a constant struggle to develop, maintain and
increase this advantage.
As mentioned, Hunt (2010) considered Alderson’s work a basis for his theory. RA theory
of Competition integrated Alderson’s differential advantage. While Alderson touted profit, RA
Theory focuses on superior financial performance (SFP). Both concepts occur under conditions
of heterogeneous demand and supply and imperfect and costly information about marketing
institutions:

market

segments,

competitors,

suppliers,

manufacturers,

investors

and

entrepreneurs. Both considered the objective financial rewards to be better than the industry
standard and all firms in the industry cannot be superior at the same time. Both rejected Neoclassical explanations of perfect competition, adopting dynamic competition with demand
stimulating product innovation and improvement. Both recognize the importance of differential
advantage. Both treat resources and markets as a basis for advantage. Both integrate various
marketing concepts including marketing strategy, marketing segments, and treat marketing
segmentation as a strategic tool.
Hunt (2010) says RA Theory extends Alderson’s work by setting up perfect competition
as a special case within the theory of competition; by considering competition a stimulus for
innovation; by recognizing that competition is a constant struggle for advantage over rivals; and
by expressing their theories descriptively, not mathematically.
Alderson and Hunt sought to develop generalized theories of marketing. The remaining
theories, of which there are many, can be classified as middle range theories given their more
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limited and specialized application. The two theories considered here are Transaction Cost and
Relationship Marketing. Although almost every transaction has a relational element, the essence
of Transaction Cost Theory is the individual sale. Its orientation is exogenous competition (selfinterest) and those risks associated with it (Blind et al 2012). The Knowledge Paradox Concept
and the behavioral tendency to inadvertently disclose information to collaborative, yet competing
partners explains risk (Cassiman and Vesigeler 2002). The paradox is that the market cannot
assess the value of knowledge until the knowledge has been disclosed. Its value is reduced
because once disclosed, the need for cooperation, or paying for the knowledge, is not necessary;
the partner has it (Blind et al 2012; Madhok 1997; Nickerson and Zenger 2004). Quintana-Garcia
and Benavides-Velasco (2004) claim this paradox creates an incentive for opportunism which
compromises the benefits of cooperation.
The goal of Transaction Cost Theory is to acquire a large number of buyers and
maximize the number of discrete exchanges with them. There is little interest expressed in
fulfilling the wants and needs of the customer or, for that matter, seeking a long term relationship
(Ferrell and Hartline, 2008). Transactional sales tend to characterize the marketing of commodity
products (transistors, resistors) for which there is a high degree of substitutability. Commodities
are often sold as individual orders solicited on a competitive basis; hence, the emphasis on price
or cost. Customers may be large, international manufacturing companies who, given power
asymmetry, may rely on overt power in the purchase of these goods (Palmer, 2007). While there
may be a relational element, Blois (1997) suggests firm behaviors reflect self-interest such that
asymmetric power and low level relational engagements may be behaviors used to pursue selfinterest.
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In contrast, Relationship Marketing is characterized by exchanges between parties who
have a history of business interaction and who have plans for future interactions (Weitz and Jap,
1995). Morgan and Hunt (1994) define relationship marketing as “all marketing activities
directed toward establishing, developing and maintaining, successful relational exchanges.”
This is the new paradigm shift that is underway in marketing (Day and Wensley, 1983; Kotler,
1991). Kotler & Armstrong (2004) and Webster (1992) have said that marketing as a field of
study and practice is being reconceptualized from transactions to relationships. Sheth and
Parvatiyar (1995) claim the essence of marketing is the relationship.
Consistent with Hunt’s RA Theory, relationship marketing is based on the management
of marketing activities and transaction specific investments as a means to achieve competitive
advantage and superior financial performance. However, beyond an emphasis on transactional
exchange, relationship marketing recognizes the joint performance of marketing activities that
result in value added for participants (Min et al 2005). These activities lead to trust, commitment,
satisfaction and performance. (Palmatier 2008; Doney and Cannon 1997; Geyskens et al 1999;
Monczka et al 1998; Whipple and Frankel 2000).

These benefits are supported by good

communications, satisfactory interactions, shared values and goals, functional conflict, a
balanced power or dependency and limited opportunistic behavior among the participants
(Anderson and Weitz, 1986, 1992).
This paradigm shift issue has been eloquently described and assessed by Hunt (2010) in
his book, Marketing Theory: Foundations, Controversy, Strategy, Resource-Advantage Theory.
In essence, the transactions approach is focused on an offering consisting of a core product and
different marketing mix strategies. In contrast, a relationship orientation focuses on creating
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value beyond the core product to include its service components in order to achieve customer
perceived quality and total value.
The debate is international. Gronroos (1994) traces the relationship orientation to
industrial and service marketing. He faults the North American School and the American
Marketing Association for championing the Marketing Mix Theory, a concept that lacks
theoretical underpinnings. Gronroos (1990) claims the marketing mix is nothing more than a list
of marketing variables that lack an integrative function or theory. He criticizes the marketing mix
as being production oriented, based on micro-economics. It alienates marketing from a total firm,
integrated concept. While the concept might apply to consumer goods marketing, it fails to meet
the relationship requirements that are clear in industrial and service marketing.
The Nordic School considers the dyadic relationship to be the fundamental theory of
marketing.

According to Harker (1999), the most representative definition of relationship

marketing and that accepted by the European Relationship Marketing community belongs to
Gronroos (1994). He states,
“Relationship marketing is to identify and establish, maintain and enhance and
when necessary also to terminate relationships with customers and other
stakeholders, at a profit, so that the objectives of all parties are met, and that this
is done by a mutual exchange and fulfillment of promises.”

Relationship marketing is not new (Gronroos, 1994; Nevin, 1995; Sheth & Parvatiyar,
1995; Weitz & Jap, 1995). Channel management research and practice has long recognized the
importance of managing dyadic relationships between people and firms performing distribution
functions, functions that create value by making products and services available to customers
providing time, place and form utilities (Alderson, 1965; Weitz and Jap, 1995). Relationship
marketing has been practiced internationally throughout the ages.
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Table 1.2: Major Characteristics of Transactional and Relationship Marketing 2
Criteria

Transactional Marketing

Relationship Marketing

Marketing Focus

Customer Acquisition

Customer Retention

Time Orientation

Short Term

Long Term

Marketing Goal

Make the Sale

Mutual Satisfaction

Relationship Focus

Create Exchanges

Create Value

Customer Service Priority

Low

High

Customer Contact

Low to Moderate

Frequent

Commitment to Customers

Low

High

Characteristics of the
Interaction

Adversarial, Manipulation,
Conflict Resolution

Cooperation, Trust, Mutual
Respect, Confidence

Source of Competitive
Advantage

Production, Marketing

Relationship Commitment

Sammiee and Walters (2003) completed a review of the empirical research conducted
with an international context. They tallied twenty-four studies with international relationship
marketing (IRM) implications, of which eight were studies across national boundaries. They
found the international research adopts the models and concepts used in U.S. studies. The
findings are no different. However, the researchers were critical of their global colleagues. A
problem with their research was the conceptual complexity of relationship marketing and a lack
of appropriate theoretical foundations and constructs. There was little replication of findings and
the lack of cultural diversity was questioned. None of the studies examined the dyad relationship
from the perspective of both partners. Most important, was the failure to investigate the role of
2

*Source: Ferrell, O.C. and M.D. Hartline (2008), Marketing Strategy, 4th ed. U.S.: SouthWestern, p. 22.
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channel intermediaries, an important consideration for IRM research. Their conclusion was that
the field of IRM research in distribution systems is wide open for investigative study.

Suffice it to say, most marketers accept that there has been a paradigm shift from a
transactional to a relational style of marketing (Kotler, 1991; Gronroos, 1994; Aijo, 1996).
Young and Wilkinson (1997) and Palmer (2007) maintain that rather than accepting a
dichotomy, transaction versus relationship, marketers must appreciate that the two styles exist
concurrently, that is, there is a portfolio of relationship styles explained by heterogeneous
customer demand. As such, these relationship styles can be used as a basis for market
segmentation and the development of differentiated marketing strategies (Palmer and Miller,
2004).
A basic theoretical framework supporting the supply chain concept is The Theory of
Production Sharing. Production sharing is the integration of production resources from different
entities separated geographically (Michie 2010). If internationally sourced, the concept is called
global or transnational production sharing (Drucker 1980, 1987). Drucker defined transnational
production sharing as “the economic integration of states of productive processes across national
boundaries.” Other terminology associated with the concept is co-production (Grumwald and
Flamm, 1985), offshore sourcing (Stopford and Wells, 1966; Moxon, 1975), parallel sourcing
(Flynn et al 2010) and outsourcing (Bolin, 1993) among others.
Production sharing is the primary relational business strategy used to achieve industrial
competitiveness in the global market place. Because production sharing is based on comparative
advantage in resources, the theory is consistent with RA Theory, Resource Base Theory and
Alderson’s Transvection. Its dominant role as a business strategy is evidenced by trade in
intermediate goods, particularly between developed and developing countries. This trade is the
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fastest growing sector of global merchandise trade representing approximately thirty percent of
manufactured goods (Yeats, 2001). Production sharing also dominates trade in finished goods.
Developing countries account for seventy-five percent of world exports of manufactured goods
(Yeats, 2001).
Production sharing is a pervasive economic concept, as old as trade itself. Production
sharing entered U.S. trade law during Colonial times as an exclusion from duty of the value of
U.S. components imported into the United States found in foreign imported production
(Committee on 806.3 and 807, 1981). The U.S. Trade Act of 1930, Paragraph 1615(g) formally
specified that U.S. goods returned to the United States that had not been advanced in value or
improved in condition by any process of manufacture or any other means could receive duty-free
entry (Committee on Production Sharing 1984). Specifically, Tariff Items 9802 are U.S.
fabricated components exported for assembly wherein the components do not lose their physical
identity in the foreign assembly process.
The advent of U.S. free trade agreements with Israel, NAFTA, Chile, Australia and other
nations have had two effects on production sharing trade: a) the volume of production sharing
trade has been increased dramatically, and b) the United States and Mexico, due to the multitude
and complexity of its trade agreements, can no longer report the actual volume of its production
sharing trade (Watkins, 2009). Despite the measurement difficulties, production sharing remains
the dominant business strategy used by industry to achieve industrial competitiveness in the
global marketplace.
The preceding theories of marketing and distribution have been reviewed because of their
relevance and explanatory power with respect to supply chain and supply chain management.
Each theory attributes competitive advantage to a network of integrated organizations that
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combine and process unique, value added resources to create product assortments that are valued
by intermediary firms and ultimate consumers. It is the quest of marketers to develop new
concepts that advance marketing thought to facilitate a greater understanding, explanation and
prediction of business practice.

1.2 THE SUPPLY CHAIN AND SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT
As evidenced by the previous discussion, the seven theories of marketing and business
are directly related to the concept of the supply chain. The supply chain is defined as a network
of multiple businesses and relationships (Lambert and Cooper, 2000) or the integration and
managing of key business processes (Cooper et al, 1997). Because supply chains originate with
the raw material and proceed through the processing, distribution and purchase of the final
product, the supply chain concept is corresponding to Alderson’s transvection. A supply chain is
a strategic network that has a pyramidal, hierarchical organized structure where the focal firm
coordinates the supply network and disposes over a centralized authority (Larenzone and BadenFuller, 1995: Jarillo, 1988) and other firms are dependent on the focal firm (Duysters et al.,
1999).
Supply chains are considered collaborative interactions among numerous firms including
a focal actor who dominates (Belaya et al, 2009) and other actors dependent on the focal actor
due to long term contracts (Lambert and Cooper 2000). Focal firms interact directly or indirectly
through suppliers or customers from the point of origin to the point of consumption (Lambert
and Cooper, 2000). Supply chains represent interconnected systems characterized by a wide
variety of complex relationships such as alliances, horizontal and vertical cooperative
engagements all exhibiting forward and backward integration (Lambert and Cooper, 2000; Van
der Vorst, 2005). Benton and Maloni (2005) identified the common characteristics of a supply
22

chain to include multiple criteria for member selection, an intensive evaluation of a partner’s
value added, shared information and success, mutual problem solving and a long term alliance
among few suppliers.
Integration is an important factor in building sustainable competitive advantage (Hoi Yan
Yeung, et al, 2009). Integration is the combination of partner resources and perspectives into
those value propositions that facilitate performance. It is the
“degree to which a firm can strategically collaborate with its supply chain
partners and collectively or collaboratively manage the internal and external
social processes to achieve effective and efficient flows of products and services,
information, finance and strategic decisions with the objective of providing
maximum value to customers at low cost and high speed” (Zhao, et al, 2008, p.
374).
Integration requires information sharing, process coordination and leadership by a power
figure. Information sharing is the degree to which coordination of information sharing activities
and the combination of different data management systems and content management systems
become a common platform for supply chain strategies (Jhingran et al, 2002; Roth et al 2002).
Information sharing presents a real challenge integrating technology, communication systems,
people and management.
Process coordination is the degree to which a firm can structure its operating processes,
shared resources, rewards and risks with partners such that consensus and competitive advantage
are achieved (Anderson et al 1994). Process coordination treats interfirm relationships as
strategic assets (Hoi Yan Yeung et al, 2009). Lastly, the access, distribution and management of
complementary resources are a key component of process coordination (Benton and Maloni,
2005; HoyYan Yeung et al, 2009). Several studies have investigated the critical role integration
plays in competitive advantage (Lee and Billington 1992), performance (Frolich and Westbrook,
2001; Narasimhard and Kim, 2002) and transaction costs (Zhao, et al, 2008).
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As indicated, power plays a significant role within the supply chain. Power in the supply
chain may be manifest, attributed or exercised, but need not always be exercised (Cox, 2001) and
can lead to opportunism and hinder the effective development of the network (Belaya et al 2009).
Power relationships are prevalent with companies simultaneously pursuing adversarial or
competitive and cooperative and partnering network strategies (Morris et al, 1998; Hogarth-Scott
and Parkenson, 1993; Dapiran and Hogart Scott, 2003). The natural state for supply chain
relationships is not symmetry, equilibrium or stability (Ogbonna and Wilkinson, 1996); its
natural state is a continued power battle for a share of surplus value generated by the members of
the supply chain (Cox 1999). Cox (1999) identified a Hierarchy of Dominance, a situation in
which the power figure owns or controls the key resources that determine value-added within the
supply chain. The power figure is he who has the relationship with the end user (Lambert and
Cooper, 2000).
While the power figure sets the tone for the network, the power balance can change with
changes in market demand (Shinohara, 2008). Cox (1999) indicated power could be used as an
effective tool to coordinate and promote harmonious relationships, resolve conflicts and enhance
performance for the network and partners. Shinohara (2008) suggested that the power figure
directs the less powerful toward satisfaction and drives the system to vertical integration on
friendly terms. Finally, power and trust benefit integration. Buyer’s use of coercion increase
suppliers’ integration; moderate levels of trust increase buyer’s commitment to the relationship
(Hoi Yan Yeung, et al, 2009). These research findings document the critical role power plays in
the administration of the supply chain system.
Globalization and changes in market demand have facilitated the introduction of new
supply chain concepts. The traditional supply chain is a “push” concept in that materials and
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products move the chain towards the consumer market, driven by forecast demand. An
alternative explanation is the “pull” concept which is based on the customer initiating supply
chain decisions, configuring products, and initiating orders that pull product through the system
(Nevin, 2010). Consistent with the “pull” concept is the value chain which states that firms build
value into every step of supply chain activity: planning, sourcing, making and the delivery of
product and services (Shepard, 2010).
The value chain is based on all changes, whether consolidations or extensions, made to
enhance value to the customer. The key to the value chain is its customer focus (Hunt and Davis
2012). A supply-demand balance is maintained throughout the system with each transaction
being evaluated for its value added contribution as perceived particularly by the customer (Nevin
2010). Some firms use customer value teams to proactively match supplier capabilities with
“best” customer solutions, an application of customer relationship marketing (CRM).
Supply chain management (SCM) is defined as “a systematic, strategic coordination of
the traditional business functions and the tactics across business within the supply chain for
purposes of improving long term performance of the individual firm and supply chain as a whole
(Mentzer, et al, 2001, p. 18).

The Global Supply Chain Forum describes SCM as “the

integration of key business processes from end users through original suppliers that provide
products, services and information that add value for customers and other stakeholders.” Shepard
(2010) says SCM encompasses a broad range of fundamental interactive processes in production
design, procurement, distribution and demand management.
Certain authors claim SCM is a major component in competitive strategies designed to
enhance productivity, profitability and performance (Li, et al, 2005; Gunaskaran, et al 2004). It is
the most advanced stage in the voluntary development of purchasing, procurement and other
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activities, particularly in the automotive industry (Thomas and Griffin, 1996). Benton and
Maloni (2005) claim the auto industry is in an advanced stage of SCM development due to
asymmetric power control that sets up partnerships focused on reduced cost, increased quality
and shared design capabilities.
At the strategic level of management, SCM is relatively new and rapidly expanding as a
means to meet the varied needs of customers (Gunasekaran, et al 2004). Successful supply chain
management requires integration of important business processes with key members (Burges, et
al, 2006). The goal is a seamless sourcing, making, delivery and logistics process that creates
competitive advantage (Li et al, 2005). Internal work competition and integration determines the
ultimate success of the focal enterprise (Lambert and Cooper 2000). The practice of supply chain
management is essential to competitiveness and profitability in the global economy (Power, et al
2001; Benton and Maloni, 2005; Shepard 2010).
In supply chain management, the integration of all business processes is not necessary
because business processes are not linked across all firms of the network. Key business processes
must be integrated with key members of the supply chain (Lambert and Cooper, 2000). One
reason for restricting access to business processes is its requirement to share proprietary
information, strategy, planning and goals. Most firms are reluctant to divulge sensitive,
competitive information or to lose control of such information (Benton and Maloni, 2005). Not
all SCM members are key members. Key members are members who are autonomous firms who
carry out value added activities (operational or managerial) in specific processes designed to
produce output for a particular customer or market. Non-key members are supporting cast. They
provide resources, knowledge, utilities or assets to primary members and do not require the
access afforded key members (Lambert and Cooper, 2000).
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Further, not all processes are equally important (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995).
Managed processes should be reserved for focal firm managers who are responsible for process
coordination, integration and management. These managers are responsible for the management
of Tier One suppliers and customers. Monitored processes are not as critical (as managed) and
are managed by other supply chain firms. Focal firm managers simply monitor and audit these
processes. Non-monitored processes do not involve the focal firm or its management at all.
Therefore, SCM divides processes into those managed and integrated, those monitored and those
not monitored. This perspective is comparable to the “critical path” concept found in production
management. These perspectives on key members and processes are comparable to the “critical
path” concept found in production management.
Supply chain management has gained tremendously in popularity (Lambert and Cooper,
2000; Lee So and Tang, 2000; McFarland et al, 2008). Shepard (2010, p. 8)) says “SCM has
emerged as a game-changer for firms globally.” SCM is a primary focus for “Best Practice”
concepts such as minimized stock, reduced lead time, value added, integration, systems and
professionalism practiced by innovative firms (Shinohara, 2008). However, the jury remains in
session whether SCM is the success claimed for it.
Li, et al (2005) judged SCM to be important, but its success fleeting. Various studies
report more than fifty percent of respondents to surveys state their firms had not been successful
in supply chain partnering (Boddy et al, 1998), their strategic alliances had failed (Spekman Et
al, 1998), or that two percent of North American manufacturers ranked their supply chains as
world class (Thomas, 1996).
Several criticisms of supply chain management are found in the literature. A major
complaint is the complexity of the supply chain and management concepts. Given domain
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complexity it is difficult to determine what is, what is not important. There is no common list of
constructs. Those constructs that do exist divide into behavioral, technical and infrastructure
issues. The various disciplines of production, engineering, transportation, logistics and others
have specific interests that might include leadership, firm relationships (intra/inter), physical
distribution, logistics, information systems, process improvements, business outcomes or more
detailed items such as JIT inventory, order processing, delivery, TQM and other. Most studies
evaluate process issues, interfirm relationships, and technical domains with biases toward
operational or strategic management or negotiation and procurement (Burges, et al, 2006).
A second criticism is a concentration on too few theories. There is no meta-theory 3.
Most are middle range theories such as transactional cost analysis, competitive advantage and
agency theory (Weitz and Jap, 1995). Few involve globalization with its scarce resource and
wealth distribution issues that challenge traditional division of labor and comparative advantage
theories (Shinohara, 2008). Too much emphasis is placed on Neo-classical economic theory and
its basic premises including perfect competition, limited resources and profit maximization of the
single firm, ignoring the system profitability (Hunt and Davis 2012). Most studies investigate the
manufacture of consumer products; few focus on industrial products. Most studies investigate
the dyad, but one side of it only and make ceteris-paribus assumptions about all other
relationships (Wathne and Heide, 2000).
There is a need to investigate relationships beyond the dyad to address the network of
exchange relationships (Johnson and Mattson, 1985; Hallen et al, 1991). There is a clear need for
behavioral studies that investigate the interrelationships among goals, power, cooperation, trust,
confidence and other issues. Given globalization, there is a need for cross cultural validity of the

3

Hunt and Davis (2012) address the lack of a “meta” theory argument by specifically grounding supply chain
management within the context of RA Theory.
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theoretical models tested (Cunningham and Green, 1984; Frazier and Summers, 1986; Shinohara,
2008).

1.3 SUMMARY

This chapter has focused on the theoretical explanations, definitions and concepts that
serve as the basis for marketing distribution. The essence of marketing is the transaction, an
exchange of value between two parties (Kotler, 1972). Distribution facilitates the transaction
function. Alderson’s transvection involves a value added process of creating meaningful product
assortments valued by intermediate members and the ultimate consumer or user of the product.
As such, value is vested with the ultimate user. Without the consumer or user valuing the
product, transactions would diminish over time or there would be no meaningful transactions
(demand) at all.
Hunt’s RA Theory states that organizations that possess unique sets of valued resources
enjoy competitive advantage in the marketplace because these resources create market offerings
valued by the ultimate consumer or user. Again, value is vested in the ultimate consumer or user.
Vargo and Lusch (2004, p. 6) focused on the concept of value added and concluded that value “is
defined by and co-created in concert with the consumer.” In essence, consumers do not buy
products but, rather, the service stream provided by the product. Hence, the transaction is the
acquisition by the consumer of a service stream provided by a product co-created by him. Vargo
and Lusch’s conceptualization is consistent with Nevin’s (2010) of the consumer value driven
supply chain.
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CHAPTER 2: THE TRADITIONAL MODEL OF DISTRIBUTION
BEHAVIOR AND MANAGEMENT – A LITERATURE REVIEW
Coinciding with the development of distribution thought in marketing, a robust literature
has emerged that models the behaviors that explain the distribution process. This chapter
presents the comprehensive traditional model of distribution behavior. However, it focuses on
those primary antecedent behaviors that explain the cooperation-conflict continuum and those
behavioral and financial outcomes that are attributed to the management of the continuum. 4

2.1 THE TRADITIONAL MODEL OF DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT
Perhaps due to the complexities associated with the supply chain concept or the ease of
conceptualizing, identifying and measuring the channel of distribution, marketing researchers
have focused their modeling and research on the latter concept (Clark 1937; Robicheaux and El
Ansary, 1975; Robicheaux and Coleman, 1994). Alderson was premature given that the
discipline’s supply chain emphasis was delayed until the mid-90s. Michie (1975) wrote an
unpublished concept paper that explained Alderson’s transvection and pointed out that the
channel of distribution is a subset of it. Vasquez et al (2005) described the supply chain in terms
synonymous with Alderson’s transvection by referring to channel of distribution as an element of
a supply chain. The channel of distribution is a marketing research tradition; the supply chain
concept is an emerging research tradition.
4

There is a robust literature that explores the role of other antecedent and outcome behaviors
within the model. The antecedents include dependency, dedicated assets or asset specificity
(Anderson and Weitz 1992; Ganesan 1994; Dyer and Singh 1998; Heide and John 1992;Rokkan
et al 2002), information sharing (Anderson and Weitz 1992; Doney and Cannon 1997;
Monczkpo 1998), governance (Heide and John 1992; Jap and Ganesan 2000; Ivens 2002),
sources of power (Hunt and Nevin 1974; Lusch 1976; Michie 1978), etc. The outcomes include
commitment (Heide and John 1992; Williamson 1993 Bensaou and Anderson 1999; Morgan and
Hunt 1994), satisfaction, etc. While important, these specific behaviors are beyond the scope of
research conducted in this dissertation.
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The traditional Model of Channel Member Behavior has its theoretical bases in
relationship, coordination, power, transaction and resource theories (Geyskens, Steenkamp, &
Kumar, 1996; Jap, 1999). As defined, a channel of distribution is a set of interdependent
organizations involved in the process of taking the end product to the consumer or business user
(Hibbard, Kumar, & Stern, 2001). Robicheaux and El Ansary (1975) postulated a comprehensive
model of channel member behavior. Without getting into detail, the essential sequential path of
behaviors within their model focused on achieving coordination among the channel members
beginning with member goal structure leading to power, cooperation, satisfaction and
performance. A cooperation-conflict continuum constituted channel management strategy.
As described previously, transaction cost and agency theories dominated traditional
thought. Stern (1969), El Ansary and Stern (1972) and Hunt and Nevin (1974) were among the
first to focus on relational management behavior as the mechanism for controlling performance
of individual channel members. Between 1970 and 2001, an extensive body of knowledge
developed articulating the traditional model of channel member behavior and its major
components: goal congruence, sources of power, power, coordination and performance. These
behaviors are pervasive, that is, they are present in almost all behavioral settings
The focal point for research was the transaction that serves as the basis for a dyad
(seller/buyer) relationship. The set(s) of business activities that lead to, or support, the
transaction are managed by the dyadic partners (Robicheaux and El Ansary, 1975; Hunt and
Nevin, 1974; Lusch, 1976). These activities are operationalized as policies and tactics that serve
to achieve channel coordination and performance (Brown & Lusch, 1982; Hibbard, Kumar, &
Stern, 2001; Hunt & Nevin, 1974; Lusch, 1976; Michie , 1978)
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2.2 ANTECEDENT BEHAVIORS

The principle antecedent behaviors that explain the cooperation-conflict continuum
include goals and goal structure and power.

Goals and Goal Structure

Goal priorities emerge in response to the business environment and must align with the
new dynamic business environment (Achrol and Etzel 2003). Goals are defined as “a consistent
set of policies, strategies or programs targeted by firm management because they are believed to
be the most salient to the success of the business at this point in time (Archol and Etzel, 2003).”
An organization’s goal structure is a function of investors’ and management’s objectives for the
business. These goals are multidimensional and influenced significantly by profit management
and achievement (Eliashberg and Michie, 1984). A dyad member that facilitates a high level of
goal attainment for his partner achieves credibility that ultimately leads to greater goal
congruence (Frazier and Rody, (1991).
Behavior that deviates from the system goals leads to conflict (Stern et al 1996) or
opportunistic behavior (Wathne and Heide 2000). Achrol and Etzel (2003) maintain that
distribution literature and research are focused on conflict, ignoring the study of goal
divergence/deviance which they consider the norm found in the business environment. They
believe that firms should focus on managing goal deviance with customized marketing strategies,
sourcing of resources, etc., rather than conflict resolution. Focusing on the former could
minimize the need for conflict resolution.
Based on Parson’s (1959) functional imperatives model, Achrol and Etzel (2003)
emphasize the salience or importance of three types of goals: productivity, adaptation and
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integration. Productivity goals address efficiency in the management of business activities such
as policies for controlling operating costs and improving revenue flows. Adaptation goals
address specific strategies intended to achieve competitive advantage and to strengthen customer
focus. Integration goals are those programs and policies intended to strengthen coordination
(structural and relational ties) between dyadic partners. These goals constitute a goal structure, a
set of objectives intended to be accomplished.
Achrol and Etzel (2003) found support for Mintzberg’s contentions that firms have a
primary goal that they intend to maximize. They also found a firm’s primary goal is supported by
complementary secondary goals. However, the primary goal’s significance and the
complementary nature of primary and secondary order goal sets depend on the various states of
the firm’s marketing environment: growth, stability, munificent (rich in resources) and lean. For
example, of the primary goals, productivity goals appear to be important determinants of
performance in growth, lean and stable environments. Adaptive goals were most influential in
mature, munificent and dynamic environments.
As for secondary goal sets, Achrol and Etzel (2003) found less uniform support. In the
different environments, they found consistent conflict between productivity and adaptation goals
– except in lean environments. They attributed conflict to productivity goals being internally
oriented at a time when an external orientation is required. Surprisingly, they found a uniformly
insignificant effect for integrative goals – except in the growth environment. They attributed this
finding to integrative effects being long term and not captured by single year financial indices
such as sales revenues or ROI. The value of the Achrol and Etzel (2003) study is the support
given to each member of the dyad having a goal set that exhibits a hierarchical order.
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Several supply chain management studies have explored the relationship between goals
and other behaviors. Gunasekaran et al (2001) studied the supply chain and determined that all
members should be involved and committed to a common set of goals. Failure to integrate the
supply chain by treating each partner independently does not maximize efficiency because each
party will pursue goals independently of each other. Lambert and Cooper (2000) indicated that
partnership structures must be compatible and reflect common goals and attitudes. Strategic
management involves coordinated financial plans, competitiveness and adherence to common
goals.

Power

Power is a pervasive behavior (Emerson, 1962; Dapiran and Hogarth-Scott, 2003;
Hingley, 2005) and a concept central to social science theory (Gaski & Nevin, 1985). Its
dimensions originate in sociology, psychology, political science, economics and business
(Belaya et al, 2009). In sociology, power can be traced to Max Weber (1947, p.

) who defined

power as “the probability, in a social relationship, to impose one’s own will even against
resistance regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.” Emerson (1962) said “power of
A over B is equal to and based upon the dependency of B on A.” Pfeffer and Salancik (1978)
considered power to be based on the control of resources considered strategic within the
organization. Sociology scholars consider power to be the pursuit of one’s self interest and the
imposition of will, despite resistance (Burt, 1976; Bredemeire and Stephenson, 1962).
In psychology, McCelland (1975) defined power as “the ability to change the behavior of
others or to modify the conduct of other individuals or groups.” The power of A over B is the
quotient of the maximum force that A could induce on B and the maximum resistance B could
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offer (Lewin, 1951). Psychologists consider power to be any force that results in behavior that
could not have occurred if the force had not been present (Mechanic, 1962). Power enables the
possessor to evoke change in behavior and conduct of others in the manner the possessor desires
despite resistance (Belaya et al, 2009).
In political science, Dahl (1986) said power “is the ability of one, individual or group, to
get another unit to do something it otherwise might not have done. Lasswell and Kaplin (1950)
said it is the process of affecting policies of others with the help of actual or threatened severe
deprivations from nonconformity with the policies intended. It is the ability to issue an order
with a reasonable expectation that it will be obeyed (Stanfield and Carroll, 2004). Pfeffer and
Salancik (1978) said power “is the ability of those who possess power to bring about outcomes
they want.” Lastly, Sharp (1980) said it is the totality of means, influences and pressures
including authority, rewards and sanctions available for use to advance the objectives of the
power holder.
In economics and business, power is the ability of one firm to influence or control the
intentions and actions of another (Emerson, 1962). Emerson’s concept of power is the most
accepted and used by marketing researchers where the prevailing concept is expressed as the
ability to influence or control the behaviors, decisions, intentions and actions of others in pursuit
of one’s own interests (Dahl, 1957; El Ansary and Stern, 1972; Sheu and Hu, 2009). Belaya et al
(2009) attribute power to an ability, capacity or potential to get others to do something, that is, to
command, influence, or control the behaviors, intentions, decision or actions of others in pursuit
of one’s own goals or interests against the will of the power target. Power can have a positive
effect on goal attainment. Power is motivated by money and profit. It is associated with financial
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payouts, possession of valuable resources, cost minimization and maximization of self-profit
even if aggression or coercion are required (Belaya et al, 2009).
As an interdisciplinary construct, there are common elements within the various
definitions: a) power is pervasive, an “atomic principle (Dapiran and Hogarth-Scott, 2003). It is
at the heart of inter-firm (dyadic) relationships (Cox, 2001). It is ever present whether power
holders wish to use it or not. It exists even when unobservable (Emerson, 1962; Dapiran and
Hogarth-Scott, 2003). b) power is authority to command someone to do something by
manifesting control or influence; c) it connotes action, that is, the freedom to pursue self-interest
in relationships; d) it connotes action in that it focuses on one achieving his own goals or sets of
goals; and e) it is dependent because without one being dependent on another there is no basis
for power (Kumar, 2005). Dahl (1957) said “the dependence of A over B is related to A’s
motivational investment in goals mediated by B and on the availability of those goals to A
outside the relationship with B.”
In marketing, power refers to the ability of firm A to influence the behavior of Firm B’s
(in a dyadic relationship) actions towards its resources, goals, management decisions and
strategies and other actions (Boyle and Dwyer 1995; Bier and Stern, 1969; Gaski, 1984; ElAnsary & Stern, 1972; Hunt and Nevin, 1974; Lusch 1976; Ferrell & Hartline, 2008). For
example, Wal-Mart’s source of power is customer demand.

Wal-Mart uses that power to

manage its relationships with companies such as Kraft and Proctor & Gamble.
What is the role of power in a dyadic relationship? At the least, its role is controversial.
Proponents of power argue that power is vital to a relationship because it can take the
relationship out of the realm of chance to give it purpose, order and direction. Stern and Heskett
(1969) said power plays an important role in achieving integration, adaptation and goal
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attainment. Kumar (1995; 1996) says power serves to effect a fair distribution of rewards and
benefits (total value added) among partners. Cox et al (2003) state that power is central to any
study of buyer-seller relationships and note that the distribution discipline is revisiting studies of
power and transactional analysis and citing the reemergence of French and Raven sources of
power (1959) and Emerson’s (1962) definition of power.
In the supply chain literature, power is seen to greatly influence the specific investments
necessary to sustain the relationship (Cox, 2000). Other researchers claim that power is an
important tool useful for integration (Van Donk and Van Der Vaart, 2005; Zhao et al. 2006;
Benton and Maloni, 2005) and performance (Benton and Maloni, 2005). Cox et al, (2003) say
power affects the expectation of what commercial value should be returned to the power holder
and his willingness to invest in future collaborative activities. Members must possess power as a
means to appropriate value added from relationships. They must understand the power structure
that exists or risk substandard performance for failure to understand the causal factors explaining
successful appropriation of value added (Cox, 2003; Kumar 2005).
Overall, distribution literature shows power to have a significant influence on factors
critical to a relationship such as cooperation, trust, compliance, conflict and conflict resolution
(Brown et al 1995; Maloni and Benton, 2000; Belaya et al 2009). Power is an effective tool to
coordinate and promote harmonious relationships, resolve conflicts and improve performance for
individual members and the supply chain (Belaya et al, 2009). Kumar (2005) says power
structure is an important determinant, but not everything.
Critics have a different view considering power’s role and structure. Hingley’s (2005)
critique of relational marketing challenges those who discount the role and significance of power
and treat power as alien to effective working relationships. Relationship theorists claim business
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performance is a function of cooperation, trust, commitment and satisfaction. Power is
negatively associated with cooperation (Doney and Cannon 1997; Bretherton and Carswell,
2002; Pole and Haskell, 2002). Hingley (2005) argued power is pervasive and important.
As second point of contention is the structure of power. Power in a dyadic relationship
can be symmetrical or asymmetrical. Gummesson (1994) and Naude and Buuttle (2000) consider
asymmetrical power to be detrimental to sustaining a good business relationship, that asymmetric
power has a negative influence and is not helpful toward building a quality relationship. Blois
(1997) said asymmetric power relationships are inherently unstable and in danger of becoming
fief-like. Johnsen and Ford (2002) said that such relationships damage the weaker partner
causing him to leave and seek another partner (Bretherton and Carswell, 2002). Kumar et al
(1998) claimed that power holders could inflict punishment on the less powerful.
Others claim asymmetry reduces exchange frequency, makes conflict resolution more
difficult (Lawler and Yoon, 1996), hinders the sharing of information, and limits the levels of
trust and commitment within the relationship (Kumar 2005). Asymmetry enables the power
holder to act opportunistically and to destroy effective relationships (Giebal et al, 1998). As a
consequence, critics of power and power structure emphasize the benefits of symmetric or
balanced power and mutuality for fostering more stable, long term relationships based on
cooperation, trust and commitment (Ganesan, 1994; Gummesson, 1994; Bretherton and
Carswell, 2002; Rokkan and Haugland, 2002).
However, the vast majority of relationships are asymmetric (Kumar, 1996). The natural
state of exchange is not symmetry because firms naturally seek asymmetry to gain a great share
of relationship benefits (Ogbonna and Wilkinson, 1996; Hingley, 2005; Gulati and Sytch, 2007;
Medcof, 2001). Hingley maintains power has no regard for whether exchange relationships are
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symmetrical or asymmetrical. Gummesson (1994) concluded that relationships based on
perfectly stable symmetry may not be possible. Suppliers may tolerate asymmetry in order to
gain and maintain a lucrative business. Hingley (2005) says an asymmetrical relationship with
proportional sharing of value added is preferable to exchange structure where high transaction
costs dominate. Less powerful will enter and tolerate an asymmetric imbalance in reward and
mutuality and are willing to sacrifice profit for exclusivity, market share and network influence
(Blundel and Hingley, 2001; Hingley, 2005). Trust and commitment can exist with asymmetric
power. Dependent partners will trust power holders provided they behave fairly (Kumar, 2005).
In a recent article, LaCoste (2012) related power to the global economic environment by stating
that customers are global firms who hold significant asymmetric power over suppliers.
Several researchers have argued that power structure is in a continual state of flux.
Feldman (1998) says the theory of disputed and punctuated equilibrium suggests any action
causing an imbalance to an exchange relationship such as specific investment (asset specificity)
leads to action to rebalance and restore equilibrium, or to one party assuming a dominant role in
the relationship (Emerson, 1962; Dapiran and Hogarth-Scott, 2003). Relationships continually
shift for power dominance to achieve a greater share of surplus value added created by their
possession and control of critical resources (Stern and El Ansary, 1977). Because each party is
motivated by self-interest, each seeks to retain as much surplus value for themselves as possible
(Williamson, 1975; Cox 1999).
Surplus value is created by joint activity, and mutual competitive advantage is gained by
value creation achieved by pooling specific investments such as technology and information
gained from complementary strengths and economies of scale (Vlosky and Wilson, 1997).
Mutual competitive advantage facilitates sustainable strategic advantage, a condition that
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competitors find hard to replicate (Sheth and Sharma, 1997; Ganesan 1994 and Buttle 1996). In
relationships characterized by collaboration, participants will overtly use power strategies to
achieve a higher proportion of surplus value for themselves. As a result, asymmetric power
imbalance is not a barrier to the formation of close and workable relationships (Hingley, 2005).
Supply chains are collaborative and strictly coordinated systems (Belaya, et al 2009).
Asymmetric power relationships are complex. Power holders are challenged to structure the
relationship to retain suppliers and to act in the best interest of both parties (Jap and Ganesan
2000; Kumar 2005; Belaya et al, 2009).

2.3 THE TRADITIONAL COOPERATION-CONFLICT MANAGEMENT CONTINUUM
The traditional cooperation-conflict continuum has been the basis for explaining the
management of the distribution process (Ferrell & Hartline, 2008; Robicheaux & El-Ansary,
1975). The continuum explains how managers achieve coordination among the various members
who seek to add value to the process while achieving superior financial performance.
The model in Figure 1 shows the critical path of behaviors that responds to the challenge
to develop a successful business that operates in a dynamic, uncertain global business and
economic environment. The path begins with the goal sets of the dyadic entrepreneurs that direct
the establishment and management of a coordinated successful business relationship that will
return a superior financial performance to them. The fulfillment of this goal expectation is a
function of the entrepreneur’s sources of power and dependency relationships that lead to power,
that is, the ability of one to control or influence the policies of the partner.
Power is manifest in the management strategies used to achieve coordination and
efficiency in the dyadic relationship. The strategies are cooperation and conflict, the cooperationconflict continuum. As a result of the management strategies, the model has specific outcomes:
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trust, commitment, satisfaction and performance. The previous literature highlighted the various
behaviors, their roles and interactions in the entrepreneur’s joint effort to achieve coordination,
efficiency and performance.

Management Strategies

Business Environment

(power exercised)

Goal Structure
Dyadic
Congruency

COOPERATION

CONTINUUM

POWER
(Control)

PERFORMANCE

Sources of
Power:
Coercive, Noncoercive

CONFLICT

Figure 1: The Cooperation-Conflict Continuum
Cooperation

As indicated, goal congruence and use of power lead to management strategies used to
achieve channel coordination and performance. Among the management strategies used is
cooperation, the striving of two parties to achieve goals and objectives held in common wherein
both parties win (Jap, 1999; May & Doob, 1937; Deutch, 1949).

In a channels context,

cooperation is the process of collaboration through the choice of policies, strategies, tactics and
actions by two or more parties at different levels of the channel to attain their mutually desirable
goals (Cartwright and Zander (1968), Sibley & Michie, 1978; Artz and Brush, 2000). Anderson
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and Narus (1991) said cooperation is similar or complementary coordinated activities performed
by firms in a business relationship to produce superior mutual outcomes or similar outcomes
with expected reciprocity over time. Strutton et al (1997) defined it as an alignment of two
party’s policies, strategies, tactics or procedures. Cooperation is positively associated with
information sharing and negatively associated with a lack of shared information, coercive power
and lack of trust (Fawcett and Magnan, 2002; Narayanan and Raman, 2004).
Collaboration is the primary strategy used to achieve channel coordination. Heide and
John (1992) defined collaboration as a willingness of OEMs and suppliers to work together to
create a positive exchange relationship, facilitating trust, and to improve the alliance and its
performance. Collaboration improves relationships, discourages self-serving behavior and
improves performance (Dwyer et al 1987; Heide and John 1992; Ganesan 1994; Kalwani and
Narayandas 1995; Doney and Cannon 1992; Monczak et al 1998; Cannon and Perrault 1999;
Goldberg and Erickson, 1987). It facilitates contract negotiation adjustments given changes in
the business environment. It is focused on transactional efficiency, performed at the operational
or strategic levels to achieve mutual goals (Dapiran and Hogath-Scott, 2003). Storey et al (2006)
reported that within supply chain management there is a distinct trend from competition to
cooperation behavior, that is, a shift from antagonism to collaboration (Matthyssen and Van den
Bulte 1994). Cooperation leads to joint effort that creates unique value that neither partner could
achieve separately ( Costen and Kumar 2005).
Zacharia et al’s (2009) study of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner case led them to focus on the
relationship between external knowledge and collaboration. They stated (p. 5), “Knowledge is
the key resource and access to new knowledge is the key driver to form collaboration with
buyers, suppliers and competitors.” They supported Storey’s (2006) conclusion that collaboration
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is important, but not his conclusion that collaboration could be eliminated or minimized in
“traditional buyer-supplier negotiation”. The outcome of cooperation is competitive advantage, a
form of strategic performance (Jap, 1999; Ramaseshan et al, 2006).
Others challenge the role of cooperation. Nyaga et al (2010) said that despite its
collaborative benefits, many firms struggle to achieve the desired level of collaboration and/or its
expected benefits.

They added that it remains unclear what factors explain successful

collaborations or whether collaboration offset its added administrative expense. Frankel et al
(2002) suggested that many collaborative initiatives do not live up to expected results.
Participants must match firm needs, capabilities, standards and goals (Daugherty et al 2006).
Benton and Maloni (2005) said it is assumed that buyers and sellers are willing and able
to cultivate mutually beneficial relationships. The benefits may be asymmetrical or both parties
may not benefit (Nyaga et al 2010). Both may benefit but the power partner benefits more.
Palmer (2007) argues that cooperation is an aberration. Life is governed by selfishness, not
cooperation. Hingley (2005) said partners may not be motivated by collaboration at all, but
essentially driven by self-interest. Business is about appropriating value for itself, not about
passing on value to someone else unless survival is an issue. Firms are successful when they
possess power (asymmetric) over something or someone (Cox 1999; Blundel and Hingley, 2001;
Hingley, 2005). Costen and Kumar (2005) claim the research is not clear regarding the benefits
associated with collaboration.
These researchers support a cooperation-power continuum, that is, power is a mechanism
for achieving coordination and cooperation (Stern and El Ansary, 1996; Berthon et al, 2003).
Defined as compliant behavior, cooperation is the result of influence and power processes
(Dapiran and Hogarth-Scott, 2003). Positive compliant cooperation is driven by non-mediated
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power (referent, non-coercive and expert) that lead to trust; negative compliant sentiments are
driven by mediated power (reward, coercive) that lead to conflict and exit strategies. Power
dependence and cooperation co-exist as part of the same construct and take place consecutively
(Stiles, 1995; Nelson and Weinstein, 1996; Dapiran and Hogarth-Scott, 2003; Hingley, 2005).
Cooperation is considered an antecedent to several others relationship behaviors. These
include coordination, trust and commitment, satisfaction and performance. Most researchers
would agree that cooperation is the primary means to achieving coordination of the channel and
supply chain systems. Anderson and Narus (1990) consider it, along with power, a major
antecedent to trust and commitment. However, these associations are not shared by all. Hwang
and Burgers (1997) considered trust a dimension of cooperation as opposed to an outcome by
stating “trust supports cooperation through its impact on two main threats to cooperation: fear
and greed.”

Cooperation stems from trust because cooperation is attributable to trust and

commitment in the relationship (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). Finally, Robicheaux and El-Ansary
(1975) Sibley and Michie (1978) and Dwyer (1980) found that cooperation is positively related
to channel satisfaction.

Conflict

Conflict is the level of tension, frustration and disagreement that results when one party
enjoys significant differences in power attributable to resources, skills or other possessed
advantages (Eliashberg & Michie, 1984; Frazier and Summers, 1986; Anderson and Narus,
1990; Ferrell & Hartline, 2008). Conflict is pervasive, inevitable in a dyadic relationship; it is
opponent-centered behavior. Similar to satisfaction, conflict may be short term as well as
accumulate over time. (In contrast, trust and commitment are long term behaviors.) It
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characterizes relationships that are highly interdependent, particularly those exhibiting
hierarchical authority and power (Reve and Stern, 1979; Wilkinson and Kipnis, 1978). Given its
economic nature, conflict is likely to occur over economic issues and in response to economic
dissatisfaction with outcomes (Geyskens et al (1999).
The construct requires disagreement or an unexpected performance difference between
the partners (Heide et al, 2007; Hibbard et al, 2001). Conflict exists when one perceives the other
as impeding the goals or some other function of concern (Thomas, 1976; Etgar, 1977). Once it
occurs, it requires resolution. Anderson and Narus (1990) attributed conflict to structural issues
including the competition for resources, different goal structures, attempts to maintain autonomy,
and attitudinal issues, specifically different expectations or roles that are poorly defined or
performed.
Conflict is considered to be the opposite of cooperation and that a “mixture” of conflict
and cooperation will be present in dyadic relationships; hence, the cooperation-conflict
continuum (Schmidt and Kochan, 1972; Robicheaux and El Ansary, 1975; Stern and El Ansary,
1977). The cause of conflict is attributable to goal incompatibility, perceptual incongruities
(Rosenberg and Stern, 1971; Kochan et al, 1975; Perry and Levine, 1976) and lack of trust
(Leonidou et al, 2008).
Conflict is multidimensional. Its types first appear in the literature as latent or manifest
(Brown & Lusch, 1982, Gaski & Nevin, 1985; Frazier & Rody, 1991; Canary and Cupach,
1988). Geyskens et al (1999) operationalized conflict as functional or dysfunctional. They felt
this classification held more managerial implications. They claimed these forms of conflict have
been ignored by channels researchers. Functional conflict is that which pushes the dyadic
relationship toward better performance. It strengthens the relationship by facilitating
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communication, satisfaction, stability and personal growth, and trust. Dysfunctional conflict
tends to destroy relationships (Reve and Stern, 1975; Hibbard, Kumar, & Stern, 2001).
Dysfunctional conflict occurs when the goal structures and the importance of certain goals
become significantly different such that fulfillment of these goals is not possible (Sibley &
Michie, 1978; Canary and Cupach, 1988).
When conflict arises in a dyadic relationship, resolution is required to return the dyad to a
coordination friendly environment (Heide et al, 2007; Hibbard et al, 2001). Reve and Stern
(1979) argue that the exchange of persons (collaborative teams) and superordinate goals reduce
conflict. Canary and Cupach (1988) attribute conflict resolution to an asymmetrical power
relationship. If asymmetrical, the power holder has little incentive to resolve the issue(s). Paulraj
and Chen (2007) argue that conflict management cannot be the equivalent or an alternative style
of management relative to cooperation because conflict resolution alone cannot achieve channel
coordination. In reality, the traditional model has but one managerial strategy to achieve
coordination. It is cooperation or strategic collaborative advantage (Anderson and Narus 1991;
Cardozo et al 1992; Day 2000; Dunn and Thomas 1994; Dyer Singh 1998; Ford 2001; Grönroos
1997; Jap 1999). As Walters et al (2003) said, the collaborative orientation has become the norm.
Value creation is optimized by cooperative relationships (Ulaga and Eggert 2006).

2.4 THE BEHAVIORAL AND FINANCIAL OUTCOMES
MANAGEMENT CONTINUUM

OF THE

COOPERATION- CONFLICT

As mentioned, the ultimate objective of the management of the cooperation-conflict
continuum is superior financial performance. However, the principle outcomes attributed to the
management of the continuum include both negative and positive effects. Opportunism is a
negative effect; trust and performance are intended positive effects.
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Opportunism
Opportunism is a highly controversial topic. Most researchers associate it with selfinterest, that is, placing the achievement of value added in the system above anything else
(coordination) to the detriment of the partner (Giebal, et al, 1998; Hingley, 2005). Hill (1990)
defined opportunism as self-interest with guile. John (1984) described it as an inherent human
characteristic that surfaces whenever it is unchecked by competitive structures or governance
models (norms or trust) fitting the complexity and uncertainty in the environment. Williamson
(1975) associated it with an incomplete or distorted disclosure of information in a calculated
effort to distort, disguise, obfuscate or otherwise confuse. Opportunism may develop if selfinterest becomes unconstrained, superior financial performance is not achieved, the system fails
to achieve comparative advantage in resources or the competitive position is compromised.
A key issue associated with opportunism is transaction cost (Hoi Yan Yeung, et al. 2009).
Ghosh and John (1999) described two dimensions of opportunism. The first is the engagement in
behavior that minimizes transaction cost regardless of the effect on total profit. The second is a
behavior that imposes additional costs on the partner that force a more favorable rearrangement
of the original terms of exchange. Most researchers consider opportunism detrimental and
associated with dysfunctional conflict, high dependence or asymmetric power, lack of trust and
commitment or the termination of the relationship (Geykens et al, 1996; Leonidou, 2008).
Opportunism or exploitation is described to be a function of asymmetric power and high
dependency. Asymmetry can be a problem because the power holder may be tempted to exploit
its power advantage for self- interest benefits and the more dependent partner may fear being
exploited given the circumstance. The power holder can elect to use mediated, particularly
coercive power, to exploit its power advantage or non-mediated power to improve the
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relationship and its long term cooperation. If the power holder elects the latter strategy, the
dependent party will interpret his restraint as a signal he intends to be cooperative and promote
long term mutual goals (Anderson and Weitz, 1989). The use of non-mediated power conveys
trust in the relationship.
Opportunism can be considered the antithesis of relationship marketing. It is negatively
associated with trust and commitment (Skarmeas, et al, 2002; Ramasehn, et al, 2006). Hingley
(2005) and Cox (1999) believe that opportunism is more the norm, than the exception behavior.
Das and Teng (2001) suggest it is an antecedent of trust. There are few studies of opportunism
and its effects on relationship marketing. Conceptually, most researchers deem it to be
detrimental.

Trust

Trust and commitment are very closely, positively associated behaviors. 5

Trust and

commitment develop over time in a relationship. In particular, trust is a primary characteristic of
long term relationships, significant investments in transaction specific investments and the role
and responsibilities of the parties involved (Palay 1984; Coote et al, 2003). ). It is a belief that a
party’s word or promise is reliable because the other party is considered integral, honest, truthful,
and able to perform actions that will end positively, or prevent actions that are negative (Dwyer
et al, 1987; Anderson and Narus, 1994). Malhotra and Murnighan (2002) defined trust as a
willingness to be vulnerable and it reflects mutual expectation of cooperation. Lastly, the most

5

Commitment is a partner’s belief that an on-going relationship is so important, that is, the
committed party believes the relationship is worth working to ensure it endures indefinitely
(Morgan and Hunt, 1994). Trust influences commitment because commitment entails
vulnerability. Trust is required to encourage partners to accept vulnerability (IBID 1994).
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commonly accepted definition of trust is “the extent to which a firm believes its exchange
partner is honest and benevolent” (Rempel et al, 1985); Kumar, 1996; Geyskens et al, 1998;
Spekman et al 1998). Honesty is a belief that one’s partner stands by its word, fulfills its
obligations and is sincere (Scheer and Stern, 1992; Morgan and Hunt, 1994). Benevolence is a
belief that one’s partner is interested in the other firms welfare, will not take unexpected actions
that negatively affect his firm (Anderson and Weitz, 1989; Anderson and Narus, 1990). Trust is
valued because once established, commitments of time, resources and effort to the relationship
are facilitated (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). Trust is complex, an outcome and an explanation of
certain behaviors in a relationship (Cowels, 1996).
Ganesan (1994) treated trust as a key relationship construct that is enhanced when the
other party has a reputation for being fair, when the relationships are fair and problems are
solved with specific investments having been made. At the firm level, it is the degree of
confidence or certainty that an entity has relative to an exchange outcome (Lusch et al, 1992).
Trust requires trustworthiness (Mentzer et al, 2000). A trustworthy partner is one who generated
confidence regarding credibility, competence and reliability (Moorman et al, 1992).
Wekeberger (1996) described trust in terms of beliefs that other parties share common
goals and will participate in actions to achieve those goals. Nevin (1995) said trust is a long term
cumulative construct that requires repeated satisfactory exchange interactions.
Trust is multidimensional (Lane and Bachman, 1998; Johnson et al, 1996; Kumar, 1996;
Doney et al, 1998; Inkpen and Currall, 1998; Knights, et al, 2001).
As a multidimensional construct, trust has several types. As mentioned, Rempel et al,
1985) and others classified trust as honesty and benevolence. Ring (1996) saw trust dividing into
two forms. Fragile trust related to the risk or probability that future outcomes would be
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consistent with current expectations of the dyadic parties. Resilient trust was based on goodwill
of others and not the predictability of a future outcome. Paswan et al (1998) dichotomized trust
into credibility and benevolence. Credibility is trust in the competence of the partner, that is, he
has the knowledge and necessary skills. Benevolence is the trust that the partner will act in the
best interests of the firm and not become opportunistic. Das and Tang (2001) dichotomized trust
into goodwill and competence. Goodwill trust engaged partners in fair dealings, good faith
intentions associated with reduced opportunism and lower transaction costs. Competence trust
was based on the resources and capabilities of the firm and relates to the firm’s intentions. It does
not necessarily relate to the firm’s ability to perform nor does it reduce performance risk.
Consistent with trust defined in terms of honesty and benevolence, Zabeer et al (1998)
identified interfirm trust as the extent to which members collectively hold a trust orientation
towards the other. The propensity to trust another depends on trustworthiness characteristics:
reliability, competence, benevolence, integrity and honesty (Sako, 1992; Mayer et al, 1995;
Brashear et al, 2003). Also, intrafirm trust considers learning as a key factor to improving
interfirm and intrafirm trust (Burt et al, 2003).
Given its different definitions and types, what is the role of trust? True to its complexity
it serves many roles. It is a coordinating, or governance, mechanism based on relational norms
and cooperation (Reed. 2001; Uzzi 1997). Because partnerships involve risk such as opportunism
and power (Williamson, 1975; 1985; Dapiran and Hogarth-Scott, 2003), trust substitutes for
power and governs transactions (Walgenbach, 2001) and these dimensions constantly recombine,
jointly reflecting the state of risk in the dyad (Das and Teng, 2001; Reed, 2001). Because trust
develops between parties that share experiences and goals, the party’s behaviors are more
understandable and predictable (Doney and Cannon, 1997).
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Partners’ adaptation and willingness to learn are highly associated with trust, particularly
in relationships that are expected to continue long term (Granovetter, 1985; Hallen et al, 1991).
Trust reflects partners’ confidence, positive expectations and attributions about each other and
their willingness to respond to their respective needs (Rempel, et al 1985; Costen and Kumar
2005). If there is high trust between partners, they will tend to mute negative factors, not
ignoring them, but will make fewer references to them. If trust is low, they will scrutinize and
monitor each other closely to guard against opportunism. In such cases, any decision to continue
the relationship is based on a calculative benefit-cost analysis. The partnership will continue if
replacement of the other proves to be cost prohibitive or there is no real benefit to making a
change. Trust and commitment are key drivers of performance in exchange relationships
(Palmatier 2008) and there is a direct, strong association between trust, satisfaction, profitability
and performance (Kwon and Suh 2004; Mohr and Spekman 1994; Doney and Cannon 1997;
Geyskens et al 1999; Monczka et al 1998; Whjipple and Frankel 2000).
Trust has several antecedents including goals, power (dependency), cooperation,
opportunism and satisfaction (Leonidou et al, 2008). Partnership trust conveys confidence that
the parties intend to work together to promote achieving long term, joint goals (Anderson and
Weitz, 1989). In a trustful, asymmetric power relationship, the more dependent party can have
more confidence the other will act constructively to promote joint interests and collective goals
(Dwyer et al, 1987) and improve satisfaction and performance (Robicheaux and El Ansary,
1975).
The distribution literature indicates that the interactions between trust and power have not
been resolved. Proponents of a positive association between the constructs believe the level of
trust is related to the use of power (Hoi Yan Yeung, et al., 2009). Trust is a means of generating
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non-mediated power influences that support the continuation of a business relationship (Dapiran
and Hogarth-Scott, 2003). Under asymmetric power conditions, Kumar (1996) said a trustful
relationship can exist if the power holder is willing to treat the less powerful figure fairly. If the
less powerful, more dependent partner trusts the power holder’s honesty and benevolence, the
more dependent partner attributes sincerity and cooperation to the power holder. He trusts the
power holder will use its power constructively and the power holder will not exploit him
(Larzeleac and Houston, 1980; Rempel et al, 1985; Dwyer et al, 1987).
Critics of the trust-power relationship are not so positive. Leonidou, et al (2008)
maintains that power is a neglected antecedent of trust and commitment. Kumar (1996, 1998)
claimed that power is the antithesis of trust. Svensson (2001) said that not all relationships result
in mutual benefit. Consequently, they could not be, and are not, based on trust. Trust alone does
not guarantee success. Campbell (1997) conducted a study in which he found no correlation
between buyers’ trust in suppliers or the reciprocal. He concluded that firms rely on sales,
personal charisma and opportunism as the basis for business relationships. Layder (1997)
suggested that trust may be attributed to a lack of viable alternatives.
Kumar (2005) reversed himself and made the point that a concentration on a power
versus trust dichotomy is not the issue. Part of the problem is the common belief that dependency
makes one inferior to another. But, dependency has positive and negative effects and is multidimensional. Dependency, itself, is not the issue; the issue is the degree of interdependency.
Interdependency is the level of mutual dependency: high or low. Low dependency is much
different than high dependency. Symmetric versus asymmetric dependence or power does not
determine trust. Kumar et al, (1996) found no difference in relationship quality between
asymmetric dependence and low mutual dependence. The significant finding was only high
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mutual dependence lowers conflict and generates high trust and commitment. Thus, Kumar
(2005) reversed himself by stating power is not the antithesis of trust.
Trust is a key factor in cooperation (Doney and Cannon, 1997; Das and Teng, 1998;
Kelle and Akbulut, 2005; Vasquez et al, 2005). It is an outcome of cooperative behavior
attributable to the use of non-mediating power (expert and information) in distribution
relationships (Dapiran and Hogarth-Scott, 2003). It is also an antecedent of cooperation and
conflict avoidance by reducing risk, increasing confidence in the partner and strengthening
commitment (Das and Teng, 1998).
Overall, trust is another pervasive behavior. Several studies have found positive
relationships between trust and favorable attitudes and behaviors (Schurr and Ozane, 1985),
personal relations (Hakansson and Jahanson, 1988); reputation (Granovetter, 1985), information
sharing (Mentzer et al, 2000; Hoi Yan Yeung et al, 2009), satisfaction (Anderson and Narus,
1990; Nevin 1995), willingness to make specific investments (Ojala and Hallikas, 2006),
commitment (Evangelista, 1996; Leonidou et al, 2008), performance (profit) (Sullivan and
Peterson, 1982) and other behaviors. In contrast, Geyskens et al (1999) concluded that
satisfaction captures trust, negating any reason to measure trust in the relationship.

Performance

Performance is the ultimate outcome variable of the distribution relationship. Hunt’s
Resource Advantage Theory is based on the firm’s objective to achieve superior financial
performance. Because firms are constrained self-interest seeking entities, superior financial
performance translates into financial rewards that are expected and considered to be better than
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the industry standard. Alderson’s Theory of Market Processes is based on “expectations of some
surplus value present within each relationship”.
Performance, too, is multidimensional. Geyskens et al (1999) defined performance as the
overall positive measure or evaluation of the aspects of a firm’s working relationship with
another. Performance is both economic (sales volume, profit, superior financial performance)
and noneconomic (good intentions, respect, willingness to work together, etc.) Achrol and Etzel
(2003) defined performance as the financial performance (sales and return on investment) of one
member (reseller) relative to that member’s peers (other resellers) in the distribution system.
Sheu and Hu (2009) define it as the aggregate outcome of members toward sustainable
relationships considering the financial performance of the target and the role performance of the
source. They define financial performance as the target’s financial contribution to the fulfillment
of the source member’s ambition; role performance is how well the target or source firm carries
out his role in the relationship.
The higher the source member’s role performance (quality of assistance) the better the
target firm is able to achieve high performance (Sibley and Michie, 1981). Kumar, et al (1992)
and Lusch and Brown (1992) defined performance in terms of efficiency and productivity. The
attainment of competitive advantage is a form of strategic performance (Jap 1999; Ramaseshan
et al, 2006). Boyle and Dwyer (1995) defined relationship performance as the degree to which
interfirm exchange activities are successfully planned and executed.
Maskell (1991) said that performance must measure both financial and nonfinancial
dimensions of performance and assess performance in both operational and strategic activities.
According to Maskell, financial performance does not assess operations, only strategic activities.
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Performance is associated with virtually all levels of behavior in a relationship.
Gunasekaran and Kubu (2007) argued that performance must be focused on the goals of the
organization. Achrol and Etzel (2003) said goals are an integral part of a firm’s effectiveness and
the firm’s goals must be congruent with the firm’s business environment if favorable
performance is to be achieved. Sheu and Hu (2009) identified the determinants of performance
were independent incentives they classified as mediated and nonmediated power, attributed
power and relationship commitment. They explained the reciprocal commitment effect, a
concept that says one’s relationship commitment is driven by his perception that the partner is
working to sustain the dyad relationship which further influences the partner’s commitment. The
effect fosters cooperative effort to achieve the individual and system goals, contributing to
success or superior performance (Morgan and Hunt, 1994).
Cooperative effort leads to competitive advantage which leads to superior performance
and enhances the firms’ and system competitiveness in the marketplace (Jap, 1999; Ramsaeshan
et al, 2006). Collaboration creates opportunities for improved operational performance (Whipple
and Frankel 2000; Daugherty et al 2006). Successful supply chain performance is based on trust
and commitment (Kwon and Suh 2008) and stronger supplier relationships yield greater
satisfaction and performance (Field and Meili 2008). Despite this research effort, there is little
research evidence that the traditional model explains channel member performance (Gaski and
Nevin 1985; Hibbard et al 2001). Wu et al (2010) claim there are no studies that systematically
validate the performance benefits of a co-operative supplier to supplier relationship.
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2.5 CRITICISMS OF THE TRADITIONAL MODEL

Specific problems with the traditional model’s conceptualization and logic, measurement
and explanation of channel member behavior follow. The most serious shortcoming of the model
is analogous to Hunt’s (2010) criticism of Neoclassical Equilibrium Economics and its Theory of
Perfect Competition. Hunt and Davis (2012) argue the Neoclassical explanation of competition
has become dominant in economics and business despite it being a “dysfunctional orthodoxy.”
This Neoclassical orientation is evidenced in supply chain research by the work of
LaCoste (2012). Her management of vertical co-opetition is accomplished using a continuum
consisting of cooperation and price competition. She argues these are opposite ends of a
cooperation-competition continuum. However, cooperation is relational and coopetition (based
on price competition) is transactional and short term in the Neoclassical sense. As such, these
constructs do not form an internally consistent managerial continuum.
Wu et al (2010) discussed coopetition relationship dynamics in terms of parallel
sourcing, which is, sourcing the same product from two different, competing suppliers. The
competition between them induces cooperative interaction. Bendtsson and Kock (2000) state that
competition research has primarily investigated horizontal inter-firm relationships among
competitors. There has been little research devoted to vertical competitive relationships.
Horizontal inter-firm relationship studies are dominated by the Neoclassical orientation.
Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1997) described coopetition as complex combination of
two opposite logics of intention. It is characterized by a collaboration paradigm in which the
firm’s interests are characterized by commitment and a competitive paradigm in which the firms’
interests are characterized by completely conflicting interests (Bengtsson and Knock 2000;
Dowling et al 1996). In their definition, competition is Neoclassical concept devoid of any
56

relational dimension. From a Neoclassical orientation, competition may evoke “completely
conflicting interests,” but if there is a relational orientation being considered, is this true? Blind
et al (2012) suggest that coopetition is used if the focal firm carries out cooperative activities
with other firm that he (the focal firm) classifies as competing regardless of whether the
competition is for the same product or in the same industry. In these cases, competition is
exogenous between two or more competing organizations. Clearly, the Neoclassical orientation
dominates any relational concept of competition in economics and business.
Hence, due to the “dysfunctional orthodoxy,” researchers have not addressed the concept
that competition can be a relational, managerial strategy alternative to cooperation as suggested
by May and Doob (1937 ) and Michie and Sibley (1985). Michie and Sibley (1979, p. 72) said,
“Acceptance of the conflict-cooperation continuum is due to stereotypical
thinking. Marketers accept without question the notion that competition is an
external environmental condition.”
Adherence to Neoclassical dictum has severely limited recent research in coopetition. In
Game Theory, competition has been shown to be an alternative strategy to cooperation as a
means to achieve superior financial performance.
A second serious shortcoming of the traditional model is the notion that channel members
have two equivalent, alternative management strategies to achieve channel coordination and
performance. These are cooperation versus conflict management, that is, the cooperation-conflict
continuum (Ferrell & Hartline, 2008; Robicheaux & El-Ansary, 1975; Michie & Sibley, 1985).
Partnering firms may enter a relationship seeking to avoid conflict, but avoidance is managed by
collaborative tactics. Partnering firms do not implement conflict resolution until conflict, an
outcome variable of a management process, requires it. There has to be an alternative
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management strategy to collaboration. It is not conflict. Game Theory suggests it is relational,
strategic competition.
The cooperation-conflict management continuum is inadequate for several reasons. There
is little face, content or empirical validity for a policy that a firm would intentionally enter a
business relationship expecting it to be fraught with conflict. In addition, researchers often refer
to competition as entering the channel management continuum. (Dant and Schul, 1992; LaCoste
2012; Schurr and Ozanne, 1985; Sheth and Parvatiyar, 1995; Quintana-G and Benevides-V,
2004).
The conflict management mechanism has a fatal flaw in logic and practice. As discussed
previously, channel conflict is an outcome behavior derived from management policy. Conflict
should not exist unless there is disagreement over the distribution of relational benefits or unfair
performance differences between dyadic partners to an already existing relationship. Once
conflict arises, it requires resolution (Heide, Wathne, & Rokkan, 2007; Hibbard, Kumar, &
Stern, 2001)
Conflict management cannot be the equivalent and/or an alternative management style to
cooperation/collaboration because conflict resolution alone cannot achieve channel coordination
(Paulraj and Chen, 2007). Conflict resolution is beneficial if conflict is functional. If conflict is
dysfunctional, resolution may not be possible. In reality, the traditional model has but one
strategy to achieve coordination. It is cooperation or what some call “strategic collaborative
advantage” – a concept elevated to theory status (Paulraj and Chen, 2007).
In addition, most studies in supply chain research have collected the perceptions of only
one side of the dyad, that of the dealers or manufacturers (Frazier & Summers, 1986; Jap 1999;
LaCoste 2012; Nyaga et al 2010; Vasquez et al, 2004). Most research cites the need for dyadic
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and longitudinal study. Although evidence supports causal relationships in empirical research,
the methodologies used by most studies rely primarily on association tests of significance, that is,
correlation and cross-sectional regression (Gaski & Nevin, 1985; Hunt & Nevin, 1974; Lusch,
1976). Jap (1999) and Vasquez, et al (2005) have been among the first to specifically address
causation.

2.6 SUMMARY

There has been a robust literature developed regarding the theoretical and empirical
support for the traditional model of distribution behavior and management. It is also clear that
the marketing discipline has not resolved a clear understanding of the model’s antecedent,
managerial or outcome behaviors’ roles, dimensionality or effects despite this effort. The
dynamic business environment continues to present new circumstances that challenge our
understanding. However, there are several tenants with the traditional and emerging literature
that are significant for my research. Hunt (2010) argument that Neoclassical Economics and its
Equilibrium Theory of Perfect Competition has constrained business and marketing thought is
extremely important. His RA Theory provides support for investigating competition as a
relational, strategic management strategy. Competition can be a relational, intangible resource of
the firm or distribution system.
The literature also supports further investigating the roles, dimensions and effects of the
various behaviors within the model. Certainly, power is a significant antecedent and becomes
more important given its dimensionality and asymmetry. Conflict may not be a viable managerial
alternative to cooperation (Michie and Sibley (1979). Given its dimensionality, dysfunctional
conflict becomes an outcome variable that requires resolution. Research suggests that
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competition is both exogenous and endogenous, that is, it has a relational dimension that may be
an alternative managerial strategy to cooperation. Deutch (1949) said that theories of cooperation
were based on the premise that individuals and organizations could select between cooperative
and competitive strategies to achieve relevant objectives and to allocate scarce resources. Again,
the Neoclassical economics perspective may have caused marketing researchers to overlook such
seminal work. Little is known about opportunism except that it is defined in terms of
unconstrained self-interest and is considered detrimental to relationships. But how is
opportunism manifest within distribution relationships?
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CHAPTER 3: A REVISED MODEL OF SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT –
THE COOPERATION – COMPETITION CONTINUUM AND THE ROLE
OF CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT (CRM)
In Chapter 2, I summarized the key tenants of the traditional models of channel
management and supply chain management. I discussed the model’s key behaviors that illustrate
its “critical path” including antecedents, the cooperation-conflict continuum and outcome
variables. I explained the model’s theoretical underpinnings and emphasized that its theoretical
foundation and research literature are based on Neoclassical Economics. Lastly, I critiqued the
model pointing out its theoretical and practical shortcomings.
In this chapter, I introduce a new revised model of supply chain management. The major
revision is a relational, strategic management continuum: cooperation-competition. Because the
key antecedents and outcomes of this model (except my treatment of conflict) are those of the
traditional model, my discussion is centered on the theoretical framework that supports the
proposed managerial continuum. Lastly, significant research emphasis has been given to the role
of Customer Relationship Marketing (CRM) in consumer marketing. At issue is what role does
CRM play within the context of supply chain management? I will discuss CRM as a
manifestation of the cooperation-competition continuum.

3.1 THE SUPPLY CHAIN SYSTEM

As mentioned, the seven foundation theories discussed previously significantly explain
the supply chain and its management. While channels research has been a primary focus of
marketing thought and development, a paradigm shift has emerged that is focused on the supply
chain. Previous research is germane to the supply chain given that most researchers consider the
channel of distribution to be a downstream subset of the overall supply chain (Flynn et al 2010;
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Latonr 2001; Nishquchi and Deaudet 1998; Vasquez et al 2004). Further, if the new model is
relevant, its antecedents and strategic outcomes of collaboration management are likely to be
those associated with relational competition management (May and Doob 1937; Michie and
Sibley 1985; Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1977; Bengtsson and Kock 1999; Dagnino and Padula
2002; Nyaga et al 2010). Given these conclusions, the supply chain model should apply equally
well to either distribution concept.

3.2 THE REVISED MODEL OF SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT BEHAVIOR

Based on previous research results and applying the proposed cooperation-competition
continuum to the revised supply chain management model, the new model is shown on Figure 2.
Based on the recommendation from my dissertation committee, Figure 2 highlights only those
modifications to the traditional model’s behavioral constructs that are specific to my dissertation
research. In the Appendix A - Figure A.1, a comprehensive model shows my behavioral
construct modifications to the traditional model of supply chain management while also showing
other relationships that are beyond the scope of this dissertation but are part of future research.
As reported in the literature review, relationships between power, cooperation, conflict, trust and
performance have been extensively researched and reported.
The primary hypothesized relationships among the constructs in Figure 2 are indicated by
arrows linking the antecedents, the cooperation-competition management continuum and the
various output variables. The primary structural revision is that competition replaces conflict as
the managerial alterative to cooperation. Coopetition exists along the continuum between
cooperation and competition. As will be discussed below, opportunism is an extension of the
cooperation-competition continuum, but is differentiated by extreme self-interest evidenced by
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an unacceptable negative return of benefits to one or both parties. Conflict is positioned as an
outcome variable similar to trust and performance. Conflict has two dimensions: functional and
dysfunctional. Functional conflict is associated with cooperation and lower levels of competition.
Dysfunctional conflict is associated with higher levels of competition, opportunism, lack of trust,
performance and termination of the relationship.

Figure 2: Revised Model of Supply Chain Management Behavior

Customer relationship marketing (CRM) is really an extension, or a special case, of the
cooperation-competition continuum and is associated to other outcome variables such as trust
and performance. Specifically, this research is intended and designed to investigate the
behavioral associations and interrelationships among power, the cooperation-competition
continuum, opportunism, conflict, customer relationship marketing, trust and performance.
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The Cooperation-Competition Continuum

The new relational, strategic management cooperation-competition continuum is
postulated to be a more realistic management paradigm than its traditional cooperation-conflict
counterpart. The theoretical framework that supports the new continuum is specifically based on
RA Theory and Game Theory. As discussed, the theoretical framework supports the continuum
itself and the concept that competition can be a relational, strategic managerial strategy.
Game theory’s theoretical support for relational competition as a strategic managerial
strategy has already been developed and discussed. While implicit within RA Theory, Hunt’s
(2010) theoretical logic for relational competition must be explained. Hunt maintains that an
organization achieves competitive advantage by combining heterogeneous and imperfectly
mobile tangible and intangible resources to create market offerings that are valued by some
segment(s) of the market, that is they service some target customer segment’s wants or needs. If
these unique resource combinations, or offerings, are valued by some meaningful and substantial
market segment(s), the organization achieves comparative advantage. These unique market
offerings are the basis for superior financial performance.
What specifically supports competition as a relational management behavior within RA
Theory? At the system level of the supply chain, the firm’s resource base extends to include
intangible, relational resources that add to the firm’s comparative advantage (Hunt and Davis
2012). These unique sets of system tangible and nontangible resources are a natural result of
exogenous competition. But, RA Theory maintains that critical “relational competencies” may
achieve different levels of cooperation, coordination, competitiveness and performance. Supply
chain systems and firms with valued relational resources are likely to achieve higher levels of
cooperation and coordination (Hunt and Davis 2012). These “relational resources” include
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policies, culture, governance, cooperation, and competition among others. Thus, Hunt’s
definition of intangible resources provides a sound logical basis to conclude that competition has
a relational dimension, both endogenous and endogenous to the firm, and therefore can be a
relational managerial strategy that contributes to the firm’s comparative advantage. The
theoretical foundation for a relational, strategic cooperation-competition continuum is supported.
Given this theoretical base, the supply chain literature also provides support for the
cooperation-competition continuum. The cooperation dimension is well developed to the point
that the traditional model has but one strategy: cooperation or what some call “strategic
collaborative advantage” – a concept elevated to theory status (Paulraj and Chen, 2007).
Studies tout the positive benefits of relational collaboration as being the key to customer seller
relationships that improve value creation and the customer’s competitive advantage (Anderson
and Narus 1991; Cardozo et al 1992, Day 2000; dun and Thomas 1994; Dyer and Singh 1998;
Ford 2001, Grönroos 1997; Jap 1999; Morgan and Hunt 1994).
Chen (2008) discussed the interrelationship between relational cooperation and
competition within a global context. He said globalization requires the exploration of cooperative
and competitive commercial business worldwide and that these constructs need to be studied
from a new perspective. Western civilization considers these constructs to be paradoxical
opposites, perhaps the most significant paradox among organizational phenomena. A paradox is
a dichotomized condition in which psychological and social perceptions of constrained polarities
mask the simultaneity of conflicting truths (Lewis 2000). Two opposites may be interrelated and
together form a new theoretical construct (Chen 2002; Lewis 2000).
Chen (2008) says globalization supports a Chinese “middle way” philosophy that
emphasizes balance, the integration of opposites and enables opposites to be considered
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interdependent. He classifies dyads as a) dependent opposites characterized by cooperation and
competition strategies being independent, even irreconcilable, zero-sum where competitive selfinterest is inversely related to cooperation; b) interconnected opposites characterized by both
cooperation and competition being interrelated strategies influencing each other. The dyad
exhibits relationship asymmetry with each partner viewing the relationship differently; and c) all
inclusive interdependent opposites (a dyad that reflects cooperation, competition and integrated
strategies) that includes strategies that allow for unforeseen events and behaviors and are
influenced significantly by exogenous variables including institutions (government) and cultural
norms. Chen (2008) almost made the transition from Neoclassical economics to relational
marketing but his description of dyadic behavior and zero sum maintain vestiges of Neoclassical
thought.
Although Chen’s (2008) conceptualization may not have made a complete transition to
relational marketing, there is an emerging theme among the researchers that cooperation and
competition form a continuum and that coopetition can be an amalgamation between relational
cooperation and competition (Michie and Sibley 1985; Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1997:
Bengtsson and Kock 1999; Dagnino and Padula (2002).
Business success does not require that relational benefits be symmetrical (Alderson 1965;
Chen 2008; Hunt 2010; Nyaga 2010; Costen and Kumar 2005). Benton and Moloni (2005) state
buyers and sellers “are assumed” to be willing and able to cultivate mutually beneficial
relationships. However, The Notion of Equity Theory says the distribution of benefits is
generally asymmetrical (Adams 1965). An individual firm’s goal is to do well (self-interest), but
superior financial and non-economic performance are not short term goals like the Neoclassical
profit motive; they are mid to long term goals. Research shows many firms struggle to achieve
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the desired level of collaboration and expected benefits (Nyaga et al 2010). However, this
conveys neither business failure nor financial loss. Both parties do not share equally in the
associated benefits but this means the “win can be different” between the parties – but this is still
a “win” for both (Nyaga et al 2010; Costen and Kumar 2005). Thus, the “win-win” condition can
be asymmetrical, but acceptable to both parties (Nyaga et al 2010; Whipple and Frankel 2000).
Certain research has attributed asymmetrical benefits to power asymmetry between
partners (LaCoste 2012).

The focal party may command the lion’s share of the benefits

including financial. Because acceptable returns are defined in terms of expectations, expectations
connote a range, that is, expectations may consist of a norm or be within an acceptable range
(plus or minus) of that norm (LaCoste 2012). In either case, the asymmetric benefit distribution
can be acceptable to both parties. In game theory, competition is defined as two parties striving
together to achieve mutual benefits (goals in-common) in which the benefit distribution (goal
achievement) is asymmetrical. As long as the benefit distribution falls within the range of
acceptable expectations of both parties, the relationship will endure. Zerbini and Castaldo (2007)
maintain that competition is consistent with relational value sharing appropriation within the
context of game theory. Aliouat (1996) created a benefit matrix that showed mutual earnings of a
customer-supplier partnership could double if the customer introduced relational competition to
his collaborative management strategy program.
Espousing a Neoclassical context, LaCoste (2012) stated that research indicates relational
value sharing leads to competition between partners because value appropriation is a zero sum
game. The more value one party receives, the less value is available for the other. This argument
ignores the benefits of synergy associated with coordination of supply chain activity.
Collaboration is touted to facilitate opportunities to grow the business (Hunt and Davis 2012).
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As suggested by Aliouat (1996), relational competition holds the same promise for synergy and
growth. As a managerial continuum, relational cooperation and competition complement each
other in supporting synergy and growth opportunities for the partnership. Relational competition
is not a zero sum. Hence, the theoretical basis for competition as a relational, strategic
management alternative to cooperation has been established.
Does the asymmetrical distribution of benefits create an ethical dilemma? How have
marketers addressed the Notion of Equity Theory within the context of the Judeo-Christian
Fairness Doctrine? Within Christianity, fairness is related to the concept of distributive and
procedural justice (Kumar 1995). Distributive justice pertains to the fair distribution of benefits
or outcomes between the parties. In distributive justice, fairness is determined by distributed
benefits between the parties falling within the acceptable range of expectations. Circumstance
can change the definition of what is fair. For instance, in today’s lean business environment,
suppliers are willing to accept a significantly lower return in exchange for business that will
increase production output. Should demand improve, suppliers will renegotiate or replace these
(now) unacceptable returns with business that maintains or increases production levels and yields
an acceptable higher return (Lara 2011; Levine 2010).
Procedural justice pertains to the process by which the benefits are distributed. Kumar
(1995) argued that procedural justice is the more important. Benton and Maloni (2005) agree by
stating that satisfaction is impacted more by the nature of the relationship than by the distribution
of performance benefits. The ethical issue for marketers appears to be addressed within the
context of procedural justice. As long as the parties understand the exchange relationship and
accept the asymmetrical distribution of benefits, the win-win condition with positive returns
addresses any ethical concerns.
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Opportunism
What is the condition that explains the situation in which the expected benefit distribution
is unacceptable or negative? Unacceptable defines opportunism. As discussed in Chapter 2,
opportunism is self-interest with guile (Hill 1990). RA Theory has as a primary premise that
self-interest is constrained. Constrained self-interest is consistent with my definition of relational
competition and the concept of acceptable distribution of benefits.
Opportunism, however, is an inherent human characteristic that surfaces whenever it is
unchecked by competitive structures or governance models (norms or trust) fitting the
complexity and uncertainty in the environment (John 1984). It is a special case of business
failure. Businesses can fail because they lack the critical resource capability, or understanding of
demand, necessary to achieve value creation that is desired by the marketplace. Opportunism is a
relational marketing tactic characterized by extreme self-interest and an intention to capture a
disproportionate share of the benefits within the relationship. It reflects unconstrained selfinterest. It leads to business termination.
In terms of expectations, the abused party is not able to achieve his reasonable
(acceptable) expectations of benefit sharing due to the excessive self-interest activities of the
other party. Opportunistic behavior exceeds the expected range (fair) of differentiated sharing of
value added. Research has found opportunism to be associated with dysfunctional conflict,
competition, asymmetric coercive power, lack of trust, compromised financial performance,
comparative and competitive advantage, disruption and the termination of the relationship
(Williamson 1975; Geykens et al 1996; Leonidou 2008).
Opportunism may be tolerated in the short term but will ultimately terminate the
relationship. It implies unadulterated self-interest to such an extent that dysfunctional conflict
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results and termination of the relationship is the option of choice (Hill 1990). Opportunism
clearly does not support an objective to achieve the coordination necessary for sustainable
competitive advantage and superior financial performance. Research has deemed it to be
detrimental to a supply chain relationship.
In summary, I postulate that marketing theory and research provide a foundation that
supports the notion that the relational cooperation-competition continuum is a more realistic
strategic approach to achieving coordination and superior financial performance in the supply
chain than is the Neoclassical-based, cooperation-conflict continuum of the traditional model of
supply chain management.

The Hypotheses

Based on the theoretical foundation, the literature review and discussion, the following
hypotheses pertaining to the cooperation-competition continuum are postulated. The previous
literature review detailed the theoretical support justifying each of the following hypotheses.
Here I will only highlight the major bases supporting the hypotheses. As discussed, the
alternative managerial strategies proposed for the continuum have a theoretical basis of support.
Collaboration is so well recognized by the discipline as a managerial strategy that the construct
has been designated “Strategic Collaborative Advantage” and elevated to theory status (Lusch
and Vargo 2007; Paulraj and Chen 2007). Competition (relational and endogenous) is considered
an alternative managerial strategy by game theorists (May and Doob 1937; Brandenburg and
Nalebuff 1977) and others (Michie and Sibley 1985; Chen 2008). Michie and Sibley (1985) and
Chen (2008) specifically stated that cooperation and competition exist as interconnected
opposites and, thus, are interrelated strategies influencing each other. Given this theoretical
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framework, I tested the managerial continuum of cooperation-competition against the
independent measures of cooperation and competition. The hypotheses are:
H1a: There is a positive relationship between the relational management continuum and
cooperation.
H1b: There is a negative relationship between the relational management continuum and
competition.
Opportunism is considered a special case of business failure (John 1984). Opportunism is
characterized by extreme self-interest or an intent to capture a disproportionate share of benefits
from the relationship. As such, opportunism exceeds the reasonable expectations for an
acceptable return; hence the result is the return becomes unacceptable and dysfunctional conflict
leads to termination of the relationship (Hill 1990). Because the self-interest return is
unacceptable, the following hypothesis is:
H1c: There is a negative relationship between the relational management continuum and
opportunism.
Because the objective of the supply chain system is superior financial return (Hunt 2010),
the relationship between the continuum and expected value added return is important to our
understanding of the management of the cooperation-competition continuum. Acceptable returns
are associated with the continuum (Chen 2008) definition and unacceptable returns are
associated with opportunism (Hill 1990). Given the operational measure applied to the
continuum (the Index), I test the following two hypotheses:
H2a: There is a negative relationship between the expected value added return (expressed
as the deviation from normal profit) and the relational management continuum.
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H2b: There is a positive relationship between the expected value added return (expressed
as the deviation from normal profit) and opportunism.
Consistent with the traditional model, my revised model presents power as a major
antecedent associated with the cooperation-competition continuum. In marketing the most
accepted application of power is “the ability to influence or control the behaviors, decisions,
intentions and actions of others in pursuit of one’s own interest” (Dahl 1957; El Ansary and
Stern 1972; Sheu and Hu 2009). In distribution management the role of power is highly
controversial. Hingley (2005) claims power is pervasive and important. Others discount the
importance of its role and claim it is a function of cooperation, trust, commitment and
satisfaction. They claim is negatively associated with cooperation (Doney and Cannon
1997;Bretherton and Carswell 2002; Pole and Haskell 2002).
Researchers cannot agree whether power is symmetrical or asymmetrical. Gummesson
(1994) and Naude and Buutle (2000) claim it is both. Kumar (1996) claims most relationships
exhibit asymmetric power. Blois (1997) says asymmetric power is detrimental, unstable and has
a negative influence on the relationship. In contrast, Hingley (2005) says an asymmetric
relationship with proportional sharing of value added is preferred and is not a barrier to the
formation of close and workable relationships. Most researchers agree that asymmetric power
relationships are complex. Based on these findings, I propose the following two hypotheses:
H3a: There is a negative relationship between power asymmetry and the relational
management continuum.
H3b. There is a positive relationship between power asymmetry and opportunism.
Conflict is an outcome of the cooperation-competition continuum, particularly associated
with competition and opportunism (May and Doob 1937; Michie and Sibley 1985). Marketing
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literature has shown that conflict is also associated with asymmetric power, coercive power, trust
and performance (Brown et al 1995; Maloni and Benton 1000; Belaya et al 2009). Conflict is
characterized as having two dimensions: functional and dysfunctional. Functional conflict, the
burr under the saddle, is beneficial to a relationship. Dysfunctional which involves intense
disagreement is likely to terminate a relationship. The critical treatment given conflict in the
revised model is its primary role as a significant outcome variable of the cooperationcompetition management process (Michie and Sibley 1985).
H4a: There is a negative relationship between the relational managerial continuum and
conflict.
H4b: There is a positive relationship between conflict and opportunism.

3.3 THE ROLE OF CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP MARKETING

Customer relationship marketing (CRM) is considered a business strategy for optimizing
customer portfolios particularly the customer lifetime value (CLV) dimension (Baran, Galka, &
Strunk, 2008). A customer portfolio tends to follow the 80-20 Rule. Studies show that ten
percent of your customer base generates sixty to seventy percent of your business. This customer
segment is critical to a firm’s profitable component of its Customer Lifetime Value (CLV). They
are recipients of specialized marketing programs loaded with incentives and perks. They are the
preferred clients, the Advantage Miles, the “complementary” gamblers at Vegas hotels.
Empirical studies have found that another forty percent of customers are marginally profitable,
but the remaining forty percent are likely to be net-loss customers. It costs more to market to
them than they return in profit margin.
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Customer Relationship Marketing is “a practice that encompasses all marketing activities
toward establishing, developing, and maintaining successful customer relationships. It focus is
on long term relationships and improving performance through customer loyalty and satisfaction
achieved at a profit.” (CRMktg Today, 2008). Customer relationship marketing requires that firm
members with customer contacts integrate with and support developing the long-term customer
relationship. Emphasis has to be placed on the acquisition, maintenance, retention and
termination of the customer base. Retention is a major theme. Sheth found that it costs five times
more to replace a customer than to retain him (Christopher et al., 1991). The White House Office
of Consumer Affairs found that the cost to attract new customers is more than the cost to retain
him (Sanchez 2008).
Customer relationship marketing utilizes customer relationship management as a market
segmentation tool that enables customer portfolios to be identified, classified and targeted by
degree of profitability or loss. Customer relationship marketing (CRM) is the implementation
strategy required to implement the customer-centric orientation and the long-term relationship
objectives of the firm – at a profit.
The goals for integrating these relational exchange concepts include customer satisfaction
and loyalty (Baran, Galka, & Strunk, 2008). Customer loyalty is the key to long term, profitable
customer relationships. Loyalty accomplishes more with company profits than traditional scale,
market share, unit costs and other factors associated with competitive advantage (Sanchez,
2008).
This study is also focused on whether or not the supply chain employs customer
relationship marketing as market segmentation and a managerial strategy, or both. Does this
marketing concept permeate the supply chain?
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Given that CRM is significantly based on collaboration and brand loyalty as evidenced
by benefits accruing to frequent users of the firm’s products or services, and superior financial
performance is anticipated, the following hypotheses are offered:
H5a: There is a positive relationship between the relational managerial continuum and
customer relationship marketing (CRM)
H5b: There is a positive relationship between CRM and trust.
H5c: There is a positive relationship between CRM and performance
The remaining hypotheses pertain to the relationship between the managerial continuum
of cooperation-competition and two primary outcome variables: trust and performance. The most
popular definition of trust is “the extent to which a firm believes its exchange partner is honest
and benevolent (Rempel et al 1985; Kumar 1996; Geyskens et al 1998; Spekman et al 1998).
Trust has several characteristics and role in relational marketing. Several authors tout its long
term characteristic (Anderson and Weitz 1989; Granovetter 1985; Hallen et al 1991; Nevin
1995). Reed (2001 and Uzzi (1997) characterized trust as a governance mechanism that
coordinates by relying on industry norms and cooperation. Others claim it substitutes for power
(Walgenback 2001), mitigates risk (Das and Tang 2001; Reed 2001) and establishes a positive
“expectation” towards each other (Rempel et al 1985; Costen and Kumar 2005). Leonidou
(2008) claims cooperation is an antecedent to trust. Given these findings, the following
hypothesis testing the cooperation-cooperation continuum, trust relationship is:
H6a: There is a positive relationship between the relational managerial continuum and
trust.
Lastly, Hunt (2010) defines the ultimate outcome of a distribution or marketing relationship is
superior financial performance. Clearly, the dominant theme in marketing is that “strategic
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collaboration advantage” begets performance including superior financial performance (Hunt
and Davis 2012; Lusch and Vargo 2007). However, I must caution that distribution performance,
despite its theoretical underpinnings, has been difficult to measure with significant results.
However, based on the literature, my final hypothesis is:
H6b: There is a positive relationship between the relational managerial continuum and
performance.
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN
The research methodology is intended to gather the data necessary to test the revised
model and the research hypotheses. The model is focused on certain “critical path” constructs
associated with supply chain coordination including key antecedents; the relational, strategic
cooperation-competition continuum and opportunism; and the output behaviors conflict, CRM,
trust and performance. As indicated, these behavioral constructs constitute the hypothesized
relationships to be tested.

4.1 THE RESEARCH DESIGN: OVERVIEW

The primary research thesis is to test whether relational competition represents an
alternative strategy of management vis-à-vis traditional cooperation. If relational competition is
supported as a management strategy, the revised cooperation – competition continuum will
challenge conventional wisdom and provide a new direction for distribution research.
In addition, the research design attempts to overcome a frequently cited limitation of
distribution research. A common criticism is previous research focused on one side of the
supplier-buyer dyad and extrapolated that single “key informant” response as an explanation of
the two-party, dyadic relationship. This study incorporates the perceptions of both the buyer and
supplier key informants, surveyed independently, responding with reference their specific dyadic
relationship.
The study also attempts to investigate vertical dyadic relationships within a supply chain
system setting between the Manufacturer-Tier 1 Dyad and the Tier 1 – Tier 2 Dyad, that is, the
Supplier-to-Supplier Dyad (See Appendix A - Figure A.2). The extension to Tier 1 and Tier 2
suppliers in the vertical supply chain is among the first of this kind.
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The study investigates a global supply chain that is administered by Mexico’s
automotive industry. Although the Mexican global automotive system is a subset of the major
manufacturers’ global system (Chrysler, Nissan, etc.), I am investigating the Mexican
headquarters administration of its Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers dispersed globally. This research
design is restricted to an investigation of the dyadic relationships among manufacturers and their
direct material suppliers. Direct materials are those materials, components and sub-assemblies
that become a physical part of the final product. Their tangible nature constitutes higher
economic value added contributions to the final product. Indirect materials and service providers
are excluded due to the complexity of the expanded supply chain network and the complexity of
measuring their value added contributions.

4.2 THE INTRODUCTIONS

In order to gain access to Mexico’s auto industry, business meetings were set up
with various Mexican business leaders who had experience with or access to industry.
Particularly helpful was Sr. Don Jaime Bermudez C, whose contacts with industry and
government were invaluable. Through him and his associates, meetings were arranged with
Mexico’s Undersecretary of Industry and Commerce, part of Mexico’s Secretariat of Economy;
the directors of the automotive manufacturer’s and supplier’s associations; Mexico’s
Maquiladora Industry representatives; and corporate managers of twelve Mexican automotive
manufacturers. The appointment schedules for these meetings are contained in the Appendix A Tables A.2 and A.3.
Two trips were taken to Mexico City, Toluca, Puebla and Pachuca. These meetings set up
the introductions with the associations and companies that would support my research. The first
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trip, August 15, 2011, was coordinated by Sr. Rafael McCadden, Director, Industrial and
Logistics, Colliers International-Mexico City, who set up initial meetings with the automotive
trade associations and companies. Sr. McCadden arranged meetings with Sr. Jesus Serrano
Landeros, Director, Industry and Commerce – Heavy Industry and High Technology; Sr. Agustin
Rios, Executive President, Mexican Association of Auto Parts Manufacturers (INA); Dr.
Eduardo Solis, President, Mexico’s Association of Automotive Manufacturers (AMIA) and
executives of twelve Mexican automotive manufacturers.
These meetings were very important. Sr. Jesus Serrano Landeros indicated his office was
supportive. He agreed to provide a letter endorsing the project. Sr. Agustin Rios agreed to write a
letter of introduction and endorsement to his board of directors and members. Dr. Eduardo Solis
indicated that he would contact the various manufacturers to encourage their participation. The
various automotive executives were interviewed and each explained his business operations in
Mexico. Each agreed to have his legal and operational managers review the project. In addition,
their purchasing directors were designated to review and critique the project: its research design
including research issues, questionnaire, data collection plan and key informant approach. As a
result of these meetings, I met with the purchasing directors from the major companies. Two
automotive trade associations and eight manufacturing companies committed to participate. I
was very encouraged by the endorsements and agreements received.
The second trip was taken February 8, 2012. The purpose of this trip was to meet with Sr.
Oscar Albin, the new executive president of the Mexican Association of Auto Parts
Manufacturers, Dr. Eduardo Solis and the automotive purchasing directors of the companies who
had agreed to participate.

Chrysler, King Autobus, General Motors had not initiated data
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collection. As a result of these meetings, everyone except Volkswagen’s purchasing director
agreed to move forward with the data collection.

4.3 THE SAMPLE FRAME AND DATA COLLECTION

As mentioned, my research design involved investigating the vertical automotive supply
chain that is administered by global Mexican automotive companies. The following discussion
describes how the sampling plan and data collection processes were administered by the
automotive companies and the automotive supplier association.

6

See Appendix A, Figure A.3

and A.4.
As mentioned, my sampling plans were based on the dyadic relationships among the
manufacturers and their Tier 1 and Tier 2 Suppliers. My sampling plans consisted of two
different initiatives: the manufacturer and the Tier 1 Supplier’s administrated initiatives. The
key informants utilized for each initiative depended on the dyadic relationship being
investigated. For example, for the manufacturer’s sampling plan, the Manufacturer-Tier 1
Supplier dyadic relationship informants were purchasing agents (manufacturer) and sales
representatives (Tier 1 Suppliers). For the Tier 1-Tier 2 Supplier dyadic relationship, the key
informants were the purchasing agents (Tier 1 Supplier) and sales representatives (Tier 2
supplier). For each of the two dyadic relationships, the key informants were intended to have
long standing direct materials, sourcing relationships.
The Trade Association Sampling Plan employed a similar key informant format.
However, the key administrator for this plan was the Tier 1 Supplier’s management. The Tier 1
6

The research methodology outlined here represents an adaptation of the methodology used by
Jap (1999) for her study of four manufacturing companies’ procurement divisions, except my
sampling plan was complicated by being conducted in a global supply chain environment.
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manager selected his sales agents to assess his supply chain relationships with his manufacturer
clients (purchasing agents). He also selected his purchasing agent to assess his firm’s relationship
with and his Tier 2 Supplier (sakes agent). His sales representative selected his manufacturing
purchasing agent counterpart and his purchasing agent selected his Tier 2 Supplier sales
representative counterpart. ( See Appendix A - Figure A.3).
My data collection plan for the manufacturer’s upstream supply chain consisted of two
different survey procedures. The first focused on the manufacturer’s purchasing department to
identify, administer and control its purchasing agents who would work closely with their
counterpart Tier 1 Supplier sales representatives to complete reciprocal surveys regarding their
dyadic relationship (Manufacturer –Tier 1 Supplier Dyadic Survey). Depending on the size of the
manufacturer, up to twenty purchasing agents might be asked to identify and solicit the
participation of four Tier1 Supplier sales representatives each. Again, depending on the size of
the Tier 1 Supplier, Tier 1 Supplier management would designate two to four purchasing agents
to each select two Tier Two Supplier sales agents to complete reciprocal surveys regarding their
dyadic relationship. (Tier 1 – Tier 2 Supplier Dyadic Survey). Given this procedure, the
maximum potential Manufacturer-Tier 1 Supplier dyadic relationships could total 640 responses
(8 x 20 x 4) and the maximum potential Tier 1-Tier 2 Supplier dyadic relationships could total
5,120 responses (640 x 4 x 2). Obviously, these maximum potential responses would not be
attained.
The second procedure focused on using the members of the Tier 1 Supplier association to
identify, administer and control their sales representatives to work closely with their client’s
purchasing agents to complete reciprocal surveys (Tier 1 Supplier – Manufacturer Dyadic
Survey). Each Tier 1 Supplier was asked to designate four sales representatives to identify two
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manufacturer purchase agents each. Again, depending on the size of the company, Tier 1
Supplier management was asked to designate four purchasing agents who would each select two
Tier 2 Supplier sales representatives to complete reciprocal surveys (Tier 1 –Tier 2 Supplier
dyadic relationship). Thus, the survey of the manufacturer’s upstream supply chain would be
complete (Manufacturer-Tier 1 Supplier – Tier Two Supplier Dyadic Relationships; See
Appendix A - Figure A.4).

4.4 THE QUESTIONNAIRES

The research design required the development and administration of four specific
questionnaires (Manufacturer Purchasing Agent, Tier 1 Sales Representative, Tier 1 Purchasing
Agent, Tier 2 Sales Representative). Further, each questionnaire had to be available in English
and Spanish. The English and Spanish versions were parallel translated to make certain the
different versions were identical. Specific instructions and illustrations headlined each survey
appropriate for the participating group. Written instructions and graphic illustrations were
specified to help the respondent administer correctly and/or complete the questionnaire. The
questionnaires’ layouts were a standard format that began with general categorical questions
followed by the interval scale questions covering the antecedent, cooperation-competition
continuum, customer relationship marketing and the major outcome constructs and ended with
more sensitive sales related information. See Appendix B.
The survey procedure and questionnaire was pretested with manufacturer purchasing
agents and Tier 1 and Tier 2 representatives. Given the proximity of Mexico’s Maquiladora
Industry in Juarez, Mexico, I was able to pretest the questionnaire with the purchasing
departments of two major automotive companies and their Tier 1Suppliers. I also held a focus
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group session with a major supplier and his Tier 2 suppliers. In addition, there were several
discussions with manufacturing and supplier managers during these companies’ approval review
processes. Several suggestions were received that were incorporated into the final survey
instruments. These suggestions specifically related to the sets of policies used to depict the
operational domains of the Tier 1 and Tier 2 Suppliers.
The response schedule developed with the directors of purchasing gave the purchasing
agents ten working days to complete and submit their surveys and to identify, contact and
distribute the link information to their corresponding Tier 1 Suppliers. For non- respondents, a
reminder was sent electronically to request completion of the survey including the names and
contact information on their corresponding Tier 1 Supplier representatives. A confidential report
listing responding and non-responding purchasing agents was sent to the manufacturer’s
directors of purchasing so they could monitor the data collection effort.
Because the four different questionnaires were administered online, the manufacturer’s
and Tier 1 Supplier administered surveys required their purchasing agents (Manufacturer) and
sales representatives (Tier 1 Suppliers) to distribute the electronic link and questionnaire
(including endorsement letters – Appendix B) to their respective counterparts. All completed
questionnaires were returned directly to my Qualtrics account at the University of Texas at El
Paso. Because Mexican nationals are extremely reluctant to provide confidential information,
research or other, this procedure helped assure the confidentiality of the returns.
For their participation, each company and key informant was assured a) their firm’s
responses would be kept strictly confidential, b) their data would be reported only as part of
summary statistics and findings, and) each company would receive a report of the study’s
findings with a managerial interpretation of the results. As an added inducement, with written
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authorization, each participating company would receive an individualized report comparing his
firm’s response with the summary results.

4.5 THE MEASURES

The construct measures were developed as a result of the literature review and
discussions with industry representatives. Consistent with the discussion of the “critical path”
behaviors with my committee, the construct measures developed here focus on antecedents
(power),

the

relational

cooperation,

competition

continuum

(with

opportunism),

acceptable/unacceptable financial return associated with the continuum constructs and outcomes
(conflict, CRM, trust and performance). Each of the critical path behaviors was measured using
an interval scale (Likert). The financial return measures were ratio scales. The nominal scales are
not discussed in detail.
The policy items selected for specification of the supplier’s business policy domains were
those policies found common to recent supply chain research. Specifically, the policy items were
compared with “common” policy items contained in Gunaskaran and Kobu’s (2007) article. No
item was included in the domains unless the item had appeared in at least one-third of policy
domains used in previous research. The item list was modified by industry representatives,
particularly those items related to logistics and performance. There was also considerable
discussion regarding the measure of value added return and the appropriate range (+,-) around
the “expected” return. Normal profit was the measure industry representatives identified as most
appropriate measure of expected return for their business operations.
Certain of the critical path construct measures including cooperation, conflict, trust and
performance were adopted from previous research with minor modifications. I visited Dr.
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Robert Lusch in Tucson, Arizona and at the 2012 AMA Winter Conference in Florida to obtain
his critique of the dissertation topic and measures being used. He suggested certain measures be
modified by selecting three itemized statements based on reliability coefficients and to reduce
those statements to brief phrases that captured the content of the overall statements.
Description of Measures

Power
Emerson’s (1962) concept of power was adopted for this project. Power is the ability to
influence or control the behaviors, decisions, intentions and actions of others in pursuit of one’s
own interests (Dahl, 1957; El Ansary and Stern, 1972; Sheu and Hu, 2009; Hunt and Nevin
1974; Lusch 1976; Michie 1977). Gaski & Nevin (1985) expressed it as the ability of the
member (a) to control the business operational policies of member (b). In the manufacturer’s
survey, purchasing agents were asked, “What is the degree of influence that exists between you
the manufacturer and this supplier over the supplier’s administration of these policies?” In the
supplier’s survey, Tier 1 Suppliers were asked, “What is the degree of influence that exists
between you and this manufacturer over the administration of these policies? In both surveys,
the seven point Likert-like scale was anchored by: 1= Manufacturer has total influence, ….., 7 =
Supplier has total influence. Again, based on the literature review (Guasekaran et al 2004;
Benton and Maloni 2005; Gunaskaran and Kobu 2007), power was assessed over administration
of the following set of supplier business operational policies:
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Cooperation – Competition Continuum with Opportunism

The cooperation-competition continuum with opportunism was assessed on scales
developed specifically for this study. To assist the respondents understanding of relational
cooperation, competition and opportunism, the following definitions and illustration of the
continuum were presented in each of the manufacturer and supplier surveys. The definitional
information was:

Given the definitions provided, the seven point Likert-like scale that measures the
cooperation-continuum (positive benefit return) is anchored by 1= Total Competition, ----, 7=
Total Cooperation. In both the manufacturer and Tier 1 Supplier questionnaires, the two
behaviors contained in the scale were assessed across the Tier 1 Supplier’s set of business
operational policies. The business policies listed are the same as the ones in the “power”
measure.
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Cooperation – Competition Continuum
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As a convergent validity check of the cooperation and competition measures contained in
the continuum, separate, independent measures of cooperation and competition were asked. A
third measure is in place for opportunism.
The measure of cooperation was adopted from Benton and Maloni’s (2005) study of a
supply chain. The multiple item, Likert-type scale is seven points: 1= Strongly Disagree; 2 =
Mostly Disagree; 3: Somewhat disagree; 4 = Neither Agree nor Disagree; 5 = Somewhat Agree;
6 = Mostly Agree; 7 = Strongly Agree. Here are the items used in the measure.

Benson and Maloni (2002) used this measure in their study of an automotive supply
chain. Each item in the measure was significant at the 0.001 level of significance.
Because most measures of competition are exogenous Neoclassical measures such as
price competition (LaCoste 2012), a measure of relational competition was developed. It, too, is
a multiple item, Likert-like scale with seven points: 1 = Strongly Disagree, ……., 7= Strongly
Agree. Here are the items for the competition measure:
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Range of Acceptable Return on Value Added

An acceptable range of reasonable benefits received is defined as those benefits greater,
or less than, normal (profit) that are acceptable additions to or reductions off normal profit. For
those benefits received that are less than normal profit, but have positive value, those benefits are
likely acceptable because the business deal offers potentially higher returns later in the
relationship or contracts that increases usage of idle capacity toward normal production capacity
(Lara, 2011; Levine, 2010; Russell, 2010).
According to Achrol and Etzel (2003), the condition of the environment has a direct
bearing on performance expectations. Consequently, the research question is:

90

Opportunism

If the reduction from Normal Profit exceeds the minimum level of positive value, that is,
the return becomes negative, opportunism (extreme self-interest) sets in and you begin to seek an
alternative partner for business or to terminate the existing relationship – as unprofitable. Given
this definition, the research question is:
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This final measure of opportunism was modified and further developed during the focus
group sessions and the pretest of the measures.

Conflict

Conflict management in marketing channels research has been a significant research
theme. As evidenced in the literature review, there have been many empirical studies of this
construct. There now appears to be a consensus that conflict does not exist on a continuum with
cooperation, but is an output the result of the relationship’s management similar to trust,
commitment, satisfaction and performance. There are two dimensions of conflict: functional and
dysfunctional. Functional conflict is a positive outcome associated with cooperative
management; dysfunctional conflict will exist and increase as competitive management becomes
more pronounced and, certainly, with opportunism as defined in this study. Most researchers
have defined conflict as a state of disagreement and investigated its intensity, or frequency. The
measure of conflict used here is adopted from Benton and Maloni’s (2005) study with certain
additions to capture both dimensions of conflict.
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Benton and Maloni’s measure showed significant levels better than 0.01 for each of the
items.

Trust

An important behavior that is related to cooperation, power, commitment, competition,
satisfaction and performance is trust. Trust’s interrelationships with these behaviors were
discussed in the literature. Certain researchers argue there is no need to measure commitment
given trust’s extremely close correlation with commitment. Thus, this project will only measure
trust. Again, Benton and Maloni’s (2005) measure will be adopted with minor additions.
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Benton and Maloni (2005) show the levels of significance for the first four statements to
be positive at 0.01. The last two items I added given the strong association between trust and
commitment and the importance of the acceptable range returns.

Customer Relationship Marketing

CRM is investigated in this research project in two ways. The first is to determine
whether CRM is practiced at all by either the supplier or the manufacturer. This will be assessed
by personal in-depth interviews with the manufacturers and his vice president/director of
marketing. The open-ended questions will determine whether, or to what degree, does the
manufacturer practice CRM with a) his channel of distribution members, and b) his major
suppliers. If it appears that there are marketing strategies in place that resemble CRM strategies,
then a measurement will be included in the questionnaire. The measure will determine whether
the core elements of a CRM program are present within the supplier organization. It is likely that
the supplier provides incentives and perks for his major clients, but this may have been a
standard practice employed for years. By considering both segments of the supply chain, I have
the ability to test for contagion within the supply chain, downstream and upstream.
The question is to what degree do these incentives and perks exist as a structured CRM
program.
The Customer Relationship Marketing measure was adapted from a measure in the study
from Reinartz, Krafft and Hoyer (2004) and it is as follows:
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Business Performance

Most researchers agree that performance measurement requires consideration of its
economic and noneconomic dimensions as well as having satisfied the critical goals of the
company. I examine the buyer/seller performance according to the rational goal model that views
organizations as striving for efficiency and productivity (Kumar, Stem, and Achrol 1992). The
measure by Lusch and Brown (1996) is used. It measures the business performance of the
buyer/seller on six aspects of efficiency and productivity: sales growth, profit growth, overall
profitability, liquidity, labor productivity, and cash flow. Responses were framed in terms of
performance relative to other firms in the industry (1 = significantly worse performance than
others in the industry; 7 = significantly better performance).
Non financial measures will include Tactical Accuracy of forecasting techniques, Product
development cycle time, Order entry methods , Effectiveness of delivery invoice methods,
Purchase order cycle time, Planned process cycle time ,Effectiveness of master production
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schedule, Delivery reliability, Responsiveness to urgent deliveries, Effectiveness of distribution
planning schedule among others. The research question is:
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CHAPTER 5: DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
In this chapter I will present the different steps taken to analyze the data, tests performed
to check for discriminant and convergent validity, test of reliability, and exploratory and
confirmatory factor analysis (EFA and CFA) of all reflective scales in the model (which include
the independent scales of cooperation, competition, the scales for opportunism, trust, conflict and
CRM). For each of the constructs of power, the managerial continuum and performance, an
index was created rather than a scale as they are based on formative indicators. No psychometric
analysis is done on these indices (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001).

In regards to

hypotheses testing, a Partial Least Squares (PLS-SEM) assessment of the model was done.

5.1 CLEANING THE DATA
As mentioned in chapter 4, there were two approaches/initiatives to gathering the data;
one was a top-down approach were the OEM Manufacturer initiated the invitations to participate
to their own purchasing agents, who passed a complementary survey to the Tier 1 supplier. The
Tier 1 supplier completed the process by passing on a complementary survey to the Tier 2
supplier. The second approach was a survey invitation initiated by the Tier 1 supplier. The Tier
1 suppliers sent complementary survey downstream to the OEM Manufacturer and upstream to
the Tier 2 supplier. The surveys used in the two approaches were exactly the same; the only
difference is who started the process. The two approaches were designed in order to maximize
responses. Each approach had 4 different group versions (OEM, Tier 1 Seller, Tier 1 Buyer, and
Tier 2) and 2 language versions (English and Spanish). This means that there were a total of 16
files to be merged into one.
Once all the data was collected and downloaded from the Qualtrics server, a single
database was put together. There were a total of 252 observations: 107 were OEMs
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(manufacturers), 69 were Tier 1-Buyers, 48 were Tier 1 Sellers, and 28 were Tier 2 Sellers.
Appendix C1, Table 1 provides further details of the characteristics of respondents. Given these
observations reflect both survey initiatives; there were insufficient pairs of complementary
responses to attempt a dyadic analysis (see Discussion, Chapter 6). Hence, the data analysis
combines the responses obtained from the OEM Manufacturer, Tier 1 suppliers and a few Tier 2
suppliers.

Missing Data
In the case of missing data, I followed the process recommended by Hair et al. (2006).
Out of the 252 observations, 21 observations were deleted from the database because they had
high levels of missing data. A total of 231 usable observations were included in the sample for
construct validations and hypothesis testing. Fourteen of those 231respondents had one or two
questions towards the end of the survey that went unanswered (no data). Those 14 responses
were removed from the dataset for the PLS analysis, leaving a total of 217 usable responses for
testing the model.
In the case of random missing data in some of the observations, I followed the imputation
method recommended by Hair et al. (2006). When missing data is random, the missing value
can be replaced with the subject’s mean for that scale (Hair et al, 2006). For each scale, I
calculated the mean where the denominator value was the actual number of responses for that
given participant. Once that mean was calculated, it was used to replace the missing value,
therefore not altering that summated scale’s final value.

5.2 INDEX AND SUMMATED SCALES
When constructs are conceived as explanatory combinations of indicators that are
determined by a combination of variables, then those indicators are formative (Fornell and
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Bookstein, 1982). In other words, the indicators are formative if they are viewed as causing
rather than being caused by the latent variable they measure. In my research instrument I had
three formative scales: Power Asymmetry, Managerial Continuum and Performance. An index
was calculated for the continuum and it was used in the correlation analysis. Since conventional
procedures used to evaluate the validity and reliability of reflective scales are not appropriate for
composite variables (i.e. indices) with formative indicators (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer,
2001), these indices were not tested for psychometric properties. In the PLS analysis, no index
was used; instead, all the items of these formative scales are included in the model, but
designated as formative indicators.
In the case of ‘Power Asymmetry’, a modification of the scale was done before
calculating the index and doing the analysis.

The original range for the scale was 1

(Manufacturer has total influence), …, 4 (Equal Influence), …, and 7 (Supplier has total
influence). Because we are testing power for levels of symmetry/balance or asymmetry, we are
not necessarily concerned with who has the influence (the manufacturer or the supplier). Rather,
we are concerned with levels of asymmetry. The scale was modified to reflect a value of zero
when the perception of power was one of symmetry (equal influence) or a value different than
zero when the perception was one of asymmetry (one party has more influence than the other).
The scale was modified to a -3 to +3 range. Then only the absolute values were used, were a
score of zero means power symmetry and a higher score (1, 2 or 3) represents higher levels of
power asymmetry. The rest of the constructs were treated as having reflective indicators.
Each variable that was measured with multiple reflective items was subjected to a scale
development and purification procedure (Churchill 1979). A few of the items that were reverse
coded were modified to show the appropriate value. After doing tests of reliability and validity,

99

(see below), items in some of the scales had to be removed, and only those that remained were
used in the analysis tests.

5.3 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY
The majority of the scales used were adapted from previous studies in marketing. Before
running any analysis I had to check the normality, reliability and validity of the reflective scales.
The first step was to check the frequencies and histograms with normality curves.

The

frequencies results showed that there were no observations within the database that were in error,
meaning that the data of each item was within the lower and upper limits of the scale (e.g.
between 1 and 7). The histograms showed acceptable normality, however, some of the items had
distributions that were somewhat skewed. Further testing of each item and scale would point to
any items that were problematic and should be removed for a cleaner, more reliable scale.
I used both qualitative (face validity through in-depth interviews and pretesting) and
quantitative assessment (Cronbach’s alpha and item to total correlation) to test for content
validity, construct validity and reliability.

Content Validity
To ensure content validity, a thorough literature review was conducted on each construct.
The survey was also pilot tested by having a panel of experts (from academia and industry)
review it. Afterwards, the necessary changes were made to improve the content and clarity of
the survey. After the final version of the survey was completed, a second group was asked to
review the questionnaire. The Spanish version was parallel translated and reviewed.
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Initial Construct Validity (Discriminant and Convergent Validity)
Before assessing the measurement model, I evaluated the convergent and discriminant
validity of the scales for construct validity and estimated the internal consistency for reliability.
The first step was to check for unidimensionality (convergent validity) of each scale by
doing an exploratory factor analysis. Convergent validity is considered acceptable when all items
loadings are greater than 0.50, and the items for each construct load onto a single factor with an
eigen value greater than 1.0. While some of the scales had good results (all items loading into
one factor), other scales had some items loading into a second factor. This meant that the
measurement items needed to be purified. For example, results showed that all of the items in
the measure of cooperation loaded into a single factor (it is unidimensional) and the variance
explained of the items was good at 76.35%. On the other hand, the results for the measure of
competition showed three items loaded onto one factor and the other two items onto a second
factor. The percentage of variance explained was low (53.42%). Before making a final decision
to remove the item(s) or not, I checked the reliabilities. The same procedure for construct
validity was done for all the reflective scales (opportunism, trust, and CRM). Initial results from
this first EFA showed problems with several items, meaning they would have to be cleaned and
certain items removed. After checking the reliabilities, a final construct validity test is done and
reported from a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) done on Lisrel 8.80 (see below).

Reliability
The second step was to do a reliability test of each reflective scale. Internal consistency
(reliability) was evaluated using item-to-total correlations (Churchill, 1979; Nunnally &
Bernstein, 1994), Cronbach’s alpha, and Composite of Reliability (Gerbin and Anderson, 1988).
The measurement items for each construct were purified by corrected item-to-total
correlations. The item-to-total correlations should be above a value of .70 (Nunnally and
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Bernstein 1994). Two items from the competition scale, two items from the opportunism scale,
two items form the trust scale, two items from the CRM scale and two items from the conflict
scale were dropped because of significant improvement in item-to-total correlation after deleting
them. In some instances, the items dropped were original items from the adopted measures from
previous research.
All the retained items for cooperation had corrected item-total correlations above .721.
The item-total correlations for the kept items for the rest of the measures were: for cooperation,
above .525; for competition, above .511; for opportunism, .561; for conflict, above .449; for
trust, above .598; for CRM, above.489. Given these test for reliability, we find only partial
reliability on the measures. An exploratory factor analysis was run again to examine the
convergence of the kept items to measure the intended concept. The eigenvalues for each factor
indicated a single predominant factor, therefore all the measures showed initial convergent
validity.
A second test of reliability was done by calculating the inter-item consistency of the
scale, estimated through Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 1951). The final Cronbach
reliability coefficients of all variables (except ‘conflict’) were higher than the minimum
benchmark score of 0.65 (Lee and Kim, 1999), or 0.70 (Nunnally 1978, Nunnally and Bernstein,
1994) and suggest a satisfactory level of reliability. Cooperation had the highest Cronbach’s
Alpha (.921), followed by trust (.812), CRM (.761), competition (.721), opportunism (.706) and
conflict (.683). While the item-to-total correlations on some of the items remained lower than
desired even after purification, they were above the lowest cutoff point accepted of .35 (Saxe and
Weitz, 1982). The final item-to-total correlations and EFA factor loadings, percentage of
variance explained and final Cronbach’s alpha for each scale are summarized in table 5.1 below.
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Table 5.1 Exploratory Factor Analysis and Reliability Analysis
Scale
COOPERATION
1.Our relationship is highly cooperative
2.Our firms perform well together
3.We share goals in common
4.Our future is bet reached together
5.Our supplier helps us get the job done
Eigen Value
% of Variance
Cronbach’s alpha

Factor
Loading

Item- Total
Correlation

.896
.916
.879
.815
.861

.823
.857
.804
.721
.781

.788
.836
.778

.525
.590
.511

.883
.883

.561
.561

.700
.739
.725
.700

.450
.490
.475
.449

.895
.853
.810

.735
.656
.598

.791
.710
.751
.830

.590
.489
.556
.662

3.818
76.35
.921

COMPETITION
1.Partner benefits are not equal
2.The supplier’s returns are acceptable but less than a normal profit
3.Not a normal profit return, but the business utilized idle capacity
Eigen Value
% of Variance
Cronbach’s alpha
OPPORTUNISM
1.They would not exploit any self-interest opportunity (reverse coded)
2.Their contract negotiations are fair (reverse coded)
Eigen Value
% of Variance
Cronbach’s alpha
CONFLICT
1.Certain supplier’s actions we do not like
2.The supplier follows his self-interests
3.We disagree on critical issues
4.Our strategic goals are too different
Eigen Value
% of Variance
Cronbach’s alpha

1.926
64.18
.721

1.561
78.03
.706

2.052
51.302
.683

TRUST
1.The supplier seeks our well-being
2.The supplier considers how their decisions/actions affect us
3.They look out for our interests
Eigen Value
% of Variance
Cronbach’s alpha

2.185
72.82
.812

CRM
1.We continually assess supplier value/contribution
2.We attempt to build long-term relationships with our high-value suppliers
3.We have a formal process for identifying highly effective/ineffective suppliers
4.My organization has established clear business goals related to supplier
qualification, development, retention and reactivation
Eigen Value
% of Variance
Cronbach’s alpha

2.383
59.575
.761

While Cronbach’s Alpha implicitly assumes that each item carries the same weight,
Composite Reliability relies on the actual loadings to construct the factor score and is thus a
103

better measure of internal consistency (Fornell and Larcker, 1981; Gerbin and Anderson, 1988).
The score for composite reliability should be greater than the cutoff score of 0.70, indicating
adequate internal consistency (Nunnally, 1978). From the output of the CFA in LISREL (see
below), I calculated the Composite of Reliability7 and the average variance extracted 8. The
composite of reliability score for all the variables except one (conflict = 0.68) were above 0.70,
with cooperation being the highest at 0.92, followed by trust (0.82), CRM (0.77), Competition
(0.73) and Conflict (0.68). Therefore, all the measures but one have acceptable consistency.
Table 5.2 shows the descriptive statistics for the constructs, the reliability of the scales and the
sources from which they were adapted.

Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics and reliability indices for constructs
Construct

Types of indicators

Mean

S.D.

Alpha

Power Asymmetry
Continuum Index
Cooperation
Competition
Opportunism
Conflict
Trust
CRM
Performance
Value-Added

Formative
Formative
Reflective
Reflective
Reflective
Reflective
Reflective
Reflective
Formative
Formative

1.39
4.28
5.66
3.90
3.26
3.71
4.61
6.01
3.28
7.79

.57
1.09
1.10
1.22
1.33
1.08
1.13
0.74
1.34
8.79

NA
NA
.921
.721
.706
.683
.812
.761
NA
NA

Composite
Reliability1
NA
NA
0.92
0.73
0.73
0.68
0.82
0.77
NA
NA

AVE2
NA
NA
.7004
.4771
.5796
.3493
.6059
.4606
NA
NA

Adapted
from:
(1)
Developed
(2)
Developed
(3)
(2)
(2)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Note: NA – Not applicable: since formative measures need not co-vary, the internal consistency of formative items is not applicable.
(1) Benton and Maloni 2005; Emerson 1962; Gunasekaran and Kobu 2006; Gunesakaran et al. 2004.
(2) Benton and Maloni 2005
(3) Gundlach et al. 1995; John 1984; Williamson 1985
(4) Reinartz et al. 2004
(5) Lusch and Brown 1996
(6) Achrol and Etzel 2003

Convergent and Discriminant Validity – CFA
Convergent validity. After assessing dimensionality and reliability, convergent validity
was evaluated again, this time with a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). A CFA for the
(∑𝑖 𝜆𝑖 )2

7

Composite Reliability =

8

Average Variance Extracted = ∑

(∑𝑖 𝜆𝑖 )2 +∑𝑖(1−𝜆2
𝑖)

∑ 𝜆𝑖 2 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝐹

𝜆𝑖 2 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝐹+∑ 𝛩𝑖𝑖
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measures of cooperation, competition and opportunism (with the purified items) was calculated
to show that they are indeed separate constructs. A second CFA for trust, CRM and conflict was
also calculated using LISREL 8.8. The estimated models provide the loadings (λ), the
correlations between constructs (Phi), and the error (Theta-Delta). Using this information, I
calculated the average variance extracted (AVE). The estimated models also shows which items
load to what construct (See figures 3 and 4 for LISREL models).

Figure 3. LISREL Model 1: Cooperation, Competition, Opportunism
There are many goodness-of-fit statistics and significance-tests in a LISREL model. Two
fit statistics that are often reported are Chi-square and RMSEA. Chi-square needs to be as small
as possible, and preferably non-significant, and the RSMEA needs to be close to or lower than
.05. (Gefen et al, 2000). The resulting Chi-square for model 1 (Cooperation-CompetitionConflict) was: X2=70.72, d.f. = 32, p = 0.00010. For model 2 (Trust-CRM-Conflict), Chi-square
was: X2= 61.88, d.f. = 41, p= 0.01916. We should note that Chi-square by definition will
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increase with the number of cases, so with a large dataset, it is more difficult to get a small, nonsignificant result. RSMEA in model 1 was 0.073 and 0.047 for the second model (good fit).
RSMEA is a weighted function of the residual of the correlations and the number of cases,
eliminating the problems that Chi-square suffers from.

Figure 4. LISREL Model 2: Trust, CRM, Conflict

Other indexes that are often reported are GFI (should be above .90), AGFI (should be
larger than .95), and the Standard root mean square residual (SRMR) (should be less than .05).
Model 1 had a GFI of .94; an AGFI of 0.90 and a SRMR of .038. Model 2 had a GFI of .95, an
AGFI of .92, and a SRMR of .046. Therefore, based on all the indices, there is partial validity
and partial goodness of fit in both models.
Fornell and Larker (1981) also call for the calculation of the average variance extracted
(AVE) to estimate convergent validity. An AVE estimate greater than 0.5 indicates that more
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than 50% of the variance of the measurement items can be accounted for by the constructs. Only
the scales of cooperation (.70), opportunism (.57) and trust (.60) had AVE scores higher than
0.50. Therefore, (based on AVE estimates), the scales of cooperation, opportunism and trust have
convergent validity. There is only partial convergent validity for the scales of competition,
conflict, trust and CRM.
Discriminant Validity. The average variance extracted (AVE) can also be used to assess
the discriminant validity of the constructs. The AVE score for each construct should be higher
than the squared-correlations between the variables in the model (Fornell and Larcker, 1981;
Gerbin and Anderson, 1988). Table 5.3 shows that the AVE for cooperation, competition and
opportunism are greater than the off-diagonal elements (squared-correlations). These results
indicate discriminant validity among the variables of cooperation, competition and opportunism
and demonstrate that they are separate constructs. Table 5.3 also shows that all the AVE scores
for trust, CRM and conflict are greater than their squared correlations, hence adequate
discriminant validity.

Table 5.3 Squared-correlations of latent variables
Competition

Opportunism

Cooperation
Competition
Opportunism

Cooperation
.7004
.0001
.3364

.4771
.0004

.5796

CRM

Conflict

Trust
CRM
Conflict

Trust
.6059
.0041
.3249

.4604
.0081

.3493

Note: Diagonal elements are the average variance extracted. These values
should exceed the squared inter-item correlations for adequate discriminant
validity
.
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5.4 HYPOTHESES TESTING RESULTS

Before testing the proposed model, I tested the relationship of the managerial continuum
with the independent measures of cooperation, competition and opportunism (Hypotheses 1a, 1b
and 1c). Also, I tested the relationship between the value-added distribution (measured by
current deviation from normal profit) and the managerial continuum (Hypothesis 2a) as well as
with opportunism (Hypothesis 2b).
As mentioned, the first hypotheses propose to test that the managerial continuum
(anchored by cooperation and competition) is associated positively with the independent measure
of cooperation and negatively with the independent measure of competition. In addition, the
continuum would have a negative association with opportunism. To test these relationships I did
a correlation analysis. The results from the analysis are summarized in Table 5.4, showing the
correlations matrix and significance levels. The results from the correlation analysis show that
the continuum has a statistically significant (at the 0.05 level) positive relationship with
cooperation, a negative (non-significant) relationship with competition and a statistically
significant (at the 0.01 level) negative relationship with opportunism. While the relationship
with competition is non-significant, the negative sign is in the hypothesized direction. Therefore,
the results support H1a and H1c. H1b is not supported by the data.

Table 5.4- Correlation Analysis: Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c

Continuum
Cooperation
Competition
Opportunism

Continuum
1
.164*
-.046
-.199**

Cooperation

Competition

Opportunism

1
.006
-.463**

1
.009

1

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
N=231
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To test hypotheses 2a and 2b, I ran a correlation analysis between the value-added
distributions in today’s economy (measured by the deviation today from normal profit) and the
managerial continuum (2a) and opportunism (2b). The analysis shows that there is a statistically
significant (at the .01 level) negative relationship between a deviation from normal profit
(asymmetric distribution) and the managerial continuum. In other words, the greater the
deviation is from a normal profit return (higher asymmetry), then the lower the level of
cooperation in the continuum.

This means that a more competitive strategy is being

implemented by one side of the relationship and distributions are different than what the average
return for the firm is.
There is no statistically significant relationship between the value added distribution and
opportunism. Therefore, H2a is supported and H2b is not supported. Table 5.5 shows the
correlation matrix and significance levels.

Table 5.5- Correlation Analysis: Hypotheses 2a and 2b
Value-Added
Distribution
Value-Added
1
Distribution
Continuum
-.198**
Opportunism .023

Continuum

Opportunism

1
-.199**

1

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed
N=231

Partial Least Squares Analysis
Structural equation modeling (SEM) has become a prevalent technique in marketing for
research analyzing cause-effect relationships between latent constructs. SEM is used because of
its ability to assess latent variables at the observation level (measurement or outer model) and
test the relationships between latent variables at the theoretical level (structural or inner model).
However, there are two types of SEM methods to consider: covariance-based techniques (CB109

SEM) (Joreskog 1978, 1993) and variance-based partial least squares (PLS-SEM) (Lohmoller
1989; Wold 1982, 1985). The philosophical difference between the two techniques is clear. If
the research objective is to test and confirm theory, then the appropriate method is CB-SEM. On
the other hand, if the research objective is prediction and theory development, then PLS-SEM is
appropriate (Hair, Ringle and Sarstedt, 2011). Neither of the SEM methods is generally superior
to the other. Instead, one needs to apply the SEM technique that best fits the research objective,
the characteristics of the data and the model set-up.
PLS-SEM was developed as an alternative to CB-SEM that would emphasize prediction
while at the same time relaxing the demands on data and specification relationships. PLS-SEM
estimates models by doing a series of ordinary least squares regressions and relaxing the
assumption of multivariate normality needed for a maximum likelihood-based CB-SEM (Fornell
and Bookstein, 1982). “It is not the concepts, nor the models nor the estimation techniques which
are ‘soft’; it is only the distributional assumptions” (Lohmoller, 1989, p. 64). The PLS-SEM
algorithm transforms non-normal data in agreement with the central limit theorem, making
results more robust if the data is highly skewed and/or when formative measures are used
(Ringle et al. 2009)
A second advantage of PLS-SEM over CB-SEM is that it can almost without restriction
handle both reflective and formative measures (Chin 1998). One of the disadvantages is that
PLS-SEM lacks a measure for overall model fit.

In addition, since it does not assume

distributional normality, the researcher has to rely on non-parametric evaluation criteria. In
reality, one technique is complementary to the other.
addressed by PLS-SEM and vice versa.
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The shortcomings of CB-SEM are

Given the exploratory nature of this research, the characteristics of the measures
(formative and reflective), and the characteristics of the data (slightly skewed distribution), I
performed a PLS-SEM analysis in SmartPLS 2.0 M3 (Ringle, Wende and Will, 2005) to test the
model and with it, Hypotheses 3, 4, 5 and 6.

Measurement Model Evaluation (Outer Model)
The PLS-SEM model allows the researcher to test the reliability as well as convergent
and discriminant validity of reflective items by computing AVE and inter-construct correlations.
In the reflective scales in the model, I used only the items that were identified in the previous
assessment of reliability and validity. Therefore, the reliability and validity results from the
PLS-SEM model should help to confirm our earlier findings.
In regards to the formative items, the model estimates the indicator weights and t-values
(significance) by a resampling procedure (bootstrapping) (Hair et al, 2011).

From this

procedure, we can evaluate the indicator weights on the formative measures (indices) and their
significance.

Note that formative indicator weights are often smaller than the loadings of

reflective indicators, so one shall not misinterpret their relevance for the construct domain
(Diamantopoulous and Winklhofer 2001). Researchers should check for multicollinearity of the
formative indicators by relying primarily on the tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF).
To estimate the outer model, I ran a bootstrapping algorithm with 217 cases and 5000
samples as suggested by Hair, Ringle and Sarstedt (2012). The results from the estimated
bootstrapping report show that the indicator loadings of the reflective measurement model are:
for opportunism, all above .852 (above the recommended benchmark of .70); for conflict, two
items above .714, two items below the standard at .673 and .696; for trust, all items above .817;
for CRM, three items above .756 and one at .639. The composite reliability for all reflective
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measures are all above .8107 (above the standard of .70); and AVE for all measures is higher
than .518 (should be higher than .50). The Cronbach’s alphas are all above the accepted
benchmark. Although some of the values are not as high as it would be desired, the analysis
shows that all the reflective scales meet the standards of validity and reliability with just some
issues in two of the items in conflict and one in CRM. The results are consistent with the
previously stated results of reliability and validity.
Because of the nature of formative measures, traditional tests for reliability and validity
do not apply (Hair, Ringle and Sarstedt 2012). Instead, theoretical rational and expert opinion
plays a more important role in the evaluation of formative indices. Nevertheless, we can look at
some statistical criteria from the PLS analysis to assess the formative measures’ quality. For
formative measurement models we can examine the indicator’s weight (relative importance) and
loading (absolute importance).

Critical t-values are 1.65 (significance level = 10%), 1.96

(significance level = 5 percent), and 2.58 (significance level of 1%). When all indicator weights
are significant, there is empirical support to keep all indicators. If both the weight and the
loading are not-significant, there is no empirical support to retain the indicator.
The PLS-SEM results for the formative items show that loadings of 17 of the items in the
continuum index are significant (most at the 1% significance level). The loadings for the power
items show 3 being significant at the 10% level. None of the loadings for the performance
measure were significant.

Only the weights for four items in the continuum index were

significant. There is only partial reliability and validity for the continuum index; limited for the
power index and none for the performance index. However, in the pretest of the measures,
experts in the field approved the items for the formative measures.

“If the theory driven

conceptualization of the measure strongly supports the indicator’s inclusion (by means of face,
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expert, and content validity), it should be kept in the formative measurement model and the
researcher should focus on explaining the empirical outcome” (Hair, Ringle and Sarstedt 2012, p.
146). Lack of significance in the indicators may be the due to the existence of heterogeneous
data structures. If parameter estimates are affected by heterogeneity, a formative indicator may
not be significant when solely evaluated on the aggregate data level. But there may be one of
more subpopulation(s) [OEM, Tier 1 Buyer, Tier 1 Seller, Tier 2 Seller] in which an indicator is
significantly related to the construct while this is not the case in another subpopulations.
Researchers can partition the data on the basis of a priori information (e.g., demographic
variables) and estimating distinct models, or by using the finite mixture PLS (FIMIX-PLS) (Hair
Ringle and Sarstedt, 2012)
To check for multicollinearity, each indicator’s variance inflation factor (VIF) should be
less than 5.

If indicators have high levels of multicollinearity, it can cause them to be

nonsignificant. A VIF value of 5 implies that 80 percent of the indicator’s variance is accounted
for by the remaining formative indicators related to the construct. Note that the higher number
of indicators used to measure a formative construct, the more likely it is that one or more
indicators will have nonsignificant weights. The VIF values of all the endogenous variables are
below 5: Continuum at 1.37, trust at 1.18, CRM at 1.03, conflict at 1.64, opportunism 1.23, and
performance 1.28.

Structural Model Evaluation (Inner Model)
In the PLS-SEM model, I assessed the model’s quality by evaluating variance-based,
non-parametric criteria (Chin, 1998). The main criterion of inner model assessment is the
coefficient of determination (R2), which represents the amount of explained variance of each
endogenous latent variable which is explained by the model. The model’s predictive validity can
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be assessed by cross-validated redundancy measures Q2 (Hair et al. 2012). Standardized path
coefficients provide evidence of the inner model’s quality. Their significance can be assessed by
their t-value statistics. The following tables summarize the results from the PLS-SEM analysis:
Table 5.6 shows the shows the latent variables correlations; Table 5.7 summarizes the scale’s
reliability and validity tests, coefficient of determination and redundancy measures; Table 5.8
overall quality of the model;

Table 5.6- Correlations among latent variables

1. CRM
2. Conflict
3. Continuum
4. Opportunism
5. Performance
6. Power Asymmetry
7. Trust

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1
-.074
.131
-.153
-.139
.095
.173

1
-.446
.582
-.136
-.348
-.444

1
-.402
.430
.521
.391

1
-.122
-.359
-.482

1
.231
.074

1
.217

1

Table 5.7- Reliability, Validity, Coefficient of Determination and Redundancy
AVE
CRM
Conflict
Continuum
Opportunism
Performance
Power Asymmetry
Trust

.582
.518
0
.781
0
0
.728

Composite
Reliability
.846
.810
0
.877
0
0
.889

R-square
.035
.392
.271
.192
.224
0
.153

Cronbach’s
Alpha
.762
.692
0
.724
0
0
.813

Communality

Redundancy

.582
.518
.151
.781
.016
.044
.728

.008
.081
.025
.116
.002
0
.110

Table 5.8- Overall Quality of the PLS-SEM Model
Hypotheses
1c. Continuum  Opportunism
3a. Power Asymmetry Continuum
3b. Power Asymmetry Opportunism
4a. Continuum  Conflict
4b. Opportunism  Conflict
5a. Continuum  CRM
5b. Trust  CRM
5c. CRM  Performance
6a. Continuum  Trust
6b. Continuum  Performance

Standardized Path
Coefficient
(direct effect)
-.30
.52
-.21
-.25
.48
.08
.14
-.20
.39
.46

t-Value for
Path

Indirect
Effect

Total Effect

3.08***
1.25
1.04
2.99***
7.53***
0.53
1.74*
1.00
4.24***
0.90

--.16
-.14
-.05
----.02

---.05
-.39
-.13
---.44

* Significant at the 0.05, **Significant at the .01, *** Significant at the .001 level
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The results from the structural model indicate that 19.32% of the variance in
Opportunism was explained by the model; 39.3% of the variance in conflict; and 15% of the
variance in Trust. The model also shows the path coefficients (γ’s and β’s) that have statistical
significance. The path between continuum and trust is positive and significant (β=.39,
significance at .001 level), supporting H6a; the path between continuum and conflict is negative
and significant (β= -.25, significance at .001 level), supporting H4a; the path between continuum
and opportunism is negative and significant (β= -.30, significance at .001 level), supporting H1c;
the path between opportunism and conflict is positive and significant (β=.48, significance at .001
level), supporting H4b; and the path between trust and CRM is positive and significant (β=.14,
significance at .05 level), supporting H5b.
Figure 5 shows the estimated model, the standardized coefficients (γ and β) for each path
(and their significance), and R2 values for each endogenous construct.

*

***

***

***
***

* Significant at the 0.05, *** Significant at the .001 level

Figure 5- Results from PLS-SEM Analysis
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In summary, the results from the correlation and the PLS-SEM analysis support
Hypotheses H1c, H4a, H4b, H5b, and H6a. Hypotheses 3a, 3b, 5a, 5c and 6b are not supported
by the data.
The most interesting findings are that the results provide evidence supportive of the
cooperation – competition continuum as a viable managerial concept for the achievement of the
coordination of the supply chain system. There is also support for conflict being an outcome
rather than an alternative to cooperation. The implications of all the findings are discussed in the
next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This research project has important implications for the research and practice of
international business and marketing at the macro and micro levels of distribution management.
With respect to research, these implications include administration, research design and
measurement issues. In terms of business practice and marketing, this project highlights what
Carlos Angulo, Principal, Baker McKenzie calls the “Clash of Cultures.” This chapter explains
these implications and concludes with recommendations and suggestions for future research.

6.1 ADMINISTRATION
The Clash of Cultures
After the first trip to Mexico City, I was very optimistic about the project. Lics. Jaime
Bermudez C. and Rafael McCadden had been most supportive by arranging my introductions
and meetings with industry representatives. The meetings had gone well. I had received verbal
support and promises of letters of endorsement from the Office of the Secretary of Industry and
the director of the Tier 1 Supplier’s Association. The director of Mexico’s Automotive
Manufacturer’s Association had promised to endorse the project with each of his corporate
members. In addition, I had met with top executive management of twelve of Mexico’s major
automotive companies. Each of the executives indicated his support for the project and would
pass the project to his company’s governance (legal) and purchasing department for review.
After the executive meetings, I met with the various governance and purchasing
department directors to discuss the project and implementation timetable. After these meetings,
four of the automotive companies declined to participate. Two companies chose not to
participate based on the advice of their legal departments. One company indicated its purchasing
agents were too busy. The fourth company had taken the project to their purchasing agents and
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the agents declined to participate. The remaining eight companies approved the project. During
my discussions with the various purchasing directors, we discussed the survey including the
issues and measures used. The directors made certain suggestions such as including “green
policies” as an issue. Each of the directors was very supportive of the project and felt the project
would be very beneficial to his company. I informed each director that the survey instrument was
preliminary, a draft. I would send them the final survey instrument in mid-September for
distribution to their purchasing agents. At that time the survey and data collection effort would
begin.
The survey materials were distributed to the companies the last week in September.
Immediately, I was contacted by a major automotive purchasing director that his surveys were
already completed. He had distributed the preliminary survey to his purchasing agents. We
discussed the problem, but he was unwilling to do more because his next purchasing agent
meeting was not scheduled and he would not be able to complete the project before the Holiday
Season. Two of the other companies were implementing the survey. Two other companies had
new directors of purchasing due to employee transfers. The remaining firms indicated that
participation was difficult due to the impending Holiday Season. They asked to delay the project.
They were finalizing their new year budget forecasts and the Holiday Season was an issue. Due
to these issues, data collection was slow and completely shut down after November 1. There
would have to be a second trip to Mexico after the first of the year.
During the period October 1-November 1 and January 15- February 10, I communicated
with the two companies that had started data collection and with the director of the Tier 1
Supplier’s Association. He had sent his letter of introduction and endorsement to his members
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and he had provided me with a membership list. I contacted several members who expressed an
interest in initiating the Tier 1 Supplier Survey, beginning February-March.
The second trip to Mexico was February 11, 2012. Specifically, it was to meet with the
director of the Tier 1 Supplier’s association and the directors of the eight automobile
manufacturers. In addition, I was meeting with the director of the National Maquiladora
Association who had been contacted by the director of the Cd. Juarez Chapter, both of whom
wanted to participate in the project. A couple of days before the trip, I received a telephone call
from the director of the Tier 1 Supplier’s Association. He said he had just left a board meeting.
He had been fired. I could meet with him, but I really needed now to meet with the new director.
He could not help me set up that appointment. Consequently, I contacted Lic. McCadden. He
arranged my meeting with the new director. The meeting with the director was difficult. Being
new to the position, this project was not a priority to him. However, the meeting concluded with
his promise to support the project with his board. I never was able to contact him again.
Whatever interest had been expressed by his members did not materialize. The group had
different priorities. The Tier 1 Survey initiative ended with only a few companies taking the
survey.
The meetings with companies went well. The two participating companies were restarting
their data collection. I met with the new purchasing directors from, now three companies, and
they promised to start data collection in March. By taking a different approach with a company
that initially declined the offer, they now agreed to participate. I had maneuvered around its legal
department. In another meeting, I spoke with the assistant purchasing director of the company
that had used the preliminary survey instrument. He agreed to ask his agents to complete an
amended survey that would capture the missing information. Unfortunately, a number of his
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purchasing agents had either been transferred or had left the firm. Employee transfers and
turnover was very high in these companies due to efforts to consolidate purchasing activities.
Finally, the remaining directors promised to begin data collection. However, most promises were
empty.
Table C.3 in the Appendix shows which companies promised to participate and their
degree of participation. As can be seen, two companies, with U.S. directors of purchasing
returned the most surveys. Overall, the level of actual participation was higher with non-Mexican
directors.
What was learned about the administration of a research project in Mexico – and perhaps
other LatinAmerican countries as well? Personal relationships provided access to executive level
administrators in government and industry. Everyone who was contacted agreed to meet and
discuss the project. Government and trade association officials agreed to endorse and either,
verbally or in writing, communicate their endorsements. With few exceptions, executives and
directors of purchasing committed to participate in the research. The exceptions were
recommendations by legal departments or purchasing agents declining to participate.
Implementation was a different issue. Mexican-National administrators always agreed to
participate. Few did.
Culturally, Mexican Nationals find it difficult to say, “No!” Unfortunately, “No” is
communicated by lack of follow through such as not providing letters of endorsement or failure
to implement the project. To further illustrate the point, Lic. Carlos Angulo said he probably
negotiated more than four hundred joint venture business arrangements between Mexican and
foreign nationals. If success was measured by business objectives, he estimated four hundred
failures: the primary issue, culture! Further, there is no legacy in Mexican business to support
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academic research. In contrast, U.S. Nationals directors of purchasing generally followed
through on commitments. If not, the reason was a job transfer with the replacement having
different priorities.
Consistent with Mexican culture’s unwillingness to be disappointing or be negative, this
unwillingness was evident in the responses to certain questions in the survey instruments.
Behavioral constructs such as cooperation and customer relationship management were answered
predominately with positive responses. Responses to trust were also skewed favorably.
Constructs such as power, competition, conflict and opportunism received primarily neutral
responses. Hence, most respondents rated their dyadic relationships as characterized by high
levels of cooperation and trust. Based on the responses, every company is characterized by
having Customer Relationship Marketing practices (See Appendix Table C.2).

Significantly

fewer respondents characterized their relationships in terms of asymmetrical power,
competitiveness, conflict or opportunism. Clearly, Mexican culture complicates research given
its tendency to report favorable assessments.
Perhaps the most serious administration issue was the purchasing agent. Several directors
of purchasing made the comment that they could assign agents to participate, but they could not
control them. As mentioned, two major companies did not participate because their agents
declined. The official reason: the agents were too busy. There is an alternative explanation. It is
well known in Mexico that purchasing and human resources are two departments most
susceptible to corruption. Purchasing agents and human resource people control contracts and are
alleged to receive financial kickbacks. This issue is at the heart of WalMart’s corruption case in
Mexico.
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Agents may refuse to participate because they see no benefit – only potential problems.
Documentation puts the agent on record. Promises of confidentially are hollow statements. For
example, Delphi agreed to participate in an article written by a national trade magazine. The
company reported sales and financial data. The Ministry of Finance concluded that the data was
different from the firm’s tax information. It took Delphi more than a year to remedy the problem
(Gutierrez, 2012). The point is, there is a breakdown in administrative control between
management and its purchasing agents. Agents operate as independent brokers. Hence, Angulo’s
(2012) perspective regarding the “Clash of Cultures!”

6.2 RESEARCH DESIGN
The research design was established to collect dyadic sets of information about the
Manufacturer-Tier 1 Supplier and Tier 1- Tier 2 Supplier relationships. The design was similar to
the dyadic design used by Jap (1999) for her study of the supply chain. Jap’s study was a study
of a U.S. domestic supply chain. My initial discussions with managers and suppliers of
automotive maquiladora companies during the concept phase of my work gave no indication that
a dyadic design would be difficult to implement in Mexico. Further, my pretests with two
maquiladora companies and Tier 1 maquiladora suppliers did not reveal any issues. Hence, there
did not appear to be a problem gathering data from the Manufacturer – Tier 1 dyad initiative. The
issue became evident when managers located in Mexico’s interior indicated they did not control
the purchasing agents’ willingness to cooperate.
An issue did arise as I investigated developing the Tier 1 Supplier Initiative. During my
discussions with managers, it became apparent that Mexican suppliers were not smaller national
companies, but rather larger multi-national companies. In order to investigate both the
manufacturer’s Manufacturer-Tier 1 Supplier Dyad and the corresponding Tier 1 –Tier 2 Dyad
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relationships, I had to rely on good communication between the sales agent and the purchasing
agent within the Tier 1 Supplier’s company. Particularly for larger Tier 1 Suppliers, these two
representatives were likely to be housed in different offices located internationally.
This issue appeared manageable for the Tier 1 Supplier Initiative because Tier 1
management had direct access control over his sales and purchasing representatives. The issue
posed a serious problem for the Manufacturer-Tier 1 Supplier initiative because the
manufacturer’s purchasing agent would have to ask the Tier 1 Supplier’s sales agent to
communicate to his company’s purchasing agent counterpart about the survey material for the
Tier 1-Tier 2 surveys. This did not seem likely to happen given different geographical locations
for these two Tier 1 Supplier representatives. Consequently, the loss of the Tier 1 Supplier
Initiative compromised my effort to complete the supply chain investigation all the way through
the Tier 2 supplier.

6.3 SURVEY DESIGN
The survey design issues were three: the length of the questionnaire, the Qualtrics
program and the capability of the purchasing agent and sales agents to respond to certain
questions. The questionnaire used in the survey was long. I was advised to not only develop a
data base to address the dissertation research topic but to include research issues that would help
develop a research stream for the future. My literature review and model development reflect my
effort to achieve this objective. While the length of the survey was discussed during the
development and pretest phases of my research, the issue was never mentioned by managers or
purchasing agents. They said it was long but should not be a problem.
A totally unanticipated issue was a problem inherent within the Qualtrics program. I
anticipated receiving a significant number of returns during the first two weeks of the data
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collection period. However, my response rate was not good. I investigated to learn that some
participants were going in to “see” the survey first (to find out more about it or plan how much
time to devote to it), but then they could not go back to the beginning or even go to the right
version of the survey. The participant at the very beginning of the survey had to choose the
language they preferred and then select if they were an OEM Manufacturer, a Tier 1 Seller, a
Tier 1 Buyer or a Tier 2 Seller. Once the participant chooses the “version” of the survey, they
would have to click through the entire survey if they wanted/needed to go back to page one and
select something different. This occurs because Qualtrics has embedded cookies that remember
where the participant left off in case they close the browser and want to return later to finish the
survey.
After two-days of talking with the technical team at Qualtrics (and having lost
incalculable participants), we arrived at the best possible solution. The only way around the
problem was to set a new link within the survey that the person could hit to ‘finish’ the survey
and go back to page one; or, to remove the cookies feature so that any time that a person would
close the browser, the survey would be finished and data entered would be lost for that
participant (meaning that they would have to start over even if they had already answered some
questions). I chose the first option as it seemed that many participants were taking the survey in
separate periods of the day(s). Given the nature of purchasing agent’s work environment, data
entry interruptions were likely to have been frequent. Needless to say, I lost many participants
that were not going to try to figure out how to fix this issue themselves or inquire about how to
go about it. The respondent and data were gone!
The pretest with maquiladora personnel did not indicate a problem with the survey
instrument or any of its questions. The maquiladoras and their personnel were administered by
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U.S. managers and their purchasing departments were long standing, stable units. However, the
business environment in Mexico’s interior was different. For example, certain respondents
located in Mexico’s interior had problems with the constant sum measure of goal structure and
importance ratings. Many did not answer the question or left it partially answered. What was
apparent was these respondents had difficulty allocating their percentages to total 100. I
subsequently removed the question.
The second question that caused difficulty was the Achrol and Etzel (2003) question
designed to estimate the percentage change from Normal Profit associated with different
business environmental conditions such as recession and growth. Many respondents left the
question blank. The problem was either the respondent could not operate the “slide” feature of
the Qualtrics Program or he may not have been familiar with what these different environmental
effects had on Normal Profit return. There appeared to be differences in the business knowledge
and experience levels between respondents from Mexico’s interior and those border respondents
who participated in the pretest.
Finally, the response rate was affected by the severe global recession and industry’s
severe reduction of Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers. As mentioned, Ford Motor Company and Delphi
reduced their suppliers from thousands to hundreds. This effect shows up in the classification
data questions. For instance, the distribution of the number of years the purchasing agent had
been working for the company had a mode of less than two years. There was also significant
turnover of directors of purchasing during the data collection period. Both of these factors
impacted the quality of data received and the support for the project within certain companies.
In summary, the “Clash of Cultures” failure of executives and managers to follow
through on commitments, particularly the Tier 1 Supplier Initiative; the Qualtrics problem and
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the impinging Holiday Season, the geographical separation of Tier 1 sales and purchasing agents
and the personnel upheaval within the industry were significant impediments impacting my data
collection effort. I was confident about my thesis research question and was initially encouraged
by the commitments made by management. Unfortunately, these implementation issues were far
more serious than I ever imagined. I accept full responsibility for the issues described above.

6.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND BUSINESS PRACTICE

Despite the implementation issues, certain results from the study have valuable
implications for supply chain research and management. My research was exploratory. I
proposed a revised model of supply chain management based on an extensive literature review of
marketing theory and distribution research. My primary research issue was whether the proposed
cooperation - competition continuum is a viable managerial alternative vis-a-vis the traditional
cooperation-conflict continuum. As indicated in Chapter 4, I used two primary data analysis
techniques, correlation analysis and Partial Least Squares (PLS).
The correlation analysis results generally support the cooperation – competition
continuum as a viable managerial strategy to achieve coordination of the supply chain system.
As hypothesized (H1a), cooperation was shown to be positively associated with the continuum.
This finding is consistent with previous research which concludes that cooperation plays a major
positive role in the management of the supply chain. This finding offers nothing new to the
marketing discipline, but for the proposed continuum to be consistent with the literature,
cooperation had to be positively correlated with the continuum.
A critical test of the proposed continuum was Hypothesis 1c., the role of conflict. For the
proposed continuum to represent a challenge to traditional marketing thought, conflict had to be
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validated as a separate construct from competition and cooperation, it had to be negatively
associated with the continuum and positioned as an outcome rather than an alternative to
cooperation (in the model). The CFA shows that conflict is a separate construct. The correlation
results find that it is negatively associated with the continuum (meaning that higher levels of
cooperation in the continuum are associated with lower levels of conflict). The PLS-SEM model
confirms the negative relationship between the continuum and conflict, and finds support for the
position of conflict as an outcome. Supply chain managers should expect certain levels of
conflict to result from their management effort. Thus, managers should focus on conflict
resolution as their primary strategy to managing conflict in the supply chain.
Although the correlation result (-.046) between competition and the continuum was not
statistically significant, the sign is in the hypothesized direction (negative). The low reliability of
the scale for competition may be behind the non-significant finding and needs to be addressed in
future research. Another explanatory factor might be the cultural bias against what might be
interpreted as controversial statements.
Correlation analysis was also used to test for the association between value added
expectations and the cooperation – competition management continuum. The results show that
the greater the deviation from normal profit is (asymmetrical distribution), the lower the level of
cooperation in the continuum. In other words, when value added distribution is close to normal
(symmetrical), the continuum value is higher (more cooperation). When value added distribution
is different from an expected normal profit (asymmetrical), the continuum value is lower (more
competition). Again consistent with the literature, acceptable value added returns could be
symmetrical or asymmetrical. Symmetrical returns were hypothesized to be associated with
cooperation and asymmetrical returns to be associated with competition. As reported, Hypothesis
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2a is supported as asymmetrical returns (greater deviance from a normal profit) were negatively
associated with the continuum. Therefore, symmetrical returns (normal profit) are positively
associated with the continuum. This finding is important for research and industry because the
measure of expected value added returns was normal profit expectations and the deviation above
or below normal profit indicated the degree of asymmetry. Further, the finding suggests that
asymmetry is associated with competition and symmetry of expected returns is associated with
cooperation. Managers can expect asymmetry of expected returns to lead to conflict, the result of
a competitive managerial strategy.
The hypothesized association between asymmetrical values added returns and
opportunism (H2b) was not supported. This result is likely to be caused by a lack of definition as
to when an asymmetrical return became unacceptable. The issue was that respondents did not
answer the question either for lack of knowledge or sensitivity issues.
The major findings and contributions to research and business practice from the
correlation analysis are the support for the proposed cooperation – competition continuum as a
managerial strategy for supply chain management and the support for expected value added
symmetry and asymmetry as measured by normal profit returns being associated with the
proposed continuum.
The relevance of the overall revised model of supply chain management was assessed
using Partial Least Squares (PLS). Table 5.8 (above) shows the hypothesized relationships
among the model’s key constructs included in my research design. The major associations tested
were between a) power and the continuum; b) the continuum and its outcome variables: conflict,
trust, performance and customer relationship marketing; c) conflict and opportunism; and
customer relationship marketing, trust and performance.
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Perhaps most surprising was the lack of significant association between power (the
antecedent) and the continuum. Whether symmetrical or asymmetrical, power was not supported
as an antecedent to the cooperation – competition continuum. As documented in Chapter 2,
previous research has investigated power and its antecedent relationships with cooperation,
conflict and other behaviors with significant results. Power has been investigated for its
dimensionality including symmetry and found to play a major role in distribution management.
Perhaps due to cultural issues, the power measure used in this study was compromised.
Managerially, industry would be cautioned to disregard the lack of significance of my power
results. Academically, we may have to develop other methods for measuring power within the
Mexican business culture, particularly as it pertains to business relationships with foreign
companies.
In contrast, PLS did show significant results between the continuum and conflict and
trust. PLS results indicated a significant, negative relationship between continuum and conflict.
This finding is consistent with the correlation results discussed previously. These two analyses
are evidence of convergent validity in support of conflict being an outcome associated with the
management of the cooperation – competition continuum. For both researchers and managers,
the continuum – conflict association requires consideration being given to the roles of the
continuum and conflict in the management of the supply chain system. Competition merits
investigation as the alternative managerial strategy to cooperation; and conflict, as an outcome,
must be managed for its resolution. The exploratory evidence suggests the tradition model of
supply chain management is wrong. Conflict is not the alternative managerial strategy to
cooperation.
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The continuum is also positively associated with trust. This suggests that acceptable
financial returns associated with the continuum probably influence trust favorably. Equally
important, competition, associated with acceptable returns, should also be associated positively
with trust. It appears managers can maintain or build trust in their relationships using a
cooperative or competitive managerial strategy.
Another surprising finding was that the continuum was not associated with customer
relationship management (CRM). However, there was a significant positive association between
trust and CRM. Given the nature of CRM in terms of it being a market segmentation tool based
on brand loyalty and a distribution of benefits to loyal customers, trust may be a key antecedent
to a company participating in a CRM program. The actual management of the relationship
utilizing the continuum needs to generate trust before CRM becomes part of the business
relationship. Not necessarily surprising is the lack of association between the continuum and
performance. Performance has always been difficult to measure and explain in distribution
research. Somewhat surprising is the lack of association between CRM and performance. Again,
given CRM’s association with brand loyalty, a positive association was expected. However, this
was not the case.
Last, there was a significant association between opportunism and conflict. Opportunism
being characterized by unacceptable value added returns is associated with higher levels of
conflict, dysfunctional conflict. Managers can expect unacceptable asymmetric financial returns
will lead to opportunism, dysfunctional conflict and the termination of the dyadic relationship.
While the tests of the revised model of supply chain management did not provide support
for all of the hypothesized relationships, correlation analysis and PLS did find support for my
major thesis issue, the cooperation – competition continuum and conflict as an outcome variable,
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not an alternative managerial strategy to cooperation as suggested by the traditional model of
supply chain management. Further, acceptable value added expectations, symmetrical and
asymmetrical, are associated with the proposed continuum. Among the findings, these two
portend the most promise for future research and management.

6.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
There are several limitations associated with this study. Perhaps the most serious
limitation is the “Clash of Culture” issues. Mexico is a country that has only recently begun to
emerge as a more open society and economy. Prior to NAFTA (1994), Mexico’s economy was
dominated by government controlled industries and a domestic business leadership who sought
to preserve Mexican business for Mexicans. Mexico’s judiciary continues to protect Mexican
domestic business interests (Angulo, 2012). As a consequence, Mexican business manages the
Strategic Profit Model differently, emphasizing profit margin management, and still fears foreign
competition. Hence, structurally, barriers to entry remain an issue for Mexico. In addition, the
“Clash of Cultures” has been discussed in terms of behavioral tendencies. Mexicans do not like
to say, “No!” No, becomes evident by a lack of follow through. They do not like to be negative.
They do not like to divulge information. Information only exposes one. There is no benefit being
exposed. These “Clash of Culture” issues were the most serious limitation faced by this research.
Commitments were not followed through. Data access was restricted. The response rate was
reduced. The responses to certain measures were biased.
Another limitation was the attempt to test a revised model of supply chain management.
By testing the model, too many constructs and relationships had to be measured. The survey
instrument was long for anyone familiar with survey research. For individuals not familiar, the
process was likely complex and confusing. While the pretests did not indicate survey instrument
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length was an issue, the pretest was conducted among those familiar with survey research: U.S.
managers, acculturated Mexican managers and those working for U.S. companies located in U.S.
– Mexico border communities. Everything was done to make the survey instrument more userfriendly. I incorporated visuals, graphics, explanations, instructions and language to assist the
respondent. However, the research surveys were conducted in Mexico’s interior where
acculturation to the research process is limited.
A number of survey questions were adaptations of measures used in previous research
that had been tested for reliability and validity. They had become standards for the measurement
of trust, conflict, cooperation and other measures. In testing these standard measures, I found that
in this international business application, the validity and reliability of these measures were
compromised. In essence, new measures for these constructs needed to be developed and
pretested.
I did not anticipate the problem with the Qualtrics Program. Qualtrics technical support
could not remedy the lost respondents. I also could not control the administration of the survey
or its response rate. The administration had to be turned over to the OEM and their purchasing
agents (Manufacturer Survey Initiative) and to Tier 1 Supplier management (Supplier Survey
Initiative). As indicated, Mexican national directors of purchasing later indicated they had no
control over their purchasing agents. A change in directors at the Tier 1 Supplier association
compromised the Supplier Survey Initiative. Again, despite extensive e-mail messages and
telephone calls, I could not control the data collection effort.
Due to the compromised response rate, particularly from the Tier 1 Suppliers, I had to
abandon my goal to collect dyadic data for analysis. Despite these limitations, I was able to
achieve evidence supportive of my major research theses.
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6.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Despite the limitations I experienced with my research, my research did provide evidence
supportive of the cooperation – competition continuum as a viable managerial concept for the
achievement of the coordination of the supply chain system. This evidence warrants further
research to more fully articulate this continuum and its potential role in the management of the
supply chain system. As a suggestion, future research should investigate this continuum within a
domestic supply chain such as one within the United States or Canada.
The evidence that supports the cooperation – competition continuum provides an
opportunity for marketing researchers to reevaluate the role competition, not as a concept defined
within a Neoclassical Economics context, but as a relational concept. Competition viewed as a
viable alternative to cooperation, and as a means to enhance the coordination and efficiency of
the supply chain system, offers new avenues for research. The new continuum introduces
symmetry and asymmetric dimensions to management given that competition is defined as two
parties striving to achieve goals-in-common wherein one party achieves a greater financial return
than the other, but both parties find this differentiated financial return acceptable.
As mentioned, Alderson (1965) and Hunt (2010) have addressed the importance of
expected value added and superior financial performance. Neither has adequately addressed how
these financial constructs should be measured. This study adopted normal profit and any
deviation from normal profit as its measure. This measure was used because discussions with
supply chain managers evolved around normal profit as their standard. Deviation from normal
profit or value added return, did show promise as being an antecedent for the cooperation –
competition continuum. Again, this finding opens opportunity for further research in exploring
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the value added return (financial) interrelationships among power, the continuum, opportunism,
conflict and other relational behaviors within the model of supply chain management.
Based on previous research, it is hard to believe there is no significant relationship
between power and the continuum or between power and the symmetry or asymmetry of the
expected value added returns. Further, power is itself often asymmetrical. While this study did
not find significant results, there remains too much previous evidence not to explore these
hypothesized relationships.
This research also postulates a reconsideration of opportunism and its role in supply
chain management. By associating opportunism with unacceptable value added returns,
opportunism can be explored for its relationship with conflict, particularly dysfunctional.
Researchers are likely to gain a better understanding of the interrelationships between
opportunism, dysfunctional conflict and termination of the business relationship.
While the role for customer relationship management (CRM) was not indicated within a
supply chain management context, there was evidence that CRM is associated with trust, and
trust is associated with the management continuum. There is an opportunity to research these
relationships to better understand CRM’s role within the supply chain system.
All factors considered, the evidence supporting the revised model of supply chain
management and its cooperation – competition continuum and expected value added return
concepts merit further research consideration. The revised model postulates a new and
challenging direction for supply chain management and research.
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APPENDIX A: TABLES AND FIGURES - SAMPLING
Table A.1 - Schedule, Mexico City August 2011.
Day
Monday

Time
8:00 AM

Company
Colliers
Internation
al
OEM
Company 1
OEM
Company 2
OEM
Company 3
OEM
Company 4

Contact Person
Rafael McCadden
Dr. Eduardo Solis (AMIA)

Address
Breakfast

Monday
8/15
Tuesday
8/16
Tuesday
8/16
Dropoff
material
Wednes
day
8/17
Wednes
day
8/17
Wednes
day
8/17
Thursda
y 8/18
Friday
8/19

11:00 AM

Director

Mexico City

Purchasing Director -

Toluca, Estado de Mexico

Purchasing

Mexico City

SOURCING MEXICO
REPRESENTATIVE.

Mexico City

9:00 AM

OEM
Company 5

Sourcing Manager. Purchasing
& Logistics.

Mexico City

11:30

OEM
Company 6

Government Relations and PR
Director

Mexico City

3:30 PM

OEM
Company 7

Purchasing and STA Director

Mexico City

3:00 PM

OEM
Company 8
Industry
and
Commerce
OEM
Company 9

Purchasing

Puebla, Puebla

Jesus Serrano Landeros,
Director – Mexico

Mexico City

Friday
8/19

8:00 Am

Purchasing Director

Pachuca, Hidalgo

Friday
8/19

12:00 PM

OEM
Company
10
OEM
Company
11

Purchasing Director

Mexico City

Friday
8/19

Phone

Purchasing

Mexicali , Baja California

12:00 PM
4:00 PM

9:00 AM
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Table A.2, Mexico City February 2012
Day
Wednesday
February 8
Wednesday
February 8

Time
8:00
AM
2:00
PM

Company
RIOS
Asesores
OEM
Company 5

Contact Person
Agustín Ríos,
Executive Director
México Sourcing Manager.
Purchasing & Logistics.

Address
Mexico City

Wednesday
February 8
Wednesday
February 8
Thursday
February 9
Thursday
February 9
Thursday
February 9
Friday
February 9

4:00
PM
6:30
PM
11:00
AM
3-4
PM
5:00
PM
12:001:00
PM
6:00
PM

OEM
Company 6
INA

Director de Relaciones
Públicas y Gubernamentales
Oscar Albin,
Executive Director
Director - Purchasing -

Mexico City

Head of Purchasing

Mexico City

Purchasing Manager

Mexico City

Purchasing Director

PUEBLA

Purchasing & Supplier
Network. Electric/
Electronics Coordinator

Mexico City

Friday
February 9

OEM
Company 2
OEM
Company 9
OEM
Company 7
OEM
Company 8
OEM
Company 12
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Mexico City

Mexico City
Toluca, Estado de Mexico

Figure A.1. Comprehensive Model

Figure A.2 Sampling Plan - Overall
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Survey Coordinator (OEM)

OEM Manufacturer Buyer

1. Select twenty (20) buyers (purchase agents)
that will take the survey.
2. Forward the e-mail to those buyers with the
link to the survey.
** Copy the researcher in the e-mails sent
(mebarua@utep.edu )
3. Monitor the completion of the surveys. You
and/or your buyers should monitor the
completion of Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers’
surveys.

1. Identify two (2) Tier 1 suppliers of direct
materials
2. Complete 2 surveys: one for each of the two
Tier 1 suppliers you selected.
3. Call these suppliers to ask them to take the
survey. They will also contact two (2) of their
suppliers to take the survey.
4. Forward the e-mail that you received (with
the link to the survey) to your 2 suppliers.
5. Monitor the completion of the surveys by
your Tier 1 suppliers and their Tier 2 suppliers

Tier 1 Supplier

Tier 2 Supplier
1. Complete one (1) survey in regards to your
relationship with your client, the Tier 1
supplier

SELLER
1. Complete 1 survey in regards to your
relationship with the OEM manufacturer.
2. Ask a buyer in your company to identify 2
suppliers of direct materials (Tier 2)
BUYER
1. Complete 2 surveys; one for each of the two
Tier 2 suppliers selected for the study.
2.

Call the suppliers to ask them to participate
in the survey. Forward them the e-mail with
the link to the survey.

3. Monitor the completion of survey by Tier 2
suppliers.

** ALL INFORMATION WILL BE PROVIDED DIRECTLY TO THE RESEARCHER AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
TEXAS AT EL PASO TO KEEP YOUR COMMENTS ANONYMOUS.

Figure A.3 Sampling Plan – OEMs
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INSTRUCTIONS
This is a Supply Chain Study. The perspectives of all three levels (Manufacturer, Tier 1 and Tier 2
Suppliers) of each supply chain are needed.

Manufacturer
(OEM)

Supplier
Tier 1

Supplier
Tier 2

As a service coordinator, your task is to identify the respondents within your company that
will take the online survey. The following is a representation of the duties of the coordinator
and other participants. In the next page you can find more detailed instructions according to
the role of the participant.

Survey Coordinator
Tier 1 Company

•

•
•

Select
5‐10 BUYERS of Tier
2 components

Select SELLER(S)
with contact to the
corresponding OEMs

Each Buyer selects
TWO Tier 2 suppliers
of Direct materials

Each seller contacts the
OEM Manufacturer

Ask each supplier to answer the
survey in regards to their rela‐
tionship with you. (Forward e‐
mail with link to survey)
Fill out one survey for each sup‐
plier relationship.
Monitor completion by Tier 2
suppliers

•

•
•

Ask each OEM manufacturer to an‐
swer the survey in regards to their
relationship with you. (Forward e‐
mail with link to survey)
Fill out one survey for each OEM
relationship.
Monitor completion by OEM

Figure A.4 – Sampling Plan – Trade Association
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APPENDIX B: SURVEYS AND LETTERS
SURVEY – OEM (MANUFACTURER) VERSION (ENGLISH)

Q1 In this survey of the automotive industry you will be asked to evaluate a person/firm with
whom you have a commercial relationship. The purpose is to obtain the perspective of both
sides of the relationship; from the manufacturer (OEM) and the Tier 1 supplier, or from a
purchasing agent of the Tier 1 supplier and his/her Tier 2 supplier.
Our objective is
complete and quality information; therefore, it is essential that everyone in the supply chain
completes their requested survey forms being as objective and honest as possible. The survey
will take you about 15 minutes to complete. All information is strictly confidential. Nobody
within or outside your firm will see your answers, only the researcher. Please select the survey
form that you wish to answer given who you are evaluating:
 I am the buyer/representative of a OEM (manufacturer) and I want to evaluate a Tier 1
supplier (1)
 I am the representative of a Tier 1 Supplier and I want to evaluate a OEM (manufacturer) (2)
 I am the representative of a Tier 1 Supplier and I want to evaluate one of our Tier 2
suppliers (3)
 I am the representative of a Tier 2 Supplier and I want to evaluate our client, a Tier 1
Supplier (4)
Q2 Which company do you represent?
 BMW (1)
 Chrysler (2)
 Ford (3)
 Kenworth (4)
 King Autobuses (5)
 Navistar (6)
 Nissan/Renault (7)
 Peugeot (8)
 Toyota (9)
 Volkswagen (10)
 Other (11) ____________________

140

Q3 What is your name and position in the firm? (VP Purchasing, Purchase manager, purchase
agent, buyer, sales agent,....) * If you have filled out this questionnaire before for another
supplier assesment, you just need to fill out the "First and Last Name" portion for this question.
First Name (1)
Last Name (2)
Title/Position (3)
Company Name (4)
E-mail address (5)
Telephone (6)
Address (7)
City (8)
Country (9)
Q4 How long have you been in this position?
# Number of years: (1)
Q5 How many years of experience have you had working in the automotive or related industries?
# Number of years: (1)
Q6 Please identify the 1st. Tier supplier and its contact person for which you wish to answer the
following questions in regards to your buyer-seller relationship
Supplier's Company (1)
First Name (2)
Last Name (3)
Title/position (4)
E-mail address (5)
Telephone (6)
Address (7)
City (8)
Country (9)
Q7 How long have you done business with this supplier's contact person?
# Number of years: (1)
Q8 How long has your company done business with this supplier?
 Less than 3 years (1)
 between 3 and less than 5 years (2)
 between 5 and less than 10 years (3)
 10 years or more (4)
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Q9 The product(s) you purchase from this supplier is(are) best categorized as:
 Body Structure (Chassis, Brakes, Metals, Trim, Etc.) (1)
 Mechanical (Power train, Stearing, Radiator, Etc.) (2)
 Electrical (Harnesses, Lights, Batteries, Etc.) (3)
 Electronics (HVAC, Safety systems, Electronic equipment, Etc.) (4)
 Chemical (Plastic components, Seats, Upholstery, Rubber, Etc.) (5)
 Glass Products (Windows, Mirrors, Etc.) (6)
 Fasteners (Brackets, Nuts, Bolts, Etc.) (7)
 Tires (8)
 Other (9) ____________________
Q10 With respect to your relationship with this supplier, to what extent do you agree with the
following statements:
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

The supplier has
different goals from
us (1)
The supplier has
compatible goals
with us (2)

Mostly
Disagree
(2)

Somewhat
Disagree
(3)

Neither/
Nor (4)

Somewhat
Agree (5)

Mostly
Agree
(6)

Strongly
Agree (7)





























Their goals support
both firm's objectives
(3)















Our firms share the
same goals (4)
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Q11 Pertaining to your relationship with this supplier, to what extent do you agree or disagree
with the following dependency items (statements)?
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Mostly
Disagree
(2)

Somewhat
Disagree
(3)

Neither/
Nor (4)

Somewhat
Agree (5)

Mostly
Agree
(6)

Strongly
Agree (7)

We could easily
replace this supplier
and buy from another
(1)















They could easily
replace our firm with
another customer (2)











































Their business is
critical to achieving
our strategic goals (5)















They provide access
to advanced
technologies (6)















Our purchases are
significant proportion
of their sales (3)
Their business has
brought us benefits
we could not have
achieved with another
supplier (4)

143

Q12 Given your relationship with this supplier, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the
following statements?
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Mostly
Disagree
(2)

Somewhat
Disagree
(3)

Neither/
Nor (4)

Somewhat
Agree (5)

Mostly
Agree
(6)

Strongly
Agree (7)

Their information was
better than ours (1)















Their knowledge has
led to good
suggestions. (2)











































Their people knew
what they were doing.
(5)















Their people were
trained and
experienced (6)















We admire their
business acumen (7)















We sought to operate
our firm similarly (8)















Our goals and actions
were similar (9)
Our duty was to do as
they requested (10)





























We were obligated to
do what they wanted
(11)















They had a right to
expect our compliance
(12)















If we did not comply,
we were treated badly
in the relationship (13)











































They knew what
needed to be done. (3)
Their expertise led to
proper actions. (4)

If we complied, we
received favorable
treatment on other
occasions (14)
We were rewarded if
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we went along with
their wishes (15)
They hinted certain
actions would be
taken to reduce our
profits if we did not
go along with them
(16)
They might withdraw
certain needed
services for
noncompliance (17)
They could make
things difficult for us
(18)
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Q13 The following items are typical business operational policies of automotive suppliers. What
is the degree of influence that exists between you the manufacturer and this supplier over the
supplier's administration of these policies?
Manufactur
er has total
influence (1)

Manufactur
er has most
of the
influence (2)

Manufactur
er has some
influence (3)

Equal
influenc
e (4)

Supplier
has
some
influenc
e (5)

Supplier
has
most of
the
influenc
e (6)

Supplier
has
total
influenc
e (7)

Demand
Forecasting and
Production
Schedule
Synchronization
(1)















Knowledge based
certification
Training (2)















Inventory
Management/Contr
ol (3)











































Advanced
Technology
Capabilities (6)















Sourcing of
Materials or
Components (7)















Distribution of
Rewards, Profit or
Value added (8)















Communication
Systems (9)
Quality Systems
and Control (10)





























Delivery
Reliability (11)















Information
Technology















Product
Development (4)
Strategic Goals and
Mission Objectives
(5)
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System (12)
Investment in
Specialized
Equipment (13)















Engineering
Change Orders
(14)















Product Warranty
(15)















Top Management
Coordination (16)















Production
Ordering Process
(17)















Location of
Production
Facilities (18)















Payment terms and
cycle (19)















Technical Teams
(20)
Price/Cost
management (21)





























Labor issues (22)















Environmental
issues (green) (23)















Quality
Management
Certification (ISO)
(24)
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Q14 In terms of special investment requirements necessary to support the business relationship
with this supplier, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Mostly
Disagree
(2)

Somewhat
Disagree
(3)

Neither/
Nor (4)

Somewhat
Agree (5)

If we didn't comply
with them we were
treated badly in the
relationship (1)















Supplier's product
required special
technical skilled
employees (2)











































We provided specific
knowledge for quality
and performance. (5)















They could make
things difficult for us.
(6)















They provided us
with advanced
technology
capabilities (7)















Supplier's
qualification involved
substantial
commitments of their
time and money. (3)
The cost to switch
business to another
supplier would be
minimal. (4)

148

Mostly
Agree
(6)

Strongly
Agree (7)

For the next few questions, please look first at the following definitions of Relationship
Management Strategies: Cooperation and Competition.
Cooperation is two parties working together to achieve goals in-common with the expectation
that each party will benefit from the relationship equally (symmetrical).
Competition is two parties working together to achieve goals in-common with the expectation
that each party will benefit differently, one benefiting more than the other (asymmetrical).
However, the party that benefits less receives a positive benefit that is within his acceptable
range.
Opportunism is extreme self-interest by one party (at the expense of the other party)
In other words, the distribution of returns between parties is acceptable (symmetric/asymmetric)
or not acceptable:
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Q15 For each of the supplier's business operational policies, to what extent is your manufacturersupplier relationship characterized by a cooperative versus a competitive management strategy?
Total
Competiti
on (1)

Mostly
competiti
ve (2)

Somewha
t
competiti
ve (3)

Jointly
cooperati
ve and
competiti
ve (4)

Somewha
t
cooperati
ve (5)

Mostly
cooperati
ve (6)

Total
Cooperati
on (7)

Demand
Forecasting and
Production
Schedule
Synchronization
(1)















Knowledge based
certification
Training (2)















Inventory
Management/Con
trol (3)















Product
Development (4)















Strategic Goals
and Mission
Objectives (5)















Advanced
Technology
Capabilities (6)















Sourcing of
Materials or
Components (7)















Distribution of
Rewards, Profit or
Value added (8)















Communications
System (9)















Quality Systems
and Control (10)















Delivery
Reliability (11)
Information
Technology
System (12)





























Investment in
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Specialized
Equipment (13)
Engineering
Change Orders
(14)















Product Warranty
(15)















Top Management
Coordination (16)















Production
Ordering Process
(17)















Location of
Production
Facilities (18)















Payment terms
and cycle (19)















Technical Teams
(20)















Price/Cost
management (21)
Labor Issues (22)





























Environmental
Issues (Green)
(23)















Quality
Management
Certification
(ISO) (24)















151

Q16 To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Mostly
Disagree
(2)

Somewhat
Disagree
(3)

Neither/
Nor (4)

Somewhat
Agree (5)

Mostly
Agree
(6)

Strongly
Agree (7)

Our relationship is
highly cooperative
(1)















Our firms perform
well together (2)















We share goals incommon (3)















Our future is best
reached together (4)















Our supplier helps us
get the job done (5)















Q17 To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Mostly
Disagree
(2)

Somewhat
Disagree
(3)

Neither/
Nor (4)

Somewhat
Agree (5)

Mostly
Agree
(6)

Strongly
Agree (7)

Partner benefits are
not equal. (1)















The supplier's returns
are acceptable but
less than a normal
profit. (2)















Not a normal profit
return, but the
business utilized idle
capacity (3)















Their profit return is
positive. (4)















Our goals are similar
but theirs are
weighted differently
than ours (5)















Now look at the definition of an Acceptable Range or Reasonable Return.
A party’s normal profit return falls within an acceptable range of reasonable benefits received.
This range includes both higher than and less than normal profit. Less than normal profits may
be acceptable given higher volume sales, economic conditions or the need to obtain business
and/or minimize idle production capacity. If the lower return falls below the acceptable return
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range for the firm, opportunism (extreme self-interest by the other party) sets in and you may
seek to terminate the relationship as unacceptable business.
In other words, the acceptable range includes returns that are:

Q18 Given the statement above, what is the typical percentage deviation above or below
the Normal Profit Margin Return you would expect the supplier to receive given the specific
business conditions cited below? [Instructions: Slide the marker to the typical acceptable return
given the specific environmental business condition]
______ High Growth Economy (1)
______ High inflation/ Stagnant growth (2)
______ Recessionary/No Growth (3)
______ Negative Growth (4)
______ Today's Economy (5)
______ At what point less than normal profit does the return become unacceptable to your firm
(6)
Q19 All factors considered, what do you consider to be a supplier's normal profit percentage
return on a contract? _______
Q20 How do you define a Normal Profit Margin Return?
 GROSS PROFIT (Revenue - Cost of Good Sold or Sales) (1)
 NET PROFIT (Before tax) (2)
 NET PROFIT (After tax) (3)
 OTHER (4) ____________________
Q21 Opportunism is self interest by one party to a business relationship that harms the other.
Given your relationship with this supplier, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the
following statements?
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

They would not
exploit any selfinterest opportunity
(1)
Their contract
negotiations are fair
(2)
We would exploit a
self-interest
opportunity, given the

Mostly
Disagree
(2)

Somewhat
Disagree
(3)

Neither/
Nor (4)

Somewhat
Agree (5)

Mostly
Agree
(6)

Strongly
Agree (7)
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chance. (3)
Given a crisis, a less
than normal return
contract is acceptable
despite the
manufacturer
exploiting their selfinterest advantage. (4)















Q22 Differences occur between business partners. To what extent do you agree or disagree with
each of the following statements?
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Mostly
Disagree
(2)

Somewhat
Disagree
(3)

Neither/
Nor (4)

Somewhat
Agree (5)

Mostly
Agree
(6)

Strongly
Agree (7)

Certain supplier's
actions we do not
like. (1)















Our business
differences are minor.
(2)











































We differ but the end
result is usually better
performance (5)















Our strategic goals
are too different (6)















The supplier follows
his self-interests (3)
We disagree on
critical issues. (4)
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Q23 Suppliers and manufacturers need to coordinate their activities. To what extent do you agree
or disagree with each of the following statements?
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Mostly
Disagree
(2)

Somewhat
Disagree
(3)

Neither/
Nor (4)

Somewhat
Agree (5)

Mostly
Agree
(6)

Strongly
Agree
(7)

The supplier seeks our
well-being (1)















The supplier considers
how their
decisions/actions affect
us. (2)











































We are committed to a
long term business
relationship with them
(5)















We both expect a
profit return that falls
within our respective
ranges of acceptable
returns. (6)















We do not trust them
(3)
They look out for our
interests (4)
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Q24 Please indicate to what extent do you agree or disagree on your company having the
following marketing/management practices
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Mostly
Disagree
(2)

Somewhat
Disagree
(3)

Neither/
Nor (4)

Somewhat
Agree (5)

Mostly
Agree
(6)

Strongly
Agree
(7)

Through ongoing
dialogue, we work with
an individual key
supplier to customize
his offerings (1)















All people in my
organization treat key
suppliers with great
care (2)











































We have a formal
process for identifying
highly-effective and
ineffective suppliers
(5)















My organization has
established clear
business goals related
to supplier
qualification,
development, retention
and reactivation (6)















We continually assess
supplier
value/contribution (3)
We attempt to build
long-term relationships
with our high-value
suppliers (4)
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Q25 In regards to your satisfaction from this business relationship, To what extent do you agree
or disagree with the following statements?
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Mostly
Disagree
(2)

Somewhat
Disagree
(3)

Neither/
Nor (4)

Somewhat
Agree (5)

Mostly
Agree
(6)

Strongly
Agree (7)

Benefits are fair for
both parties. (1)















We are satisfied with
this Supplier (2)















We would like to
drop this Supplier (3)















The Supplier is a
good partner (4)















The relationship has
been good for both
parties (5)
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Q26 Compared with other manufacturers in your industry, how do you rate your firm’s
performance over the last year on the following performance items? Was your performance:
Significantl
y Worse
performan
ce (1)

Supply chain
(overall)
Operational
Efficiency
(1)

Worse
Performan
ce (2)

Marginally
Worse
Performan
ce (3)

Equal
Performan
ce (4)

Marginally
Better
Performan
ce (5)

Better
Performan
ce (6)

Significantl
y Better
Performan
ce (7)











































Sales Growth
(4)















Profit
Growth (5)















Inventory
Turnover (6)















Sales Per
Employee (7)
Overall
Profitability
(8)





























Pre-tax
Return on
Investment
(9)















Cash Flow
(10)















Joint
Planning (11)















Product
Development
(12)















Advance
Technology
Access (13)















Achieving
Strategic
Goals (2)
Supply Chain
Responsiven
ess (3)
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Production
Capacity
Utilization
(14)















Procurement
(15)

























































Order
Processing
(16)
Delivery (%
on time) (17)
Quality
(Defective
Parts Per
Million) (18)
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Q27 Please use the left side goal set to rate the importance your firm places on supply-chain
goals. Do so by distributing 100 points among the goals listed. The higher the point total
assigned to a particular goal, the more important that goal is to you. After completing your
firm’s views on supply chain goals, please distribute another 100 points among the goals listed in
the right side goal set. This rating is how you believe the supplier will rate the supply-chain
goals.
Please make certain that your columns each total 100 points!
Supply chain goals:
Financial
Performa
nce (1)

Integrated
Communicati
ons (2)

Price
Competitiven
ess (3)

Customer/Sup
plier
Relationship
(4)

Your
Rating
of
Suppl
yChain
goals
(1)
How
you
believ
e the
Suppli
er will
rate
the
Suppl
yChain
goals
(2)
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Cost
Minimizati
on (5)

Meet
Deliver
y
Schedul
es (6)

Deliver
ed
Quality
Produc
t (7)

Oth
er
(8)

Q28 How do you classify this supplier?
 Sole source supplier of one/more products (1)
 One of two/three major suppliers of one or more products (2)
 One of several suppliers (3)
 Other (4) ____________________
Q29 This supplier is:
 Mexican-owned supplier (1)
 U.S. /Canadian Owned supplier (2)
 Non North-American Supplier (3)
Q30 This supplier is:
 A business independently owned and managed (1)
 A subsidiary of our company (2)
 A joint venture partner of our company (3)
 Other (4) ____________________
Q31 From your company's buying perspective, How do you classify this supplier?
 Small (1)
 Medium (2)
 Large (3)
Q32 What are your total annual purchases (2010) made from this supplier?
 Less than $500,000 dollars (1)
 $500,000 to less than 1 million dollars (2)
 $1 to less than 10 million dollars (3)
 $10 to less than 25 million dollars (4)
 $25 to less than 50 million dollars (5)
 $50 million to less than 100 million dollars (6)
 $100 to less than 500 million dollars (7)
 $500 million to less than 1 billion dollars (8)
 More than $1 billion dollars (9)
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Q33 Purchases from this supplier represents what percentage of your total purchases of this
product(s)?
Q34 The total number of employees working for my company are:
 Less than 100 (1)
 101 - 500 (2)
 501 - 1,500 (3)
 1,501 - 2,500 (4)
 2,501 or more (5)
Q35 For classification reasons, please tell us your nationality:
 Mexican (1)
 U.S. (2)
 Other (3) ____________________
Q36 Is your company registered under IMMEX (maquiladora)?
 Yes (1)
 No (2)
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SURVEY – OEM (MANUFACTURER) VERSION – (SPANISH)
Q1. En este cuestionario de la industria automotriz se le pedirá que identifique a una
persona/empresa con la que tiene una relación comercial. El propósito es obtener la
perspectiva de ambos lados de la relación; ya sea del fabricante /ensambladora (OEM) y el
proveedor Tier 1, ó del comprador Tier 1 y su proveedor Tier 2.
Nuestro objetivo es tener
información de calidad y completa; por lo tanto, es esencial que todos en la cadena de suministro
llenen la parte del cuestionario que les corresponde de la manera más objetiva y
honesta posible.
El cuestionario le tomará aproximadamente 15 minutos para
completar. Toda la información es estríctamente confidencial. Nadie dentro o fuera de su
empresa podrá ver sus respuestas, unicamente la investigadora.
Por favor escoja el
cuestionario que quiera responder según a quién quiere evaluar:
 Soy el comprador de un Fabricante/ Ensambladora (OEM) y quiero evaluar a un proveedor
Tier 1 (1)
 Soy el vendedor de un Proveedor (Tier 1) y quiero evaluar a un Fabricante/ Ensambladora
(OEM) (2)
 Soy el comprador de un Proveedor (Tier 1) y quiero evaluar a uno de nuestros Proveedores
(Tier 2) (3)
 Soy el representante de un Proveedor (Tier 2) y quiero evaluar a nuestro cliente, el Proveedor
Tier 1 (4)
Q2 ¿A qué compañia representa usted?
 BMW (1)
 Chrysler (2)
 Ford (3)
 Kenworth (4)
 King Autobuses (5)
 Navistar (6)
 Nissan/Renault (7)
 Peugeot (8)
 Toyota (9)
 Volkswagen (10)
 Otro (11) ____________________
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Q3 ¿Cuál es su nombre y puesto en la empresa? (VP de compras, Gerente de compras, agente de
compras, ventas,....)* Si usted ya ha llenado este cuestionario antes para evaluar a otro proveedor
Tier 1, solo necesita llenar su Nombre y Apellido en esta pregunta.
Nombre (1)
Apellido (2)
Título/Puesto (3)
Nombre de la Compañia (4)
Correo electrónico (5)
Teléfono (6)
Dirección (7)
Ciudad (8)
País (9)
Q4 ¿Cuanto tiempo lleva en este puesto?
# Número de años: (1)
Q5 ¿Cuántos años de experiencia ha tenido trabajando en la industria automotriz y empresas
relacionadas?
# Número de años: (1)
Q6 Por favor identifique al Proveedor de Materiales Directos Tier 1 y el nombre de la
persona/contacto en esa empresa para la que usted desea contestar las siguiente preguntas en
cuanto a su relación comprador-vendedor
Compañia del Proveedor (1)
Nombre (2)
Apellido (3)
Título/Puesto (4)
Correo Electrónico (5)
Teléfono (6)
Dirección (7)
Ciudad (8)
País (9)
Q7 ¿Cuántos años lleva de relación comercial con esta persona representante del proveedor?
# Número de años: (1)
Q8 ¿Cuántos años lleva su empresa en relación comercial con este proveedor?
 Menos de 3 años (1)
 entre 3 -- y menos de 5 años (2)
 entre 5 -- y menos de 10 años (3)
 10 años ó más (4)
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Q9 El producto(s) que usted compra de este proveedor podría ser clasificado como:
 Estructura (Chasis, frenos, metales, acabado, etc.) (1)
 Mecánico (power train, stearing, radiador, etc.) (2)
 Eléctrico (cables, luces, baterias, etc.) (3)
 Electrónicos (HVAC, sistemas de seguridad, equipo electrónico, Etc.) (4)
 Químicos (componentes de plásticos, asientos, tapiceria, hule, etc.) (5)
 Productos de vidrio (ventanas, espejos, etc.) (6)
 Tornilleria (tornillos, tuercas, etc.) (7)
 Llantas (8)
 Otros (9) ____________________
Q10 En cuanto a su relación con este proveedor Tier 1, ¿qué tan de acuerdo está con las
siguientes declaraciones?
Totalmente
en
desacuerdo
(1)

En
desacuerdo
(2)

Algo en
desacuerdo
(3)

Ni de
acuerdo ni
en
desacuerdo
(4)

Algo de
acuerdo
(5)

De
acuerdo
(6)

Totalmente
de acuerdo
(7)

El
proveedor
tiene metas
diferentes a
las nuestras
(1)















El
proveedor
tiene metas
compatibles
con las
nuestras (2)















Sus metas
respaldan
tanto
nuestros
objetivos
como los de
ellos (3)















Nuestras
empresas
comparten
las mismas
metas (4)
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Q11 En cuanto a su relación con este proveedor, ¿qué tan de acuerdo está con las siguientes
declaraciones sobre dependencia entre las empresas?
Totalmente
en
desacuerdo
(1)

En
desacuerdo
(2)

Algo en
desacuerdo
(3)

Ni de
acuerdo ni
en
desacuerdo
(4)

Algo de
acuerdo
(5)

De
acuerdo
(6)

Totalmente
de acuerdo
(7)

Nosotros
podríamos
facilmente
reemplazar a
este
proveedor y
comprarle a
otro (1)















Ellos podrían
reemplazarnos
facilmente
con otro
cliente (2)















Nuestras
compras son
una parte
significativa
de sus ventas
(3)















El proveedor
ha traido
beneficios a
nuestra
empresa que
no podríamos
haber
alcanzado con
otro (4)















El proveedor
es esencial
para alcanzar
nuestras
metas
estratégicas
(5)















Ellos nos
proporcionan
acceso a
tecnologías
avanzadas (6)
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Q12 Dada su relación con este proveedor, ¿qué tan de acuerdo está con las siguientes
declaraciones?
Totalmente
en
desacuerdo
(1)

En
desacuerdo
(2)

Algo en
desacuerdo
(3)

Ni de
acuerdo ni
en
desacuerdo
(4)

Algo de
acuerdo
(5)

De
acuerdo
(6)

Totalmente
de acuerdo
(7)

Su
información
era mejor que
la nuestra (1)















Su
conocimiento
ha llevado a
buenas
sugerencias (2)















Ellos sabían lo
que se tenía
que hacer (3)















Su experiencia
llevó a
acciones
adecuadas (4)















Su gente sabía
lo que hacían
(5)















Su gente
estaba
entrenada y
con
experiencia (6)















Admiramos su
visión de
negocios (7)















Buscamos
llevar nuestra
empresa de
forma similar
(8)















Nuestras metas
y acciones
fueron
similares (9)















Nuestra
obligación era
hacer lo que
ellos
requirieran
(10)















Nosotros
estabamos
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obligados a
hacer lo que
ellos querían
(11)
Ellos tenian
derecho de
esperar que
nosotros
accedieramos
(12)















SI no
cumpliamos
con ellos
seríamos
tratados mal
(13)















Si cumpliamos
con ellos,
recibíamos un
trato favorable
en otras
ocasiones (14)















Eramos
recompensados
si cumpliamos
sus deseos (15)















Ellos
insinuaron que
algunas
acciones serían
llevadas a cabo
para reducir
nuestras
utilidades si no
estabamos de
acuerdo con
ellos (16)















Ellos podrían
quitar algunos
servicios
necesarios si
no cumplimos
(17)















Ellos podrian
hacer las cosas
difíciles para
nosotros (18)
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Q13 Los siguientes puntos son términos típicos de las operaciones comerciales de
los proveedores. ¿Qué nivel de influencia existe entre usted y el proveedor en cuanto a
la implementación de éstos términos?
Fabricante
tiene
influencia
total (1)

Fabricante
tiene la
mayor
influencia
(2)

Fabricante
tiene algo
de
influencia
(3)

Influencia
por igual
(4)

Proveedor
tiene algo
de
influencia
(5)

Proveedor
tiene la
mayor
influencia
(6)

Proveedor
tiene
influencia
total (7)

Pronóstico de
Demanda y
sincronización
del calendario
de producción
(1)















Entrenamiento
de
certificaciones
(2)















Manejo/control
de Inventario
(3)















Desarrollo de
productos (4)















Metas
estratégicas y
objetivos
(misión) (5)















Capacidad en
Tecnología
avanzada (6)















Sourcing de
materiales y
componentes
(7)















Distribución de
ganancias,
utilidades o
valor agregado
(8)















Sistema de
comunicaciones
(9)















Sistemas de
Control de
Calidad (10)















Fiabilidad de la
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entrega (11)
Sistema de
Tecnología de
Información
(12)















Inversión de
equipo
especializado
(13)















Cambio de
ordenes de
Ingeniería (14)















Garantía del
Producto (15)















Coordinación
de altos
ejecutivos (16)















Proceso de
orden de
producción (17)















Ubicación de
instalaciones de
producción (18)















Términos de
pago y ciclo
(19)















Equipos
técnicos (20)















Manejo de
Precios/Costos
(21)















Temas
Laborales (22)















Temas de
Medio
Ambiente
(Green) (23)















Certificación en
Calidad (ISO)
(24)
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Q14 En cuanto a requisitos de inversión especial necesaria para apoyar la relación con este
proveedor, ¿qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo está con las siguientes declaraciones?
Totalmente
en
desacuerdo
(1)

En
desacuerdo
(2)

Algo en
desacuerdo
(3)

Ni de
acuerdo ni
en
desacuerdo
(4)

Algo de
acuerdo
(5)

De
acuerdo
(6)

Totalmente
de acuerdo
(7)

Si no
cumplíamos
con ellos
eramos
tratados mal en
la relación (1)















El producto del
proveedor
requería de
empleados con
habilidades
técnicas
especiales (2)















La
certificación
del proveedor
requería una
suma
importante de
dinero y
tiempo por
parte de ellos
(3)















El costo de
cambiar a otro
proveedor
sería mínimo
(4)











































Nosotros les
damos
conocimiento
en especifico
para calidad y
rendimiento
(5)
Ellos podrían
hacer las cosas
difíciles para
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nosotros (6)
Ellos nos
proporcionaron
con capacidad
en tecnología
avanzada (7)















Q1 Para las preguntas que siguen, por favor vea primero las siguientes definiciones del Manejo
de Relaciones Estrategicas: Cooperación, Competencia, y Oportunismo.
Cooperacion
significa dos empresas trabajando en conjunto para lograr metas en común, con la expectativa de
que ambas empresas sean beneficiadas por la relación de manera equitativa (la distribución de
beneficios es simétrica).
Competencia significa dos empresas trabajando en conjunto para
lograr metas en común con la expectativa de que cada empresa se benificiará de forma diferente,
una con mayor beneficio que la otra (distribución de beneficios es asimétrica). Sin embargo, la
empresa que se lleva menos, recibe aún un beneficio (positivo) que se enuentra dentro de su
rango de beneficios considerados aceptables.
Oportunismo es interés propio al extremo por
una empresa (a costa de la otra) En otras palabras, la distribución de las ganancias entre las
empresas es aceptable (simétrica/asimétrica) o no aceptable:
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Q15 Dada las definiciones anteriores, conteste la siguiente pregunta: Para cada uno de las
siguientes operaciones comerciales del proveedor, ¿cómo se caracteriza su relación con este
fabricante: una estrategia de administración COMPETITIVA (distribución asimétrica de los
beneficios) ó COOPERATIVA (distribución simétrica de los beneficios)?
Totalment
e
competitiv
a (1)

Mayorment
e
competitiva
(2)

Algo
competitiv
a (3)

Cooperativ
ay
competitiv
a a la vez
(4)

Algo
cooperativ
a (5)

Mayorment
e
cooperativa
(6)

Totalment
e
cooperativ
a (7)

Pronóstico de
Demanda y
sincronización
del calendario
de producción
(1)















Entrenamiento
de
certificación
(2)















Manejo de
Inventario (3)















Desarrollo de
productos (4)















Metas
estratégicas y
objetivos
(misión) (5)















Capacidad de
tecnologia
avanzada (6)















Sourcing de
materiales y
componentes
(7)















Distribución
de ganancias,
utilidades o
valor
agregado (8)















Sistema de
comunicacion
es (9)















Sistema de
Control de
Calidad (10)















Fiabilidad en
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la entrega (11)
Información
Técnica y de
sistemas (12)















Inversión en
equipo
especializado
(13)















Cambio de
ordenes en
Ingeniería
(14)















Garantía del
Producto (15)















Coordinación
de altos
ejecutivos
(16)















Proceso de
orden de
producción
(17)















Ubicación de
instalaciones
de producción
(18)















Términos de
pago y ciclo
(19)















Equipos
técnicos (20)















Manejo de
Precios/Costos
(21)















Temas
laborales (22)















Temas medio
ambiente
(green) (23)















Certificación
en Calidad
(ISO) (24)
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Q16 ¿Qué tan de acuerdo está con las siguientes declaraciones?
Totalmente
en
desacuerdo
(1)

En
desacuerdo
(2)

Algo en
desacuerdo
(3)

Ni de
acuerdo ni
en
desacuerdo
(4)

Algo de
acuerdo
(5)

De
acuerdo
(6)

Totalmente
de acuerdo
(7)

Nuestra
relación es
altamente
cooperativa
(1)















Nuestras
empresas
trabajan bien
juntas (2)















Compartimos
metas en
común (3)















Nuestro
futuro es más
alcanzable
juntos (4)















Nuestro
proveedor
nos ayuda a
cumplir el
trabajo (5)
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Q17 ¿Qué tan de acuerdo está con las siguientes declaraciones?
Totalmente
en
desacuerdo
(1)

En
desacuerdo
(2)

Algo en
desacuerdo
(3)

Ni de
acuerdo ni
en
desacuerdo
(4)

Algo de
acuerdo (5)

De acuerdo
(6)

Totalmente
de acuerdo
(7)

Los
beneficios
del socio
no son
iguales (1)















El margen
de utilidad
(ganancia)
del
proveedor
esaceptable
pero menor
a su
utilidad
normal (2)















La utilidad
(ganancia)
para el
proveedor
no es la
normal,
pero
pudieron
utilizar
equipo que
estaba sin
utilizar (3)















Su margen
de utilidad
(ganancia)
es positiva
(4)















Nuestras
metas son
similares
pero la
importancia
de cada una
es diferente
(5)
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Ahora lea la definición de un Rango Aceptable o Ganancia Razonable.
El margen de utilidad
(ganancia) normal de una empresa se encuentra entre un rango aceptable de beneficios
recibidos. Este rango incluye beneficios que a veces son más de lo normal o menos de lo
normal. Las ganancias menores de lo normal pueden ser aceptables si significan, por
ejemplo, un mayor volumen de ventas, según el entorno económico ó por la necesidad de tener
actividad y/o minimizar el tiempo sin usar de una máquinaria. Si el margen de ganancia está por
debajo del rango mínimo aceptable, entonces la relación es oportunista (interés-personal al
extremo por parte del socio) y usted busca terminar con esta relación pues ya no es
comercialmente aceptable. En otras palabras, el Rango Aceptable incluye ganancias que son
:
Q18 Dado lo anterior, ¿Cuál es la desviación porcentual típica, mayor o menor al margen de
ganancia normal, que usted cree que un proveedor podría considerar aceptable dados los
siguientes entornos económicos?
[Instrucciones: Deslize el indicador a el margen de
ganancia típica que sería aceptable para el proveedor Tier 1 según el entorno económico]
______ Economía en alto crecimiento (1)
______ Alta inflación/ crecimiento estancado (2)
______ Recesión/ sin crecimiento (3)
______ Crecimiento negativo (4)
______ Economía actual (5)
______ A qué punto menor de una ganancia normal se vuelve la utilidad inaceptable para la
empresa? (6)
Q19 Considerando todos los factores, ¿Cuál considera que sea un porcentaje de ganancia normal
para un proveedor en un contrato?
Q20 ¿Cómo define un Margen de Ganancia Normal?
 UTILIDAD BRUTA (Ventas- Costo de ventas) (1)
 UTILIDAD ANTES DE IMPUESTOS (2)
 UTILIDAD NETA (3)
 OTRO (4) ____________________
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Q21 Oportunismo es cuando un socio busca su interés personal y daña al otro. Dada su relación
con este proveedor, ¿qué tanto está de acuerdo con las siguientes declaraciones?
Totalmente
en
desacuerdo
(1)

En
desacuerdo
(2)

Algo en
desacuerdo
(3)

Ni de
acuerdo ni
en
desacuerdo
(4)

Algo de
acuerdo
(5)

De
acuerdo
(6)

Totalmente
de acuerdo
(7)

Elllos no
explotarían
ninguna
oportunidad
de sacar
interés
personal (1)















Sus
negociaciones
son justas (2)















Nosotros
explotaríamos
la
oportunidad
de conseguir
nuestro
interés
personal si se
dá el caso (3)















Dada una
crisis, un
contrato con
una ganancia
menor del
mínimo es
aceptable a
pesar de que
el fabricante
está
explotando su
ventaja e
interés
personal (4)
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Q22 A veces existen diferencias entre socios comerciales. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo está con las
siguientes declaraciones?
Totalmente
en
desacuerdo
(1)

En
desacuerdo
(2)

Algo en
desacuerdo
(3)

Ni de
acuerdo ni
en
desacuerdo
(4)

Algo de
acuerdo
(5)

De
acuerdo
(6)

Totalmente
de acuerdo
(7)

Algunas
acciones del
proveedor no
nos gustan (1)















Nuestras
diferencias de
negocios son
mínimas (2)















El proveedor
busca su
interés
personal (3)















Estamos en
desacuerdo en
cuestiones
críticas
/fundamentales
(4)











































Aunque
tenemos
diferencias, al
final el
resultado es
una mejor
utilidad (5)
Nuestros
objetivos
estratégicos
son muy
diferentes (6)
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Q23 Los proveedores y fabricantes necesitan coordinar sus actividades. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo
está con las siguientes declaraciones?
Totalment
e en
desacuerd
o (1)

El proveedor
busca nuestro
bienestar (1)
El proveedor
considera cómo
sus
decisiones/accione
s nos afectan (2)

En
desacuerd
o (2)

Algo en
desacuerd
o (3)

Ni de
acuerdo ni
en
desacuerd
o (4)

Algo de
acuerd
o (5)

De
acuerd
o (6)

Totalment
e de
acuerdo
(7)





























Nosotros no les
tenemos confianza
(3)















El proveedor cuida
de nuestros
intereses (4)











































Estamos
comprometidos a
una relación de
largo plazo con
este proveedor (5)
Ambos esperamos
una ganancia que
caiga dentro de
nuestros rangos de
utilidad aceptables
(6)

180

Q24 Por favor indique qué tanto está de acuerdo en que su empresa tiene las siguientes políticas
de mercadotecnia /administración.
Totalment
e en
desacuerd
o (1)

En
desacuerd
o (2)

Algo en
desacuerd
o (3)

Ni de
acuerdo ni
en
desacuerd
o (4)

Algo de
acuerd
o (5)

De
acuerd
o (6)

Totalment
e de
acuerdo
(7)

A través de un
diálogo contínuo,
trabajamos junto
con proveedores
claves para
personalizar/adapta
r los productos que
ofrecen (1)















Todos en mi
empresa tratan a los
proveedores clave
con mucho cuidado
y atención (2)















Estamos evaluando
constantemente el
valor/contribución
de los proveedores
(3)















Intentamos formar
relaciones de largo
plazo con nuestros
proveedores de alta
calidad (4)















Tenemos un
proceso especifico
para identificar
proveedores de
gran eficacia y los
no-efectivos (5)















Mi empresa ha
establecido metas
comerciales claras
relacionadas con
lacertificación,
desarrollo,
retención y
reactivación de
proveedores (6)
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Q25 En cuanto a su satisfacción con esta relación comercial, ¿Qué tanto está de acuerdo con las
siguientes declaraciones?
Totalmente
en
desacuerdo
(1)

En
desacuerdo
(2)

Algo en
desacuerdo
(3)

Ni de
acuerdo ni
en
desacuerdo
(4)

Algo de
acuerdo (5)

De acuerdo
(6)

Totalmente
de acuerdo
(7)

Los
beneficios
son justos
para
ambos
socios (1)















Estamos
satisfechos
con el
proveedor
(2)















Nos
gustaría
descartar a
este
proveedor
(3)















Este
proveedor
es un buen
socio (4)















La
relación
ha sido
buena para
ambas
partes (5)
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Q26 Comparado con los otros fabricantes en su industria, ¿cómo califica su desempeño del
último año en los siguientes términos de desempeño? Su desempeño/rendimiento fué:
Significativam
ente mejor
desempeño
(1)

Mejor
desemp
eño (2)

Marginalm
ente mejor
desempeño
(3)

Desemp
eño igual
que los
demás
(4)

Marginalm
ente peor
desempeño
(5)

Peor
desemp
eño (6)

Significativam
ente peor
desempeño
(7)

Funcionami
ento
eficiente de
la cadena de
suministro
(en general)
(1)















Metas
estratégicas
alcanzadas
(2)















Respuesta
rápida
(sensibilida
d) de la
cadena de
suministro
(3)















Crecimiento
en ventas
(4)











































Ventas por
número de
empleados
(7)















Rendimient
o Total (8)















Rentabilida
d sobre
activos















Crecimiento
en
utilidades
(5)
Rotación de
inventarios
(6)
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(antes de
impuestos)
(9)
Flujo de
Efectivo
(10)











































Acceso a
Tecnologia
avanzada
(13)















Uso de la
capacidad
de
producción
(14)















Abastecimie
nto (15)

























































Planeación
de procesos
(11)
Desarrollo
de
productos
(12)

Planificació
n de
procesos
(16)
Entrega (%
a tiempo)
(17)
Calidad
(partes
defectuosas
por millon)
(18)

Q27 Por favor, utilizando la serie de objetivos de la izquierda, califique la importancia de los
siguientes objetivos para su empresa. Hágalo dividiendo 100 puntos entre la lista de
objetivos. Mientras más alto sean los puntos, más importante es el objetivo para su
empresa.
Después de completar su clasificación sobre los objetivos de su empresa, por favor
distribuya otros 100 puntos a los objetivos listados en la parte derecha según como crea que el
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proveedor clasificaría estos objetivos. Por favor asegurece que ambas columnas sumen 100
puntos. Ojbetivos de la cadena de suministro:
Rentabili
dad y
salud
financiera
(1)

Comunicacio
nes de
conjunto (2)

Competitivi
dad de
Precios (3)

Relación
Cliente/prove
edor (4)

Su
evaluaci
ón de los
objetivos
de la
cadena
de
suminist
ro (1)
Cómo
cree que
el
proveed
or
contestar
á sobre
los
objetivos
de la
cadena
de
suminist
ro? (2)
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Disminuci
ón de
costos (5)

Cumplimie
nto de
fechas de
entrega (6)

Entreg
a de
produc
to de
cálidad
(7)

Otr
o
(8)

Q28 ¿Cómo clasifica a este proveedor?
 Proveedor único de uno o más productos (1)
 Uno de dos/tres grandes proveedores de uno o más productos (2)
 uno de varios proveedores (3)
 Otro (4) ____________________
Q29 Este proveedor es:
 Proveedor de dueños Mexicanos (1)
 Proveedor de dueños de Estados Unidos/ Canada (2)
 Proveedor fuera de Norte América (3)
Q30 El proveedor es:
 Una empresa independiente (1)
 Una empresa subsidiaria a la nuestra (2)
 Una empresa conjunta (joint-venture) de nuestra empresa (3)
 Otro (4) ____________________
Q31 Desde el punto de vista de compras que hace su empresa, cómo clasificaría a este
proveedor?
 Chico (1)
 Mediano (2)
 Grande (3)
Q32 ¿Cuántas compras anuales totales (2010) hace su empresa a este proveedor?
 Menos de $500,000 dólares (1)
 $500,000 a menos de $1 millón de dólares (2)
 $1 a menos de $10 millones de dólares (3)
 $10 a menos de 25 millones de dólares (4)
 $25 a menos de 50 millones de dólares (5)
 $50 a menos de 100 millones de dólares (6)
 $100 a menos de $500 millones de dólares (7)
 $500 a menos de 1 billón de dólares (8)
 Más de $1.0 billón de dólares (9)
Q33 ¿Qué porcentaje del total de compras de este producto(s) representan las compras que hace
de este proveedor?
Q34 El número total de empleados de producción de tiempo completo que trabajan para mi
empresa son:
 Menos de 100 (1)
 101 - 500 (2)
 500 - 1,500 (3)
 1,501 - 2,500 (4)
 2,501 ó más (5)
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Q35 Para cuestiones de clasificación, por favor diganos ¿cuál es su nacionalidad?
 Mexicana (1)
 Estados Unidos (2)
 Otra (3) ____________________
Q36 Esta su empresa registrada bajo IMMEX (maquiladora)?
 Si (1)
 No (2)
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ENDORSEMENT LETTERS

I N DU S TR IA NA C I O N A L DE A U TO PA R TE S , A . C .
September 26, 2011

Dear Director:

The University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP) is running a supply chain study of Mexico’s automotive industry. The
research is interested in testing a new supply chain model developed by Dr. Donald Michie and Maria E. Barua, a
Mexican doctoral student at UTEP.
At the present time, the study is capturing the perspective from various vehicle manufacturing companies
established in México and it is now crucial the integration of different level suppliers (Tier 1 and Tier 2) into the
supply chain. This is why I ask you to participate in this important project.
Your participation is divided into two parts: the first one asks that you take an online survey about your
relationship with an OEM Vehicle Manufacturer in Mexico that you select. The survey is interested in capturing
your perspective in regards to the strategies used to manage the relationship between the two firms and
investigates the impact those strategies have on the performance of the supply chain. In part two, you are asked
to evaluate your relationship with two (2) of your own direct materials suppliers (Tier 2). This allows the industry
analysis to be more complete, capturing the perspective of both suppliers (Tier 1 and Tier 2).
Your participation is strictly confidential. All responses are submitted online and go directly and only to the
researcher (Ms. Barua). No one within your firm or within your supplier’s firm will see your survey response. The
only person to see your response is Ms. Barua. She alone will compile and summarize your information with
others as part of a comprehensive data set. Only the statistical analysis of the study’s comprehensive data set will
be published in academic and trade journals.
Ms. Maria Barua is responsible for the project. If you would like more information, she could explain the research
and the survey in detail via telephone and/or e-mail at 001- (915) 539-6788 or at mebarua@utep.edu.
I consider your participation in this project extremely important as we collaborate with the International
Academy that is interested in our automotive value-chain. The final industry results will be distributed to the
association and its members. This means a tremendous opportunity to better understand our supply chain.
Asociación Mexicana de la Industria Automotriz - AMIA and Industria Nacional de Autopartes – INA, thank you in
advance for your valuable cooperation. We await your prompt response to the survey.
Thank you so much in advance for your cooperation.
Best Regards,

Agustín Ríos M
Executive President
Industria Nacional de Autopartes A. C.
Av. Colonia del Valle 607, Colonia del Valle, México D.F., 03100.
Tel: (5255)5682-5862 Fax: (5255)5669-3842 www.ina.com.mx

Figure A.4 Letter to OEM Manufacturers
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September 26, 2011
Dear Director:
The University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP) is running a supply chain study of Mexico’s automotive industry. The
research is interested in testing a new supply chain model developed by Dr. Donald Michie and Maria E. Barua, a
Mexican doctoral student at UTEP.
At the present time, the study is capturing the perspective from various vehicle manufacturing companies
established in México and it is now crucial the integration of different level suppliers (Tier 1 and Tier 2) into the
supply chain. This is why I ask you to participate in this important project.
Your participation is divided into two parts: the first one asks that you take an online survey about your
relationship with an OEM Vehicle Manufacturer in Mexico that you select. The survey is interested in
capturing your perspective in regards to the strategies used to manage the relationship between the two firms
and investigates the impact those strategies have on the performance of the supply chain. In part two, you are
asked to evaluate your relationship with four (4) of your own direct materials suppliers (Tier 2). This allows the
industry analysis to be more complete, capturing the perspective of both suppliers (Tier 1 and Tier 2).
Your participation is strictly confidential. All responses are submitted online and go directly and only to the
researcher (Ms. Barua). No one within your firm or within your supplier’s firm will see your survey response. The
only person to see your response is Ms. Barua. She alone will compile and summarize your information with
others as part of a comprehensive data set. Only the statistical analysis of the study’s comprehensive data set will
be published in academic and trade journals.
Ms. Maria Barua is responsible for the project. If you would like more information, she could explain the
research and the survey in detail via telephone, e-mail and/or via video conference through Skype.
I consider your participation in this project extremely important as we collaborate with the International
Academy that is interested in our automotive value-chain. The final industry results will be distributed to the
association and its members. This means a tremendous opportunity to better understand our supply chain.
Asociación Mexicana de la Industria Automotriz - AMIA and Industria Nacional de
Autopartes – INA, thank you in advance for your valuable cooperation.
We await your direct response to the researcher, Maria E. Barua, at mebarua@utep.edu. Other contact
information: mebarua@utep.edu, Telephone: 001-915-539-6788 (U.S.).

I ask you to please copy us at: asistentepresidencia@ina.com.mx
Attached you will find a small introduction to the study as well as instructions on how to take the survey.
We await your prompt response.
Thank you so much in advance for your cooperation. Best Regards,

Agustín Ríos M Executive
President
Industria Nacional de Autopartes A. C.

Av.

del Valle 607,
del Valle,
(5255)5682-5862
(5255)5669-3842

Figure A.5 Letter to Tier 1 Suppliers
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APPENDIX C: DATA ANALYSIS TABLES AND FIGURES
Table C.1-- Demographic Characteristics of Respondents
Characteristics
Type of Respondent
OEM Manufacturer Buyer
Tier-1 Supplier Seller
Tier-1 Supplier Buyer
Tier-2 Supplier Seller
Gender
Male
Female
Language
English
Spanish
Nationality
Mexican
U.S.
Other
Years in this position
Years of experience in the industry
Years of relationship with this person
Years with this suppliers/buyer company
Less than 3 years
Between 3-5 years
Between 5-10 years
10 years or more
Type of product
Body structure
Mechanical
Electrical
Electronics
Chemical
Glass products
Fasteners
Tires
Others
Supplier Classification
Sole Source Suppliers
One of two or three major suppliers
One of several suppliers
Supplier Company Ownership
Mexican-owned supplier
U.S./Canadian owned supplier
Non- North American supplier
Size of supplier
Small
Medium
Large
Number of employees
Less than 100
Between 101-500
Between 501-1,500
Between 1,501-2,500
More than 2501

Frequency

Percentage

Mean

S.D.

Min

Max

Mode

99
62
46
24

42.9
26.8
19.2
10.4

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

171
57

75.0
25.0

--

--

--

--

--

70
161

30.3
69.7

--

--

--

--

--

163
32
19

76.2
15.0
8.9

--

--

--

--

--

5.29
12.41
2.87

5.21
8.3
2.36

1
1
0

30
53
15

1
15
1

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

19
25
61
114

8.7
11.4
27.9
52.1

43
51
19
26
35
3
0
0
53

18.7
22.2
8.3
11.3
15.2
1.3
0
0
23.0

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

28
156
41

12.4
69.3
18.2

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

71
63
80

33.2
29.4
37.4

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

19
94
102

8.8
43.7
47.4

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

39
46
44
25
62

18.1
21.3
20.4
11.6
28.7

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

Note: Missing data are not counted in frequency.
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Table C.2 - Descriptive Statistics of Variables

Power Asymmetry
Continuum Index
Cooperation
Competition
Opportunism
Conflict
Trust
CRM
Performance
Valued-Added Distribution

N

Range

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

231
231
231
231
231
231
231
231
231
231

3.00
5.25
6.00
6.00
6.00
5.00
6.00
3.75
5.40
60.0

0
1.75
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
3.25
5.40
0

3.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
6.00
7.00
7.00
6.57
60

1.39
4.28
5.66
3.90
3.26
3.71
4.61
6.01
3.28
7.79
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Std.
Deviation
.577
1.09
1.10
1.22
1.33
1.08
1.13
.743
1.34
8.79

Table C.3 – Marketing Research Design and Participation
Commitment
to Participate

Type of
Commitment

Proposed
Implementation

# of
Purchasing
agent
responses

# of Tier 1
Buyer
Responses

# of Tier 1
Seller
Responses

# of Tier 2
Responses

No

--

--

--

--

--

--

Legal department advised against participation

Yes

Survey

25 buyers X
3 surveys each

40

27

9

5

U.S. Purchasing Director. Good support throughout.

No

--

--

--

--

--

--

No actual manufacturing operations in Mexico

No

--

--

--

--

--

--

Part of other manufacturer. Separate management

5

Yes

Survey

6 buyers X
4 each

3

6

0

0

Mexican Sourcing Director said he had no control over
purchasing agents

6

Yes

Survey

14

6

6

4

7

Yes

Survey

16

2

1

0

8

No

9

Yes

Survey

4 buyers X
4 each

1

0

0

0

10

Yes

Survey

12 buyers x
4-8 each

17

11

0

0

U.S. Purchasing Director enthusiastic about participating.
Purchasing Agents slow to respond, but finally cooperated.

11

Yes

Survey

6 buyers X
2 each

10

8

2

0

Mexican Purchasing Director agreed to participate.
Purchasing agents were slow to participate at first.

12

Yes

Survey

5 buyers X
4 each

4

4

4

1

Mexican Sourcing Coordinator enthusiastic over research
project. Actual participation was low.

2

15

7

Supply Chain
Participant

Comments

Manufacturer

1
2

3
4

Other

11 buyers X
2 each

16 buyers X
2 each

Mexican Government Relations Director first advised
against participation. Purchasing Director (Indian) later
approved
Mexican Purchasing Director had the purchasing agents
answered the preliminary draft of the survey (incomplete).
Only some completed it later.
German Vice-President of Corporate Relations was very
positive about project. Purchasing agents refused to
participate
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After a very positive visit in manufacturing plant, I was
never able to contact the Mexican Purchasing Director
again.

Supply Chain
Participant

Commitment
to Participate

Manufacturer
Association

Yes

Type of
Commitment
Telephone
calls to
manufacturers
Endorsement
Letter, Calls
to Tier 1
Suppliers

Proposed
Implementation

Yes

Tier 1
Association
(Director 2)

Yes

Endorsement
Letter

None

Yes

Endorsement
Letter

None

Yes

Endorsement
Letter to
Chapters

None

Yes

Distribution
of survey to
OEM and
Suppliers in
their
association

None

National
Maquiladora
Association
AMAC
Juarez
Maquiladora
Association

# of Tier 1
Buyer
Responses

# of Tier 1
Seller
Responses

# of Tier 2
Responses

2

3

11

11

Comments

Don’t know

Tier 1
Association
(Director 1)

Secretary
Industry and
Commerce

# of
Purchasing
agent
responses

Yes

Data collection was just getting started.
Cooperation/implementation ended with the change of
Director to the Association.
No follow through on the project by the new Director of
the Association
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